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Health management and information systems (HMIS) provide valuable data for monitoring and 
evaluating health services, identifying unmet needs, establishing local priorities, and measuring the 
performance of health programs. Considerable investments have been made in implementing 
technical approaches to improve HMIS performance, however, growing evidence suggest that 
focusing on these approaches alone is insufficient. 
 
A recent HMIS policy reform in Uttar Pradesh, India, implementing a series of technical approaches 
to improve the quality and use of HMIS data in decision-making, offered a unique opportunity to 
examine how organizational factors, including organizational culture, shape the implementation of 
formal policy guidelines and influence overall HMIS performance. The first paper qualitatively 
examines how organizational factors, for example, hierarchy and distribution of power, influence 
HMIS implementation processes, and in turn performance, from the perspectives of policy 
implementers. The second paper quantitatively examines how data quality varies among HMIS 
indicators that are used in performance metrics (like district rankings), that are associated with 
financial incentives and that are only collected for routine monitoring. The final paper describes the 
types of HMIS data manipulation observed in Uttar Pradesh (UP), and their underlying drivers.  
 
Results demonstrate that issues of weak HMIS implementation are not merely a reflection of 
insufficient resources or lack of technical guidelines. We found challenges associated with working 
within a strict hierarchy. Performance pressures and punitive work culture resulted in weak 
enforcement of data quality mechanisms and created perverse incentives to manipulate district 
ranking indicators to show high achievement of performance metrics. The HMIS data quality 
analysis corroborated these assessments and presented evidence to show the potential overreporting 
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of HMIS indicators that are associated with performance measures like district rankings and financial 
incentives.  
 
Looking ahead, stakeholder engagements would be critical for identifying context-appropriate 
strategies to: (i) align health actors on HMIS goals, so that the goal of high data quality is not at odds 
with the goal of achieving a high district ranking; (ii) strengthen the integrity of data-related 
processes at all levels; and (iii) to implement system-wide policies that make data manipulation an 
anomaly.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to the study 
Health management and information systems (HMIS) in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) 
like India routinely collect data on public health services provided by the government. For example, 
HMIS provide information about the availability of drugs, equipment, and the utilization of health 
services within a geographic area (Boerma, 2013). These data can be valuable for monitoring and 
evaluating health services, identifying unmet needs, and benchmarking the performance of different 
health facilities (World Health Organization, 2009).  
 
The importance of investing in strengthening the performance of HMIS has been codified in the 
World Health Organization’s (WHO) Health Systems Framework, which identifies Health 
Information Systems as one of the six critical building blocks of a health system (World Health 
Organization, 2007). Sustainable Development Goal 17.18 similarly underscores the importance of 
improving “the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, 
age, race, ethnicity….and other characteristics relevant in national contexts” to support decision-
making (United Nations, 2016).  
 
In discussing the importance of strengthening HMIS performance, it is important to acknowledge a 
paradigm shift that has occurred in the last few decades. In the early 1990s, improving the 
performance of HMIS often relied on technical solutions. These approaches focused on ensuring the 
availability of resources and designing and implementing technical rules for HMIS data collection, 
processing, and analysis. The expectation was that if managers had sufficient resources and 
developed appropriates rules and processes, then HMIS data would be used for decision-making 
(Aqil et al., 2009). Aligned with this thinking, global health partners and national governments 
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created technical outputs like the data management standards, training manuals on conducting data 
quality audits, and tools to better analyze and use data for decision-making (Health Metrics Network, 
2008; MEASURE Evaluation, 2019). 
 
Implicit in these technical approaches was the assumption that a well-designed HMIS would deliver 
on its intended HMIS performance goals of producing good quality data that are used in decision-
making. However, growing evidence from evaluations of HMIS in many LMICs show that these 
technical approaches have been simply insufficient in improving HMIS performance; thereby, 
questioning a linear causal relationship between HMIS inputs (e.g., resources), processes (e.g., good 
organizational rules), and outputs (e.g., use of good quality data in decision-making) (Chaulagai et 
al., 2005; Aqil et al., 2009).  
 
Increasingly, practitioners and evaluators of HMIS have underscored the importance of non-technical 
determinants, like organizational factors (e.g., the culture of information use), and behavioral factors 
(e.g., the demand for good quality data) in improving HMIS performance (Aqil et al., 2009), and 
have contributed to a paradigm shift which begs the question: If technical policies and guidelines are 
insufficient for improving HMIS performance, then what else explains HMIS performance, and how 
can HMIS performance be improved in a health system? 
 
The Government of Uttar Pradesh (GOUP) in the state of Uttar Pradesh, India, sees HMIS as an 
important source of information for planning, monitoring and evaluating health programs that are 
implemented across its 28,250 health facilities, which serve roughly 230 million state residents 
(Census Population, 2020). To improve the performance of its HMIS, beginning in 2014, the GOUP 
implemented a series of technical policies driven by the assumption that improvements in data 
quality would promote data use, and this reinforcing positive feedback loop would lead to better 
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HMIS performance. This HMIS policy reform in Uttar Pradesh offered a unique opportunity to look 
beyond the technical determinants and unpack the underlying organizational determinants of HMIS 
performance in Uttar Pradesh, India. 
 
1.2 Study objectives 
This dissertation explores the non-technical determinants of HMIS performance, such as 
organizational factors that are critical for effective HMIS performance, yet often less examined in 
literature. A majority of HMIS performance initiatives continue to rely on technical approaches, 
which predominantly focus on strengthening the formal rules and processes for HMIS, and 
insufficiently examine how contextual, organizational, and behavioral factors influence everyday 
HMIS practices.  
 
Leveraging both qualitative and quantitative methods (explained further in Chapters 2-4), this 
dissertation seeks to identify the barriers to HMIS performance, including the unintended 
consequences that result from a partial implementation of well-intentioned technical policy 
guidelines. Understanding factors that weaken or deter HMIS implementation is critical for 
informing strategies and mechanisms to remove such barriers and for supporting the 
institutionalization of processes that can ultimately lead to a stronger HMIS. This study contributes 
evidence on how non-technical factors, such as hierarchy, distribution of power and authority, 
discretion, and interpersonal power dynamics, influence the implementation of HMIS policies, and 
HMIS performance. In addition, this study examines one aspect of HMIS performance – data quality 
– and analyzes the underlying drivers of poor data quality, including factors that incentivize HMIS 




Each of the three dissertation papers has a distinct aim. The first paper (Chapter 2), a policy 
implementation study, analyzes how organizational factors, including organizational culture shape 
the implementation of new HMIS policies in Uttar Pradesh from the perspectives of policy 
implementers, and further explains the observed gap between well-intentioned HMIS policies and 
their implementation. The second paper (Chapter 3) quantitatively examines how data quality varies 
among HMIS indicators that are used in performance metrics (like district rankings), associated with 
financial incentives or those that are only collected for routine monitoring. Finally, the third paper 
(Chapter 4) describes the types of HMIS data manipulation observed in Uttar Pradesh, with a focus 
on investigating the underlying drivers that create opportunities and the pressures to manipulate data 
and the rationalization of data manipulation by those involved.  
 
1.3 Conceptual framework  
The conceptual frameworks and theoretical perspectives that were used to inform the research 
questions, data collection, analysis, and interpretation of findings, are presented in the chapters 
specific to each of the three aims. However, the overall dissertation and the literature review draws 
on the concepts presented in the Performance of Routine Information Systems (PRISM) framework 
(Aqil et al., 2009), which emphasizes the role of underlying non-technical determinants like 
organizational and behavioral factors in influencing HMIS processes and ultimately, HMIS 
performance.  
 
The PRISM framework promotes an integrated approach to analyzing HMIS performance. As shown 
in Figure 1, the framework recognizes that the collective interactions among technical factors, 
organizational factors, and behavioral factors can shape HMIS data processes, and in turn, influence 
overall HMIS performance (Figure 1). For example, technical factors, like HMIS design and the 
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complexity of data collection forms can influence data processes, like data collection, which in turns 
affects HMIS performance. Similarly, the PRISM framework recognizes the importance of 
organizational factors (e.g., available resources, training and supervision), however among these, it 
does not explicitly recognize less tangible factors, like accountability, enforcement of HMIS rules, 
and work culture that may also influence HMIS data processes in critical ways. The PRISM 
framework below has been adapted to include these factors (reflected in blue). In addition, discretion, 
autonomy and authority have been added to the PRISM framework as both organizational and 
behavioral factors. While organizations may set, for example, the degree of authority one has in the 
workplace, we recognize that individuals also have the capacity to determine how to exercise that 
authority.  
 
Overall, the conceptual framework suggests that technical, organizational and behavioral factors can 
influence the implementation of data processes, which in turn drive HMIS performance, reflected in 
improved HMIS data quality and use of HMIS data in decision-making. Decisions made based on 
good quality data are expected to improve health systems performance and ultimately lead to better 
health status.  
 
An examination of interactions between technical, organizational and behavioral factors presented in 
the PRISM framework, or even a subgroup of them, may help inform the development of different 








Figure 1. Performance of Routine Information Systems framework 
 
*Adaptations; Source (Aqil et al., 2009) 
 
1.4 Overview of health management information systems (HMIS) 
Brief history of HMIS strengthening efforts 
A well-functioning HMIS is a core component of a country’s health system and is designed to 
generate timely, relevant, and accurate information to facilitate decision-making about managing, 
planning, and monitoring health programs. During the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 
escalating demand for data to monitor and track the progress of health programs, build accountability 
and create transparency, drew global attention to the challenges of existing HMIS in many low- and 
middle-income countries (LMICs) (Chan et al., 2010). In addition, as vertical donor-funded data 
collection efforts proliferated, the MDGs highlighted the missed opportunity of making better use of 




To coordinate and align HMIS efforts on a global level and to strengthen the performance of HMIS 
in LMICs, the Health Metrics Network was established in 2005 (Vidaurre-Arenas et al., 2005). The 
Health Metrics Network created universal standards and methodologies for data collection, analysis, 
synthesis and dissemination, and developed a technical framework outlining the components of a 
successful national health information system (Health Metrics Network, 2020). This framework 
highlighted the core technical components (including resources and data management policies) that 
would ultimately lead to good data quality and data use. Around the same time, in 2009, the 
International Health Partnership (IHP+) also organized themselves around a common monitoring and 
evaluation platform. Through a common evaluation framework, IHP+ aimed to align countries and 
partners to develop a national comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan that would generate the 
data required for monitoring progress and performance of health programs without creating undue 
reporting burdens in accordance with the principles of the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness 
(International Health Partnership+, 2009). 
 
Health partners generated and implemented technical tools in LMICs to: (i) inform and assess the 
design of a well-performing HMIS, (ii) identify barriers to data quality and data use; (iii) determine 
appropriate stakeholders for data-related processes; and (iv) develop measures to monitor data 
quality and use. Varying levels of financial and technical investments were made to strengthen 
national-level capacity building efforts, for example, by developing HMIS training curricula and 
implementing trainings, designing HMIS monitoring tools and documenting best practices to support 
continuous HMIS improvement (Health Metrics Network, World Health Organization, 2012; 
MEASURE Evaluation, 2017, 2019).  
 
In parallel to these strengthening efforts at the global and national levels, there was increasing 
evidence on factors affecting HMIS performance in LMICs. While technical guidelines and the 
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implementation of technical processes were expected to improve data management, data quality and 
data use, some researchers acknowledged that they were not an end in themselves for assuring good 
data quality and data use (Garrib et al., 2008; Karuri et al., 2014). In fact, there was growing 
recognition of underlying non-technical determinants that may influence HMIS processes and overall 
performance. The Performance of Routine Information System Management (PRISM) developed by 
Aqil and colleagues (Aqil et al., 2009) encapsulated some of these concerns and identified three 
interrelated determinants - technical, behavioral and organizational factors - that influence HMIS 
processes and performance, which is measured by good data quality and the use of those data in 
decision-making (Aqil et al., 2009). 
 
Factors affecting HMIS performance 
Based on a review of literature, the underlying challenges and opportunities to strengthen HMIS 
performance are presented below according to the three determinants identified in the PRISM 
framework (Aqil et al., 2009).  
 
A. Technical factors 
Technical factors have been defined as the “know how” for designing, implementing, and 
strengthening HMIS processes (Aqil et al., 2009). These include the design of data collection forms, 
the reporting processes that govern data collection, analysis, and review, as well as the complexity of 
information communication and technology (ICT) services that support HMIS data collection and 
management processes. In many countries, technical barriers - reflected in the high burden of data 
collection and data entry, use of complex reporting forms, and lack of universal data reporting 
standards - have adversely affected data quality (Odhiambo-Otieno, 2005; Andargie, 2006; Foreit et 
al., 2006; Aqil et al., 2009; Djibuti et al., 2009; Braa et al., 2012; Boerma, 2013; Teklegiorgis et al., 
2014; Nah and Sæbø, 2017). Relatedly, challenges arise from the complexity and design of the data 
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collection forms, for example, the collection of too much data (Braa et al., 2012) or the absence of 
relevant data (Al Laham et al., 2001).  
 
The implementation of user-friendly computer software, and HMIS data rationalization activities 
have been found to address HMIS-related technical barriers. For example, countries that have 
implemented the District Health Information System (DHIS) platform have reportedly improved the 
timeliness of reporting, and increased the use of data for decision-making at local levels (Boerma, 
2013). The implementation of user-friendly software systems have also been found to facilitate data 
analysis by automating the analytical capacity and thereby supporting data use (Mutale et al., 2013). 
With respect to improving reporting forms and the use of collected data, a study in Zanzibar 
demonstrated how regular review of HMIS data through quarterly workshops contributed to a 
reduction in number of data elements collected, and the integration of many vertical data collection 
forms into a more streamlined HMIS form. In addition to successfully rationalize the HMIS 
indicators, these quarterly data use workshops were also found to strengthen technical capacity such 
as, data analysis and interpretation skills, as well as data presentation skills, which contributed 
towards the timeliness, completeness, and accuracy of HMIS data (Braa et al., 2012).  
 
B. Organizational factors 
Organizational factors refer to the broader organizational context that influences HMIS performance 
through formal and informal rules, organizational values and norms, as well as the availability of 
financial and technical resources, such as the level of training and supervision of those involved in 
HMIS activities (Aqil et al., 2009).  
 
Inadequate availability of human resources both in number and technical skill, as well as, the absence 
of inputs necessary for data collection and analysis efforts, such as data collection forms/registers, 
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pens and papers, and computers for data managers to perform their jobs have been found to impede 
all aspects of HMIS performance, including data collection, data entry, data analysis and review, as 
well as activities, like supportive supervision (Aqil et al., 2009; Ndabarora et al., 2014; Nah and 
Sæbø, 2017). In particular, in clinical settings with persistent health worker shortages, where health 
workers have to decide between attending to their patients’ needs or entering data; the latter has 
consistently been deprioritized (Nah and Sæbø, 2017). Relatedly, in settings where HMIS reporting 
from peripheral health facilities to the district-level is paper-based, delays in transferring data from 
one level to the next have been attributed to transportation challenges; for example, in Cameroon, 
submission of paper-based HMIS reports at district-levels depended on when sub-district supervisors 
traveled to district offices for meetings (Nah and Sæbø, 2017). 
 
Organizational rules, both formal and informal, have also been found to affect data quality and data 
use. Rules refer to the shared understanding among actors about “what actions are required, 
prohibited, or permitted”(Ostrom, 2011). Formal rules expressed in government orders, circulars, 
letters, and other guidelines govern what data are collected, at what frequency, and indicate when and 
how data should be reviewed for accuracy or used in decision-making. Such rules dictate how 
information or data systems are structured, managed, or may be accessed by a decision-maker.  
However, formal rules may also reinforce silos among data collection processes, limiting the ability 
to harmonize and integrate data across different sources, and hindering a more holistic understanding 
of health needs. For example, the centralized data management structure in Mexico was found to 
affect data use by limiting the flow of information to lower, operational levels where those data may 
be most relevant for decision-making (Trostle et al., 1999).  
 
While formal rules reflect the “written policies,” they may not always be practiced as such. In 
practice, “working rules” are what are implemented and adhered to (Ostrom, 2011). Working rules 
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may arise from a lack of clarity or specification in formal documents. However, working rules more 
commonly reflect the shared values among actors within an organization (Ostrom, 2011), which may 
reinforce normative behaviors around HMIS-related processes, and in turn may influence HMIS 
performance. For example, organizational cultures that were unsupportive of ‘data collection’ and 
‘information’ made minimal investments in the development and capacity of their information 
systems (Kamadjeu et al., 2005).  
 
Organizational culture and governance processes were also found to stymie HMIS processes, 
affecting both data quality and data use. For example, in Orissa, despite guidelines for conducting 
supportive supervision visits, presiding norms condoned weak implementation of supervision and 
data quality checks at lower administrative tiers, which contributed to overall low quality of HMIS 
data (Bhojani et al., 2010). A study in Pakistan demonstrated that the weak prioritization of data-
related activities by the leadership resulted in incomplete reporting and exacerbating the data quality 
of the province (Qazi and Ali, 2009). Poor data quality has also been attributed to intentional data 
manipulation, for example, studies in India, and Pakistan found HMIS data were overreported by 
junior staff at the insistence of their superiors, who wanted to secure additional funds for their health 
facilities (Qazi and Ali, 2011; Husain et al., 2012). Similarly, a study in Nigeria showed the 
underreporting of maternal deaths to meet hospital performance targets (Oni-Orisan, 2016).  
 
Overall, these findings suggest that factors related to organizational culture, such as strict adherence 
to hierarchies within a health system, may lead staff to operate in ways that meet favor with their 
supervisors (perhaps through reporting inaccurate data) rather than enhancing data quality.  
Though not explicitly stated in the PRISM framework, the ability to implement HMIS-related 
processes and use data for decision-making is also influenced by the level of power and autonomy 
given to HMIS data staff and data units within the health system (Mutemwa, 2006; Wickremasinghe 
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et al., 2016). For example, the low prioritization of national statistical agencies reflected in their 
small annual financial budgets has limited the functional authority necessary for strengthening HMIS 
performance in many LMICs (Sandefur and Glassman, 2015).  
 
C. Behavioral factors 
The behaviors of both data collectors and users, as well as underlying drivers influencing their work-
related motivation, confidence, and competency may affect the prioritization and implementation of 
HMIS-related processes (Harrison and Nutley, 2010; Moreland et al., 2010; Oliver et al., 2014). For 
example, interpersonal relationships between supervisors and supervisees, and workplace culture, 
may influence the motivation to complete HMIS-related tasks and shape other behaviors that 
influence HMIS processes (Mutemwa, 2006; Aqil et al., 2009; Qazi and Ali, 2009). In Syria, poor 
feedback given to doctors who were expected to report on notifiable diseases contributed to a 
perception that reporting these diseases was not important (Al Laham et al., 2001). Similarly, weak 
implementation of data quality checks also resulted in data clerks developing “the habit for data 
falsification” according to a study conducted in Cameroon (Nah and Sæbø, 2017). The same study 
noted that though monthly reports were an impetus for data review, the actual use of these data to 
improve health program performance was absent. Together, these findings suggest that despite 
having formal organizational processes, existing norms and values shaped individual behaviors that 
in turn affected the effectiveness of HMIS processes (Aqil et al., 2009; Ndabarora et al., 2014). 
 
Specifically with respect to data use, studies have found that multiple factors, including: a decision-
makers’ perceptions about data; their technical ability to understand, analyze and/or use the data, 
their work-related motivation, their personal interests, as well as the vested interests of other actors 
may influence demand and use of HMIS data in decision-making (Harrison and Nutley, 2010; 
Moreland et al., 2010; Oliver et al., 2014). Due to their preconceived notions or perceptions about 
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program operations and performance, decision-makers may have low appreciation for data, 
especially, if data contradict their own perceptions of success (Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1980). 
Relatedly, decision-makers may also discredit data for being of low quality, inaccurate or irrelevant 
to their decision-making needs (Mutemwa, 2006). For example, Aqil and colleagues noted that some 
decision-makers found household- and facility-level surveys more objective than HMIS data, and 
therefore preferred the former in decision-making (Aqil et al., 2009). Such perceptions not only 
affect decisionmakers’ demand for the data, but also influence how inclined they may be to take 
‘ownership’ of the data. Those who are less likely to take ownership of these data, are also found to 
be less likely to invest in improving data quality and thereby reducing the usability of data in 
decision-making (Odhiambo-Otieno, 2005; Harrison and Nutley, 2010).  
 
1.5 Study context and research site 
The data for this study were collected from the district, division and state-levels in Uttar Pradesh, 
India. Data were collected from 16 different districts that span four different administrative divisions. 
At the state-level, data were collected from Directorates of Medical Health and Family Welfare, and 
the National Health Mission, which are in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. 
 
To place the research site into a broader context, Uttar Pradesh is the most populous state in India 
and home to roughly 230 million people (Census Population, 2020). If it were a country, Uttar 
Pradesh would be the sixth most populous country in the world following China, India, United 
States, Indonesia, and Pakistan  (US Census Bureau, 2020). However, when measured based on 
health outcomes, Uttar Pradesh continues to lag behind other Indian states in maternal and child 
health indicators as well as social development indicators, such as poverty and literacy rates (The 
DHS Program, 2016). To address these pressing challenges, the GOUP has prioritized improving the 
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performance of its health system, particularly its HMIS (Government of Uttar Pradesh, 2013, 2015). 
As described in the next section, the GOUP expected that improvement in HMIS data quality would 
better inform health program planning and monitoring, which in turn, would improve service 
delivery and increase the impact of different health interventions and programs (Government of Uttar 
Pradesh, 2013, 2015). 
 
HMIS system overview in Uttar Pradesh 
Many of the challenges affecting HMIS performance (described in Section 1.4) have also been 
observed in Uttar Pradesh. In 2009, consistent with national-level Government of India (GOI) policy 
recommendations, the GOUP implemented the national-level HMIS platform (hereafter, 
HMIS)(Government of India, 2008). In 2014, five years following the implementation of HMIS in 
Uttar Pradesh, an assessment conducted by the GOUP with the support of the Uttar Pradesh 
Technical Support Unit (UP-TSU) revealed several technical and process-related challenges affecting 
HMIS performance. 
 
On a technical level, several issues with the existing HMIS were noted (Meghani et al., 2020). 
Firstly, HMIS data reporting forms were unavailable at different levels of the health system. 
Secondly, duplicative data were being collected between the HMIS reporting forms and vertical 
program specific paper-based reports. Thirdly, there was a mismatch between what data program 
managers at the district- and state- levels found useful (e.g., indicators capturing inputs and 
processes) versus what was actually being collected in the HMIS (e.g., indicators capturing outputs). 
In addition, managers at the block- and district- levels lacked digital access to the facility-level HMIS 
data for analysis. At the state-level, though program managers had access to these data, monthly 
reports from at least 28,000 health facilities had to be individually downloaded in order to conduct 




Weak reporting processes at the block- and district-levels were also found to contribute to untimely 
and incomplete reporting of data to the HMIS. In part, this was attributed to the varied 
implementation of reporting guidelines across the state. Because data were usually aggregated and 
analyzed before the monthly District Health Society meetings held by the District Magistrates, 
reporting periods varied from district to district based on when this meeting was scheduled. This 
resulted in districts forwarding data to the state at different time points resulting in unique monthly 
reporting periods by district (e.g., 16-15th, 26-25th, 1-30th) that diverged from the state’s expected 
HMIS reporting guidelines.  
 
The assessment also revealed that districts had inadequate mechanisms in place to validate HMIS 
data quality before they were entered into the HMIS at the district-level. This challenge was reflected 
in the incompleteness and inaccuracy of several data element reported in HMIS. Relatedly, the 
assessment also found that mechanisms to promote the use of HMIS data for decision-making were 
weak at the district-level. While two monthly district-level meetings chaired by district-level Chief 
Medical Officers and District Magistrates were held, these meetings tended to focus on resolving 
logistical issues rather than strategically reviewing data to inform decision-making about program 
improvement. In part, this was attributed to the lack of understanding about what data sources/portals 
should be reviewed during these meetings, and how those data should be analyzed and interpreted to 
identify performance gaps and inform decision-making.  
 
The development of UP-HMIS and policy guidelines to strengthen its performance 
To address these technical challenges associated with the HMIS, with the support of the UP-TSU, the 
GOUP created its own data platform known as the Uttar Pradesh HMIS (UP-HMIS) in 2015. The 
three primary objectives for developing UP-HMIS were: (1) to capture data elements that were 
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absent in the HMIS but imperative to decision-making at the district- and state-levels; (2) to integrate 
data elements from government data portals and different health program paper-based reports into 
one centralized data source –  the UP-HMIS; and (3) to provide decision-makers at different levels of 
the health system with relevant data to measure holistically the performance of health programs. 
Following the development and implementation of the new UP-HMIS, the GOUP with the support of 
the UP-TSU conducted state-wide trainings for sub-center, block, district, division and state staff on 
the new UP-HMIS data formats and the corresponding web-based UP-HMIS portal in 2017. These 
initial capacity building activities were followed by targeted efforts to strength the processes 
governing HMIS data quality and HMIS data use for decision-making, particularly at the district-
levels. To this end, the GOUP developed and released a series of government orders, circulars, and 
memos. Figure 2 presents a simplified timeline highlighting the major policy decisions that were 
implemented by the GOUP. These policy decisions are discussed further in Chapter 2, which 
examines UP-HMIS policy implementation at the district-level. 
 
Figure 2. Simplified timeline of major GOUP policy decisions with respect to improve HMIS data 







The parent project and my role 
This dissertation was nested in a health system strengthening project led by Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health (JHSPH) in Uttar Pradesh, India under the direction of Dr. David 
Peters, the Principal Investigator from JHSPH. The overall project aimed to provide analytical 
support to the Uttar Pradesh, Technical Support Unit (UP-TSU), a technical unit to the Government 
of Uttar Pradesh (GOUP). One of the key priorities of the UP-TSU has been to improve the 
performance of the state’s Health Management Information Systems (HMIS). In collaboration with 
the GOUP, the UP-TSU has played a critical role in designing and implementing the UP-HMIS 
described above, as well as, designing and scaling up initiatives to improve the quality and use of 
UP-HMIS data in decision-making at the block, district and state-levels.  
 
As a research assistant and doctoral student on this project, I was closely involved with the project’s 
Data Use workstream, which focused on understanding the performance of the UP-HMIS. I played a 
key role in designing, planning and implementing the primary data collection for the Data Use 
workstream; developing the study protocols and managing the submissions of the Institutional 
Review Board approvals; as well as preparing training materials, conducting trainings, pilot-testing 
data collection tools, and analyzing and drafting the results.  
 
To oversee and implement these activities, I was based in Lucknow, the capital city of Uttar Pradesh, 
for roughly one year. This time allowed me to collaborate with our colleagues at the UP-TSU who 
informed the conceptualization and supported the implementation of this dissertation. At the outset of 
my dissertation, I spent several weeks trying to understand the UP-HMIS – for example, what led to 
its development and why; what are the new reporting mechanisms; and what are GOUP’s processes 





At the time, many of my conversations with UP-TSU colleagues focused on understanding how 
broader institutional mechanisms promoted or hindered the use of data for decision-making at the 
district-level, given the important administrative role districts play in the state’s health system. In 
addition, we discussed how district-level decision-makers’ perceptions about their own 
empowerment in the workplace might influence their use of data for decision-making. These 
discussions largely reflected my previous dissertation interests, which focused on understanding the 
relative role of individual- and organizational-factors in shaping the use of data in decision-making.  
 
However, findings from my formative work, consisting of in-depth interviews and a few district-level 
meetings observations, which aimed to understand UP-HMIS policy implementation processes at the 
district-level (first aim), brought a fundamental question to the forefront: are HMIS data of high 
enough quality to be used for decision-making? Challenges associated with data quality dominated 
nearly every interview and for strong technical reasons, I revised my second and third aims to focus 
explicitly on issues affecting HMIS data quality as presented in Section 1.2. 
 
During the revision process and during subsequent stages of data collection, I periodically discussed 
emerging themes and general observations with UP-TSU colleagues and sought their reactions. 
Currently, UP-TSU colleagues are reviewing the three papers presented in this dissertation (Chapters 
2, 3, and 4) and I will be discussing the findings with them by Zoom in August 2020. Their written 
and oral feedback will be incorporated into the final drafts of the manuscripts before publication.  
I would also like to note that this dissertation research is closely linked with other work products 
from the Data Use workstream. The Data Use workstream’s two primary goals are to: (i) describe 
existing processes, including barriers and facilitators, for data quality and use; and (ii) examine and 
strengthen HMIS data quality in Uttar Pradesh, India. Findings from this dissertation will contribute 
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to both the goals by: (i) describing the factors affecting the implementation of data quality and data 
use policies at the district levels and identifying data-related processes and systems that may not be 
functioning as expected (Chapters 2 and 4), and (ii) examining the quality of HMIS data (Chapter 3). 
In addition, findings from this dissertation, which focuses largely on processes at the district-level, 
complements the objectives of a separate data use survey, which examines the capacity to demand 
and use HMIS data by division- and state-level officials. Overall, our hope is that the Data Use 
workstream is able to provide a comprehensive view of how HMIS data is being collected, analyzed, 
monitored and used in Uttar Pradesh, with the aim of helping GOUP build a culture of information 
use – one that aligns incentives and existing accountability mechanisms for data use and data quality 
activities across the state. 
 
Positionality 
It is important to reflect on my positionality as a researcher given my roots and strong family 
connections in Uttar Pradesh. First and foremost, I found being able to speak Hindi with native 
fluency, and using my middle name - formerly my maiden name (a common surname in Uttar 
Pradesh) to introduce myself during interviews - immediately created a sense of familiarity, which 
helped me build a stronger rapport with my respondents. Often, my interviews began and ended with 
questions about myself and my family, including, which part of Uttar Pradesh I belong to and where 
my family lives. I found these conversations created a sense of kinship, which I think was critical for 
rapport building, and helped create a comfortable interview space.  
 
During district-level interviews, and particularly when discussing issues around hierarchy, a punitive 
work culture, and data manipulation, I deemphasized the “foreign” aspects of my identity, like my 
international institutional affiliation, which could be viewed as prestige marker, and could lead 
respondents to perceive me as being more powerful relative to them. In addition, especially for 
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sensitive issues, like data manipulation, I found my myself switching between being informed and 
uninformed, or even at times, being naïve in order to encourage respondents to provide greater 
details, which otherwise they would have been assumed to be commonly understood.  
 
When speaking with a few senior health and administrative officials at the district and state levels, I 
found that drawing on my international institutional affiliation actually made it easier for me to 
schedule interviews with them. Similarly, for some interviews at the division- and state-levels, being 
introduced by UP-TSU colleagues was critical for gaining access to potential respondents. To access 
district-level respondents generally, I found approaching contractual data staff and scheduling 
interviews with them first, enabled subsequent access to the remaining district-level respondents 
during my visit.  
 
Across all the interviews, I found that having a strong foundational understanding of the UP-HMIS 
was critical for gaining access to their more intimate insights and opinions about implementation 
processes and challenges. In two occasions, I found being conversant in the content and details of 
UP-HMIS government orders was imperative for being given time to conduct interviews with two 
district-level health officials.  
 
Nearly all my study respondents at the district-level, and most of my respondents at the division- and 
state-level were men. Often being the only woman or one of the only women was especially obvious 
when I conducted district-level meeting observations. Overall, I did not see being a woman factored 
into the quality of my interviews because I found my strong ties to Uttar Pradesh and being a native 
Hindi speaker was most critical for developing a strong rapport with all of my respondents, and 
gaining access to intimate insights, which I think otherwise would have been quite difficult. In one 
notable occurrence, I did find that my caste played a role. After my interview ended, one district-
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level respondent personally introduced me to a senior district health official because of our common 
caste (which is identifiable based on my maiden name). This was an exception. The issue of caste did 
not emerge during my interview with this district health official, nor did it come up again in the 
interview process. 
 
I think coming to the interview space as an “outsider” also had its advantages. Because I did not have 
any preconceived notions, I was able to open myself up to new perspectives. For example, while the 
problem of data manipulation is well-known among actors within the GOUP health system, I was 
surprised by how frequently respondents spoke about it with a blithe lack of concern. I was also 
equally surprised to see how infrequently data manipulation was explicitly discussed in HMIS 
literature.  
 
In this respect, being able to draw upon attributes of being an “insider” and an “outsider,” provided 
me with a unique advantage that fueled my motivation and interest to study data manipulation in 
greater depth without having to worry about standing out.  
 
1.6 Organization of the dissertation 
The subsequent three chapters – 2, 3, and 4 – pertain to my three aims. Chapter 2, a policy 
implementation analysis, examines how organizational factors, including organizational culture, 
shaped the implementation of new HMIS policies in Uttar Pradesh, India from the perspectives of 
policy implementers. Chapter 3 quantitatively examines how data quality varies among HMIS 
indicators that are used in performance metrics (like district rankings), associated with financial 
incentives or those that are only collected for routine monitoring. Chapter 4 qualitatively explores the 
construct of data manipulation. It first describes the types of data manipulation observed in HMIS, 
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and then explains the driving factors that have allowed data manipulation practices to persist. 
Reflecting on the findings of this dissertation, Chapter 5 offers concluding remarks on strengthening 
HMIS performance, including considerations for addressing the problem of data manipulation and 




Chapter 2. The disconnect between policy intentions and implementation 
practices: How organizational factors influence health management 
information systems in Uttar Pradesh, India 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Timely, accurate and relevant health data are fundamental for the effective implementation, 
monitoring, and management of health programs (Aqil et al., 2009). For example, data gathered in 
health management information systems (HMIS) are critical for informing public health decision-
making (World Health Organization, 2019). Among other data sources, HMIS data routinely provide 
national and local decision-makers with information about the changing disease burden of their 
populations, and the range and number of health services delivered to them. These data further enable 
decision-makers to establish and plan local health priorities, allocate resources, evaluate health 
services, and identify areas of unmet health needs.  
 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) underscored the importance of strengthening data 
systems as a “global public good” (Chan et al., 2010). The increased demands for data, including 
HMIS data, during the MDGs were largely fueled by global donors who used results-based 
mechanisms to track performance, enhance accountability, and evaluate their own investments in 
low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) (Chan et al., 2010). However, these demands for data 
also revealed the weaknesses of HMIS in LMICs (Boerma and Stansfield, 2007) including challenges 
exacerbated by the fragmented disease-specific data collection efforts, and high reporting burdens 
associated with donor-sponsored programs (AbouZahr et al., 2007; Chan et al., 2010). 
 
Over the past 15 years, there has been a renewed focus on strengthening HMIS in LMICs 




Macfarlane et al., 2019). HMIS performance, reflected in the quality and use of HMIS data in 
decision-making, has been influenced by three interrelated determinants: technical, behavioral and 
organizational factors (Aqil et al., 2009). Technical factors, like complex reporting forms and 
insufficient human resources, have been found to weaken HMIS data collection, entry and analyses  
(Andargie, 2006; Foreit et al., 2006; Aqil et al., 2009; Djibuti et al., 2009; Teklegiorgis et al., 2014). 
Relatedly, the behaviors of both data collectors and users, including their levels of work-related 
motivation, confidence, and competency to perform their work, influence the prioritization and 
implementation of HMIS-related processes (Harrison and Nutley, 2010; Moreland et al., 2010; 
Oliver et al., 2014). Organizational factors, such as interpersonal relationships between supervisors 
and supervisees and workplace culture, may also influence the motivation to complete HMIS-related 
tasks (Mutemwa, 2006; Aqil et al., 2009; Qazi and Ali, 2009). Similarly, existing norms and values 
around data use within organizations may directly influence HMIS performance (Aqil et al., 2009; 
Ndabarora et al., 2014). 
 
Evidence suggests that technical tools have only been partially effective in improving HMIS 
performance (Belay et al., 2013; Welay et al., 2017; Wandera et al., 2019). In fact, non-technical 
factors, such as social and political influence in decision-making have been found to contribute to 
low HMIS data use (Wickremasinghe et al., 2016) and poor HMIS data quality (Qazi and Ali, 2011). 
Chauglagai et al. corroborated this point, in their reflection of Malawi’s HMIS implementation, and 
concluded: “no matter how good the design of an information system, it will not be effective unless 
there is internal desire, dedication and commitment of leadership to have an effective and efficient 
health service management system” (Chaulagai et al., 2005). So far, few studies on HMIS have 
moved beyond technical assessments (Mutemwa, 2006; Qazi and Ali, 2009, 2011; Maluka et al., 
2010), and a fundamental question remains unanswered: why have HMIS strengthening objectives 




To address this question, it is critical to understand how the “software” components of HMIS (e.g., 
organizational cultural factors including hierarchy, distribution of power and authority, discretion, 
and interpersonal power dynamics) interact with their “hardware” counterparts (e.g., formal rules and 
processes) (Sheikh et al., 2011). Thus, we analyze how organizational factors, including 
organizational culture, shape the implementation of new HMIS policies in Uttar Pradesh (UP), India 
from the perspectives of policy implementers. In addition, we attempt to explain the observed gap 
between well-intentioned HMIS policy guidelines and their actual implementation, which has 
contributed to the partial achievement of the HMIS policy objectives; and finally, we conclude with 
considerations for strengthening HMIS. 
 
Study context 
This section provides an overview of the new HMIS policies implemented in UP, and summarizes 
the roles of key government workers, who are involved in policy implementation. 
 
A. The design of the Uttar Pradesh - Health Management Information System (UP-HMIS) 
In 2015, the Government of Uttar Pradesh (GOUP) with the support of the Uttar Pradesh, Technical 
Support Unit (UP-TSU), an entity established in partnership between the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation and the GOUP, implemented new policy guidelines (hereafter referred to as policies) to 
strengthen the state’s HMIS performance. These policies aimed to address existing barriers with 
HMIS performance, for example, the complexity and duplication of reporting formats, and weak 
processes resulting in the lack of timeliness and completeness of reporting across block- and district-





First, the GOUP designed and implemented its own data platform, the Uttar Pradesh HMIS (UP-
HMIS), to include data elements that state program managers felt were absent in the national HMIS 
but relevant for decision-making. Second, the GOUP developed policies to improve the UP-HMIS 
data quality and use. Table 1 presents these policy details and their current implementation status.  
 
1. Data quality policies  
To improve data quality, the GOUP targeted two points in the UP-HMIS data flow (Appendix 1): (i) 
the block-level, where data from public and private health facilities are collated before being 
forwarded to districts; and (ii) the district-level, where data from blocks and additional private health 
facilities are collated before being forwarded to the state-level.  
 
Data quality policies targeted strengthening UP-HMIS reporting and monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) processes. First, all paper-based health facility reports which were collated at the block-level 
were directly entered into web-based portals, thereby discontinuing paper-based reporting from 
block- to the district- and state- levels. Second, blocks and districts were required to establish data 
validation committees to ensure UP-HMIS data quality were vetted before being forwarded to 
subsequent administrative levels (from block to district, and district to state) (Appendix 2). To 
complement these initiatives, a state-level data validation committee and data quality audit teams 




Table 1. Overview of key Government of Uttar Pradesh (GOUP) policy guidelines to improve data quality and use 
 Policy topic (description) 
 
District policy 
status 4  






















Timeliness and periodicity of reporting 
by blocks 
 
(Paper-based health facility reports1 are 
entered into digital portals at the block-





Overburdened data entry operators are 
unable to enter data from health 
facilities during the allocated time  
 
 
(1) Data on digital portals are 
incomplete, missing or inaccurate, 
especially those data elements that are 
not used to calculate district rankings; 
(2) Due to incomplete data some 
district and state officials rely on paper-
based or other forms of reporting 










Reporting from private health facilities 
and medical colleges in Uttar Pradesh to 
the UP-HMIS digital portal 
 
(Private sector services are captured on 
paper-based forms and entered to digital 




Private facilities rely on paper-based 
reporting; reporting has been 
infrequent despite the state- and 
district-level directives urging 
compliance 
(1) Limited data on utilization of 









Discontinuation of paper-based 
reporting1 in favor of reporting via 
digital portal 
 
(Only digital reports are to be used at all 
levels of the GOUP health system so that 






Paper-based reports are being used to 
cross-check the data reported in the 
UP-HMIS digital portal at the district-
level 
(1) Validation of data quality between 
paper-based reports and digital portal 
data has replaced recommended data 
quality checks like supportive 
supervision visits; (2) When 
discrepancies exist, paper-based reports 
are viewed as the “gold standard” 
























Data quality supportive supervision 
visits by block officials 
 
(Block officials are expected to check 
data accuracy by comparing digital data 
with source data reported in health 






Irregularly implemented based on 
assessment of district program and 
data staff 
 
Block staff are viewed as lacking the 
technical know-how to conduct data 
quality checks 
(1) Frequent detection of data quality 
errors at the district-level, particularly 





















Establishment of block and district level 
data validation committees 
 
(Data validation committee meetings are 
expected to review the accuracy of 
digital portal data before they are 









Meetings held irregularly held at the 
block-level 
 
Meetings held regularly at the district-
level 
(1) Frequent detection of data quality 
errors at the district-level, particularly 






























Guidelines outline: (1) the review of UP- 
Health Dashboard, specifically the 
district rankings, to inform decision-
making during monthly district-level 
meetings; (2) the analyses that should be 
conducted to identify gaps in health 
services based on district ranking 
indicators; and (3) the development of 





District rankings are reviewed, 
however the preparation and review of 
action plan during meetings is variable 
across districts.  
 
Meetings focus on addressing 
logistical issues rather than using data 









(1) Focus on district ranking indicators 
reduces focus on other program 
indicators that are excluded from the 
monthly district ranking; (2) Greater 
emphasis is on using district ranking 
data to manage performance rather than 
giving equal consideration issues of 
data quality; (3) Limited focus on 
developing action plans to improve 




















 Use of rankings & UP Health Dashboard 
during monthly Executive 
Committee/program review meetings3 
 
Promote the review of key indicators in 
the district rankings, available on the 
UP-Health Dashboard to ensure progress 




District rankings and the indicators 
used to achieve those rankings are 
regularly reviewed during executive 
committee meetings, in addition to the 
district health society meeting chaired 
by the District Magistrate 






















Training on UP-HMIS 
 
Orders released to ensure full 
participation of in health trainings at the 
primary health center, block, district, 
division and state levels and the 





Results suggest 88% of targeted actors 
participated in the UP-HMIS trainings 
across all levels of the health system,6 
however the quality of trainings is 
unclear 
(1) Limited technical knowledge and 
understanding of issues of data quality, 
particularly, at the block level (from the 
perspective of district-level 
staff/officials); (2) High demand for 
refresher UP-HMIS trainings for field 









Release of annual funds to support the 
printing of UP-HMIS formats and 
financial support to hire data entry 
operators at the block level 
Unable to assess  Unable to assess (1) Indication that block data entry 
operators are insufficient; (2) Unclear 
whether larger budgets for hiring are 
required or existing budgets are not 
being allocated for the intended 
purpose 
1Blocks are the first administrative level where paper-based reports are digitized by being entered into the UP-HMIS web-based portal; 2A separate government 
order in September 2015 required the inclusion of members from district hospitals in the district data validation committees; 3Executive committee meetings are 
also referred to as program review meetings or monthly medical-officer-in-charge (MOIC) meetings; 4This analysis is based on our in-depth interviews from a 
purposive selection of high, middle and low performing districts across Uttar Pradesh; 5To support policy implementation, these guidelines are released every 





2. Data use policies  
To promote UP-HMIS data use at the district-level, the GOUP implemented two policies. The first, 
focused on improving the periodicity and quality of monthly district-level Executive Committee 
meetings, which convene all block and district health staff, and are chaired by the district’s chief 
medical officer. The second, required the review of the UP-Health Dashboard during Executive 
Committee meetings, and the high-level Governing Body meetings of the District Health Society 
(hereafter, District Health Society), chaired by the District Magistrate and attended by block and 
district health staff and health partners (Appendix 2). The UP-Health Dashboard (Figure 3) was 
viewed as an important data use tool for these meetings because it presents the monthly ranking of 
each district (relative to the other 74 districts in the state) using a set of UP-HMIS indicators. Based 
on the monthly performance in the district rankings, districts are expected to prepare an action plan 
for improving poorly performing health indicators and facilities. 
 
Figure 3. District-level performance data available on the Uttar Pradesh Health Dashboard  
  






3. The role of key staff/officials in UP-HMIS implementation 
Five main types of government workers involved in UP-HMIS policy implementation are: 
(i) Permanent employees of the Directorate of Medical Health and Family Welfare 
(DOMHFW), who receive full benefits and paid time off;  
(ii) Contractual employees of the Uttar Pradesh National Health Mission (NHM), who receive 
fewer benefits than permanent employees and have less job security;  
(iii) Temporary contractual staff, who are hired by external agencies, like data entry operators;  
(iv) M&E specialists, contractual data staff of the UP-TSU, who are posted in 25 high priority 
districts out of the 75 districts in UP; and 
(v) District administrative officials (e.g. district magistrates), who are members of the prestigious 
Indian Administrative Services, govern the district and play a peripheral role in UP-HMIS 
policy implementation.  
 
With respect to data quality policies, permanent data staff in blocks and districts lead data quality 
processes, including data validation committee meetings, with the support of contractual data staff at 
each level.  
 
With respect to data use policies at the district-level, contractual data staff are responsible for 
analyzing the district performance data and presenting those data (including district rankings) during 
the two district-level data use meetings. They are also expected to conduct gap analyses and develop 
action plans with support of district program staff, who are permanent employees and manage health 
programs in the district. Appendix 3 provides additional details about the roles and responsibilities 







We investigated policy implementation from the lens of district-level respondents, the primary 
implementers of the UP-HMIS data policies. To understand their experiences, we drew from 
Lipsky’s street level bureaucracy theory (Lipsky, 2010), which challenges the key assumption that if 
policy objectives are neatly laid out, then implementation will follow suit. Instead, the theory focuses 
“on what organizations actually did [do] in the name of policy” by examining the perspectives of the 
policy implementers on the frontlines - the street level bureaucrats (SLBs) - and understanding how 
their realities shape policy implementation (Brodkin, 2012). Often, it is their interpretation of 
policies, based on their worldviews, which creates a gap between “policies as written” versus 
“policies as practiced” (Brodkin, 2012).  
 
SLBs exercise varying levels of discretion and autonomy that shape how, when and where policies 
are implemented. SLBs often face high performance pressures and are expected to deliver on them 
despite limited time and resources. Under these circumstances, SLBs develop “coping mechanisms.” 
Some SLBs use their discretion to comply with policy directives, while others bend policies to meet 
broader organizational objectives. Therefore, the discretion exercised by SLBs reflects the powers 
they have negotiated within their organizational and work environment, which Lipsky argues 
influences SLB practices. In line with street-level bureaucracy theory, we investigated how the 
discretion, autonomy, and authority of district officials/staff in Uttar Pradesh influenced UP-HMIS 
policy implementation. We examined how their behaviors and implementation practices were shaped 
by organizational factors, like performance pressures.  
 
We also drew on organizational culture literature to study how the behaviors of the SLBs were 
influenced by their broader environment. We understand organizational culture as “the beliefs, 




work is approached and conducted” (Shortell et al., 2000). Within organizational culture, we 
examined two specific dimensions given their importance in the UP bureaucracy and how SLBs 
operate namely: (i) organizational hierarchy, focusing on reporting relationships among actors, 
formal rules, processes and regulations; and (ii) performance management culture, including 




Our study draws on a pragmatist epistemology (Strübing, 2007) and follows an emergent research 
design (Creswell, 2013). For this research inquiry, we drew from three primary data sources: (i) 
document review; (ii) in-depth interviews; and (iii) meeting observations. The document review was 




A. Document Review 
We conducted a document review to describe the new UP-HMIS policies on data quality and use; 
examine their implementation status; and inform the development of a semi-structured in-depth 
interview guide. Review of GOUP government orders, circulars and memos helped: (i) define the 
new data collection, data quality and use processes at the district-level; (ii) describe proposed 
meeting platforms for data quality and data review/use; and (iii) distinguish the roles and 





The UP-TSU and district level participants shared documents, such as, the agendas, presentations, 
and meeting minutes for data quality and data review meetings, and examples of reports from 
supervision visits, which enabled us to ascertain policy implementation status. 
 
We analyzed 49 Hindi and English documents according to steps outlined by O’Leary (O’Leary, 
2004), focusing on who produced the document, when, and for what purpose. Results were 
summarized in English in an Excel sheet. 
 
B. In-depth interviews 
The district-level in-depth interview guide consisted of questions on the: (i) actual roles and 
responsibilities of district-level staff/officials in UP-HMIS policy implementation; (ii) status of data 
quality/use policy implementation in the district; (iii) barriers and facilitators influencing 
implementation; (iv) district-level interactions with block and state officials/staff relating to data 
quality and use; and (v) general perspectives on how to strengthen policy implementation. The 
division and state-level interview guide focused on understanding current practices for data use in 
decision-making, and potential challenges and opportunities to improve data use in UP. 
 
We conducted 87 in-depth interviews with district-, division- and state-level staff/officials, who were 
involved in compiling, analyzing, or reviewing routinely collected GOUP health data, like the UP-
HMIS, or were knowledgeable about UP-HMIS policies (Table 2). Interviews were conducted by 
AM primarily in Hindi, the official language of GOUP, in three rounds: (i) December 2018; (ii) 
February-March 2019; and (iii) August-October 2019. Except for 12 phone interviews, in-person 






Table 2. Number of respondents interviewed by administrative level and employment type 
Level Staff type Number of 
interviews 
State Program managers 26 
Data managers 5 
Division Data staff 7 
District District administrative & health 
officials 
3 
Permanent - Program staff  10 
Permanent - Data staff 10 
Contractual - Data staff 26 
 Total 87 
 
 
Seeking maximum variation, district selection was based on two factors: (i) the district’s 
performance based on its ranking in the UP-Health Dashboard during the interview month; and (ii) 
the district’s designation as a high priority or non-high priority district. We found these two factors 
important given their potential to influence the level of UP-HMIS policy implementation at the 
district-level. First, this approach enabled us to examine whether high ranking districts had better 
implementation of UP-HMIS policies compared to lower ranking districts. Second, we were able to 
examine the potential influence of UP-TSU’s contractual data staff in high priority districts on UP-
HMIS policy implementation.  
 
In sum, we conducted interviews in 5 top ranked districts (ranked 1-25), 6 middle-ranked districts 




districts. In each district, we aimed to interview four respondent-types: (i) contractual data staff (e.g., 
district program managers or district data managers); (ii) permanent data staff (e.g., assistant research 
officers); (iii) permanent program staff (e.g., assistant chief medical officers); and (iv) district health 
officials (e.g., chief medical officers) or district administrative officials (e.g., district magistrates). 
We selected these groups to understand the relative roles of both permanent and contractual data and 
program staff in UP-HMIS policy implementation. 
 
We interviewed M&E officers at the division-level, who are responsible for monitoring district-level 
data quality processes through supportive supervision and data audits. State-level respondents 
included program managers from the NHM, and directors or joint directors from the DOMHFW. To 
capture the diversity of experiences at the state-level, we purposively interviewed state-level 
respondents responsible for national health programs, state health programs, and involved in data-
related activities. 
 
We sought written informed consent before each interview. If permission was granted, interviews 
were audio-recorded; otherwise, hand-written notes were taken. Interviews ranged from 25 to 90 
minutes. A qualified transcription service translated audio-recorded interviews to English; transcripts 
were reviewed for quality by AM.  
 
Following interviews, AM wrote memos to record emerging themes/sub-themes, detail existing 
themes/sub-themes or identify areas of further inquiry for upcoming interviews. Constant comparison 
of emerging findings (Boeije, 2002) between interview rounds through memo writing, and 
discussions among team members informed the revision of the interview guide, and triangulation of 
findings by respondent-type. This iterative approach to data collection and analysis facilitated the 




C. Meeting observations 
We observed 15 district and state level meetings, and notes were taken on the adherence to new UP-
HMIS policy implementation guidelines, the nature of interactions among district officials/staff 
(SLBs), and between SLBs and their superiors, as well as the tone and the level of participation of 
meeting participants (Table 3). The observations helped contextualize and triangulate findings from 
the document review and in-depth interviews.  
 
Table 3. Meetings observations conducted in Uttar Pradesh 
Level Number of observations 
District1 
Data validation committee meetings 6 
Executive Committee 5 
District Health Society  3 
State 
Data validation committee meeting 1 
Total 15 
1Meetings were observed in 8 districts, where interviews were also conducted.  
 
Data analysis 
The framework method was used to thematically analyze the in-depth interviews (Gale et al., 2013). 
First, AM read through all the interviews, and performed line-by-line inductive coding on the first 20 
transcripts. Following open coding and iterative discussions with study team members, an analytical 
framework was developed based on the identified inductive codes and the conceptual theories 
described above. The analytical framework identified five major categories: (i) policy environments 
at the national and state levels; (ii) UP-HMIS policy implementation observed in practice; (iii) 




and (v) perceptions about barriers and opportunities to strengthen policy implementation. Each 
category was further divided into codes and sub-codes described in Appendix 4.  
 
This analytical framework was applied to all the interview data and meeting observation notes, and 
relevant data were extracted into an excel sheet. For each category, memos were written to capture 
the following: definition of each category; codes and sub-codes within the category; summary of 
findings; deviant cases; and points for further consideration when comparing and contrasting findings 
across respondent type. The documentation summary excel sheet was also reviewed and relevant 
information was incorporated into the memos written for each category. After the analysis, a meeting 
was conducted with a couple of respondents as a way of member checking. 
 
Authors’ positionality  
We are a team of researchers and public health practitioners, who combine perspectives of insiders 
and outsiders. Our research team includes UP-TSU members who were deeply involved with the 
design of UP-HMIS and initial implementation efforts, and JHU members, who were not associated 
with UP-HMIS policy reforms. Two authors (AM, SB) conceptualized and designed this study with 
input from other co-authors. UP-TSU colleagues additionally imparted important contextual 
understanding to inform this study.  
 
2.3 Ethical Considerations 
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health deemed this research as IRB exempt (00009106). 
The study was approved for ethical research by the Institutional Review Board of SIGMA Research 






Overall, we found no meaningful differences in implementation experiences across high, middle, and 
low ranked districts. As district rankings fluctuate for many districts in UP, including those where we 
conducted interviews, this may not be a meaningful categorization reflecting larger underlying 
issues. Therefore, we do not present our results by these stratifications. 
 
With respect to policy implementation, we found annual budgetary policies for printing UP-HMIS 
forms and hiring data entry operators were fully implemented. In contrast, process-oriented policies – 
which formed the crux of the GOUP data quality and data use policies – were partially implemented 
(Table 1). District-level staff/officials (SLBs) identified: (1) inadequate organizational inputs for 
policy implementation, such as, inadequate human resource capacity and technical skill; but also (2) 
deeply embedded organizational cultural issues, like seniority and hierarchy, which significantly 
influenced how staff/officials implemented UP-HMIS policies.  
 
The first part of the results describes the role of organizational factors on UP-HMIS implementation 
practices, followed by a deeper investigation of the influence of organizational cultural factors in the 
subsequent section.  
 
Organizational factors influencing policy implementation 
A. Human resource capacity 
Inadequacies in human resource capacity – both in number and skill – were universally 
acknowledged by respondents at all levels; as one succinctly stated, “Where there is more 
manpower, there is better data” (I-78, state-level respondent). District-, division- and state-level 




challenge facing UP-HMIS implementation. On average, each block data entry operator played a 
critical role of entering paper-based reports from each of its 26 to 31 health facilities (depending on 
block size) to up to 16 digital health portals every month.  
 
District-level respondents acknowledged that the high data entry workload contributed to incomplete 
and inaccurate data, limiting their use at the state-level due to empty data fields and mistrust in some 
of the reported data. As a result, many state respondents described making separate data requests 
from districts, and at times, reverting to paper-based reports, despite the new policies discouraging 
their use.  
 
Human resource constraints were also observed at the district-level. Such constraints arose from 
delays in recruitment or having disproportionately higher “less active” or low-performing district 
staff. To cope with these challenges, district health officials (namely, chief medical officers) were 
found to assign or transfer program responsibilities to “more active” health staff, who they perceived 
could “get the job done” (I-35, contractual data staff, district-level).  
 
While this informal reallocation of responsibilities across existing staff allowed district health 
officials to manage work expectations by ensuring “no posts are [were] vacant because someone is 
[was] made-in-charge” (I-1, contractual data staff, district-level), many district staff felt the 
additional workload distracted them from performing their data-related responsibilities. 
Overburdened with program responsibilities, district-level program staff were unable to fulfill their 
data-related responsibilities, such as conducting supportive supervision visits at the block-levels or 





Many district staff also acknowledged that the reallocation of responsibilities resulted in performing 
duties that went beyond their terms of reference and training. While some reconciled this strategy as 
a form of coping with human resource constraints, others found the divergence between actual and 
assigned responsibilities demotivating: 
"People see the difference between their TOR [Terms of Reference] of when they joined and 
what it is presently. They begin thinking ‘what was the purpose of joining here when this is 
now the work that we are doing’" (I-5, contractual data staff, district-level). 
 
B. Technical skills & trainings 
Though trainings on new UP-HMIS policies were conducted at all levels as a part of the initial policy 
implementation processes, district-level staff felt the lack of technical knowledge about UP-HMIS 
data elements among field and block staff was the root cause of poor data quality. Often limited 
knowledge about UP-HMIS data resulted in basic data entry errors, like the reporting of institutional 
deliveries in male hospitals. District respondents further explained that data entry problems increased 
when: (i) Hindi-literate field staff were expected to populate English-based data collection forms; and 
(ii) data collection forms were frequently revised or new ones were introduced. Reflecting on these 
technical barriers, one state respondent recommended:   
“If any new indicator is getting included, permission should be taken from everyone… 
Recommendations like ‘At least for six months, none of the indicators should be included or 
deleted from portal’ should be suggested. Guidelines should also not change often.” (I-85, 
State-level respondent) 
 
According to some district staff, poor data quality was expected given the high workload of data 




entry operators made low salaries of 5000-7000 rupees (US$66-93) per month; many worked second 
jobs for additional income.  
 
District respondents observed that a second technical barrier among block staff/officials was their 
inadequate knowledge about the latest health program guidelines. District staff felt this knowledge-
gap resulted in data discrepancies between financial and service data reported in UP-HMIS, and data 
validation errors between indicators one would expect to correlate. These barriers were also evident 
in district-level meeting observations.  
 
District respondents felt these technical weaknesses would be mitigated at the block-level if existing 
permanent block-level data staff, who were more experienced than their contractual counterparts, 
took ownership of UP-HMIS data quality processes, like data validation committee meetings, and if 
vacant data-related posts were filled. The lack of technical ownership to review data quality at the 
block-level was found to increase dependency on districts: 
“MOICs [Medical Officers-in-charge; block health officials] do not have requisite 
knowledge and skills to use data. BPMs [block program managers] are also not that skilled 
to analyze and use data. Hence, they are dependent on the district. Whatever we brief them at 
the district, they blindly follow and implement the same but next time they again depend on 
us" (I-1, contractual data staff, district-level). 
 
In contrast, we observed higher levels of technical skills among district data staff (both permanent 
and contractual) based on district-level respondents’ own assessments, as well as our meeting 
observations. During meetings, district data staff were critical in identifying data discrepancies in 





Technical skills observed among district data staff, however, did not equate to computer literacy. 
Though commonly viewed as the data expert at the district-level, some permanent data staff, who had 
less experience using computers, were found to rely on others to access, download, or view the UP-
HMIS data, limiting them from carrying out data-related activities independently:  
"Most of them [permanent data staff] don’t know how to use a computer. So, they won’t be 
able to download the data. They feel comfortable in manual [paper-based] reports 
verification and if there are any errors then sit with the operator and get them rectified” (I-
49, contractual data staff, district-level). 
Our state respondents, who had formerly held district-level data positions, corroborated this 
assessment, and described working in dyads for data entry. 
 
Organizational cultural factors influencing policy implementation 
A. Organizational hierarchy 
Observance of strict hierarchical rules resulted in a significant power imbalance at the district-level. 
We observed that an individual’s status within the health system hierarchy was usually determined 
by: (i) their formal position (e.g., decision-making authority); and (ii) their employment status 
(permanent or contractual staff), with permanent staff being more highly regarded. These factors 
influenced who had discretion, authority, and power, which at times, shaped how UP-HMIS policies 
























1Chief medical officers, assistant chief medical officers (program staff); 2Block level medical officers in charge 
 
B. Seniority-oriented organizational culture  
District data staff explained that the disadvantages of a hierarchical organizational culture was felt 
most by field staff, who sat at the base of the organizational pyramid. Their perceived lack of 
authority contributed to the incomplete reporting as many private health facilities sent field staff 
away or directed them “to come another day” when they went to gather UP-HMIS reports (I-15, 
district-level permanent data staff).  
 
The consolidation of power and authority among senior health officials, the medical officers-in-
charges in blocks and chief medical officers (CMOs) in districts, resulted in an abuse of power. 
District-level staff/officials shared several examples of block-level health officials redirecting data 
entry operators to prioritize their personal errands over formal data entry duties:  
“"Whatever work, like if the MOIC [medical officer-in-charge] needs a train reservation, he 
asks the MCTS [data entry] operator. The other work like typing up a letter is also assigned 
to him. So, there is problem in his priority. " (I-11, contractual data staff, district-level). 
1. District Magistrate 
2. Permanent officers1 – District 
3. Permanent (data) staff - District 
4. Permanent officers2 – Block 
5. Permanent (data) staff - Block 
6. Contractual data staff – District 
7. Contractual data staff – Block 








This reallocation of priorities of data entry operators at the behest of block health officials 
exacerbated the extant problems of incomplete and inaccurate data, which were also attributed to the 
severe shortage of data entry operators. Despite the release of a state-level GOUP memo, 
reprimanding block health officials for this practice, district staff reported that little had changed.  
 
District data staff also found themselves overburdened. Attending to the immediate priorities of their 
district-level superiors or managing urgent ad-hoc data requests from the state-level, left district data 
staff with little time for their own work. District data staff found state-level requests particularly 
distracting because state officials/staff had access to the same web-based data portals as they did: 
 "It [Ad-hoc requests] spoils our personal planning. Like 10 General Managers sit there [at 
the state level] and if they have called and asked for the report then they all want their report 
first. So, we cannot fix our priorities as we are bounded by them. If 9 get the report out of 10 
then that one person will be upset" (I-5, contractual data staff, district-level).  
 
State respondents explained that data requests arose when data were missing, incomplete, appeared 
inaccurate or when additional data, not routinely collected, were needed for high-level meetings. 
However, state respondents also acknowledged increasing the frequency of data requests during 
national health campaigns or priority programs because they wanted data in real-time, whereas the 
portals only provided them access to monthly data.  
 
To cope with these requests, district data staff often prioritized the reporting of closely monitored 
data, which they explained contributed to incomplete reporting of other data elements reported in 
UP-HMIS. Furthermore, district data staff felt the steep power differential precluded them from 




levels. Relatedly, they also acknowledged that their lack of power and authority at the district- and 
block-levels often resulted in escalation of data-related issues:  
“Basically, in Data Cell, we do not have administrative powers, we cannot punish anyone, 
we can only request our boss and say this is the situation we are facing… I will give this 
letter to our senior, CMO [Chief Medical Officer] Sir, and he is the authority to take further 
action" (I-18, permanent data staff, district-level). 
 
As a result, minor issues were tabled to the monthly data use meetings chaired by district health and 
administrative officials, who helped to bring greater accountability to data-related processes at the 
block and district-levels:  
"DM or the CDO [district magistrate and chief development officers; district administrative 
officials] ask questions directly to the MOICs [medical officers-in-charge; block health 
officials] about their performance. If the DPM [contractual data staff] asks it doesn’t make 
much of a difference, even with the CMO [chief medical officers; district health official] you 
may not get the effects you’d see with the DM or CDO. There is a distance maintained so 
they take the feedback of these IAS [Indian Administrative Services; cadre of district 
administrative officials] more carefully" (I-5, contractual data staff, district-level). 
 
Escalation, however, came at a high cost. Only occasionally did the monthly data use meetings 
achieve their intended policy objectives of making strategic decisions (e.g., identifying drivers of 
poor performance) based on UP-HMIS district ranking indicators. Meetings we observed 
predominantly focused on coordinating logistics across teams, reflecting deep working silos among 






Unequal distribution of power and authority between permanent and contractual staff 
District contractual data staff universally noted one major exception to the strict observance of 
seniority in organizational culture: the distinction between permanent and contractual staff, with the 
former benefitting from power and authority not available to contractual staff. 
 
Some district contractual data staff reported an inability to directly question or provide feedback to 
block-level permanent data staff or senior block health officials about data quality issues they were 
identifying. All feedback about data quality errors had to be directed to block-level contractual data 
staff. District-level contractual data staff recognized that the power gradient was steeper for block-
level contractual staff who were incapable of mandating the implementation of data quality 
validation committees or data quality supportive supervision visits without support from their block-
level permanent health officials.  
 
In districts where paper-based reports were still used, district-level data staff (both contractual and 
permanent) noted how the distinction between permanent versus contractual staff influenced how 
block-level data were regarded at the district-level. If differences in data were observed between 
paper-based reports and those entered in UP-HMIS, preference was given to paper-based reports 
because they were signed off by permanent staff. In comparison, the UP-HMIS portal data was given 
less priority because it was managed by contractual data staff. Even in instances when district data or 
program staff questioned the integrity of these paper-based reports, the presiding norms around 








A. Punitive performance management  
1. Overemphasis on performance data 
Within the context of UP-HMIS implementation, district data staff noted a dichotomy: district 
rankings ended up generating accountability for performance data, but not for data quality.  
Particularly district-level data staff felt that GOUP’s primary policy intention of using district 
rankings to actively encourage UP-HMIS data use to guide program improvement was overlooked by 
the district health (i.e., CMOs) and administrative officials (e.g., district magistrates).  
 
Many district staff felt their district health and administrative officials were fixated with becoming 
the top-ranking district in their administrative division, if not across the state, as they saw the 
rankings as a reflection of their own performance. While some of this pressure was associated with 
improving actual performance on health indicators, many district staff felt the pressure of achieving 
high district rankings “at all cost” was passed on to them and block-level staff. If the district’s 
monthly ranking was low, district staff described being verbally reprimanded during monthly district-
level meetings or receiving warning letters from district officials demanding a justification for their 
low performance. One permanent program staff equated working in the GOUP health system to 
“being in a pressure cooker, with the pressure coming in from all levels of the health system” (I-42, 
permanent program staff, district-level).  
 
Many district data staff acknowledged that rankings were misleading district officials. Because 
districts were ranked relative to others in the state, they were not absolute measures of performance:  
“Competition should not be there in terms of ranking; it should be in terms of data entry 
improvement and improvements of indicators. We should focus on the percentage of 




improvement, and then we need to work on them. We should change our thinking...” (I-33, 
Contractual data staff, district-level). 
 
However, when some district data staff aimed to redirect attention to absolute achievement of targets 
as opposed to rankings, many felt unsupported by their senior district health officials because of their 
need to be a top ranked district, as one district data staff recounted:  
" The CMO [district health official] said, “Bring me everything on one page. Tell me which 
block is poor. The rest I will take care of.” If I start telling the CMO which block are poor, 
letters will be sent against them. Then the blocks will send back letters with reasons 
achievement did not happen. Letters will keep getting exchanged from here [district] to there 
[block]...the meetings will get diluted" (I-61, Contractual data staff, district-level). 
 
2. Differential approaches to enforcing individual vs team-based accountability  
Though district rankings measured the overall district performance on priority health programs, the 
prevailing norms around accountability targeted individuals rather than teams. District staff often felt 
district health and administrative officials targeted and blamed staff for wrongdoing, rather than 
suggesting corrective action. While district health officials and permanent district staff felt the 
burden of poor performance, contractual data staff felt they unfairly faced the greatest repercussions 
of poor performance: termination of their contractual status or warning letters by district 
administrative officials holding them accountable for the district’s poor ranking. In comparison, 
transferring or even firing permanent employees, which involves complex government processes 
(Legal Service India, 2018) was not pursued and reserved for high-profile misdemeanors (e.g., 





Contractual data staff felt this differential approach to accountability was evident in a new 
accountability mechanism introduced specifically for contractual data staff that ranks district 
program managers on health and process indicators (UP NHM, 2019). While these indicators 
measured district-wide performance (e.g., percent of women accepting a birth-spacing method), a 
single individual was being held accountable in the ranking.   
 
Examples of strengthening implementation of UP-HMIS policies 
Leadership that valued good quality data for decision-making was critical in promoting adherence to 
UP-HMIS policies. This was evident during meeting observations, where we observed district health 
and administrative officials reiterating the importance of “real data,” “not hiding neonatal deaths,” 
and encouraging district staff to communicate the significance of data accuracy with their field staff. 
In another meeting, we also observed a district administrative official motivating district health 
officials to use data to uncover the root causes of low performing programs by commissioning them 
to complete analyses and present findings during the next monthly meeting. According to district 
staff, review of supportive supervision reports and surprise visits by district health and administrative 
officials created stronger accountability for data quality measures, which were otherwise ignored.  
In high priority districts, the presence of UP-TSU M&E contractual data staff helped ensure the 
regularity of district-level data validation committee meetings, and the implementation of UP-HMIS 
supportive supervision visits. However, the enforcement of accountability for data quality by district 
leadership was still viewed as a critical factor in institutionalizing the new UP-HMIS policies.   
To close the technical gaps in UP-HMIS data comprehension at field- and block levels, data staff in 
one district described implementing quarterly trainings. A majority of the data-related staff we 
interviewed across high priority and non-high priority districts also described using existing district-




also observed in practice during our district- and state- data validation committee meetings 
observations. 
 
On a broader scale, many respondents acknowledged that widespread corruption affected the 
implementation of UP-HMIS processes, such as, the quality of supportive supervision visits, and UP-
HMIS data quality. However, corrupt practices did not go unnoticed by district administrators. Some 
district administrative officials described resorting to independent monitoring to keep corruption in 
check, as one district administrative official shared:  
“Most of the CMOs [Chief Medical Officers] are more into other things than their own jobs. By 
other things, I mean there is corruption…I believe that corruption is a culture that flows from top 
to bottom, and it would be worse at the bottom compared to top, because it is flowing down. That 
is a big reason for the poor performance of our district, but we do so much monitoring of it that 
we do not let it spoil a lot. Our project director is deputed for regular inspection….” (I-26, district 
administrative official).  
 
2.5 Discussion 
Technical approaches to strengthening HMIS have been extensively examined in health systems 
literature. However, this paper explicitly examines the role of organizational cultural factors in 
shaping the behaviors of policy implementers in the context of new HMIS policies, an area which has 
been relatively understudied.  
 
Consistent with other studies, we found that human resource constraints – the number and level of 
technical skill in light of the high reporting burden weakened the implementation of HMIS policies 




and accuracy (Odhiambo-Otieno, 2005; Garrib et al., 2008; Qazi and Ali, 2009, 2011). While hiring 
more data staff and providing skills-based training may address these technical challenges, our 
evidence suggests that they would be unlikely to resolve the underlying organizational cultural 
barriers, which are critical for effective HMIS policy implementation at local levels. For example, 
studies examining the effects of training on HMIS implementation in South Africa and Zanzibar 
reported mixed findings: while trainings helped build analytical skills among district staff, they did 
not remove the feeling of “powerlessness” associated with low discretion to act on the data (Østmo, 
2007). 
 
The bottom-up perspectives of district-level respondents, namely, the street-level bureaucrats 
provided overwhelming evidence for the influence of organizational cultural factors on UP-HMIS 
implementation. Though the UP-HMIS policy guidelines were driven by a rational theory – that 
improved data quality (via stronger data validation processes) would drive data use (use of district 
rankings data to improve district performance) and this positive feedback loop would drive HMIS 
performance –  our analysis points to several implementation gaps.  
 
First, operating within UP’s strong command-and-control hierarchy presented challenges for district-
level data staff, who were responsible for UP-HMIS implementation. Holding relatively lowly 
positions in the hierarchy, district data staff had little discretion, autonomy, or authority to make 
decisions. They were expected to follow superiors’ directives – even if that meant ignoring UP-
HMIS policy objectives (e.g., using paper-based reports). Exacerbating these challenges was the 
inability of district-level data staff to share grievances with an independent entity, like a functional 
data unit at the state-level. Other studies have similarly reported on how challenges associated with 
strict hierarchies between supervisors and subordinates influenced the functioning of HMIS at 




reporting on data entry operators in their HMIS units being “forced” to complete non-work-related 
tasks per their superiors’ directives (Qazi and Ali, 2009). 
 
Second, unequal distribution of authority between permanent and contractual staff complicated UP-
HMIS accountability processes. Though district-level data contractual staff were held accountable for 
managing UP-HMIS across the district, they were unable in turn to hold others accountable for poor 
adherence to UP-HMIS guidelines because of their contractual status. The state envisioned creating 
accountability for UP-HMIS through contractual staff in a way they were unable to do so with 
permanent staff who hold more secure positions. Yet, power dynamics between contractual and 
permanent staff resulted in dysfunctional reporting relationships and minor issues being escalated to 
monthly meetings chaired by senior district officials. This escalation came at another cost: high-level 
data meetings became fora for troubleshooting trivial issues instead of being a platform for strategic 
discussions as outlined in the UP-HMIS policies. This discordance between contractual and 
permanent staff has also resulted in state-wide protests demanding “equal pay for equal work” 
(Tribune News Service, 2020).  
 
Third, the overemphasis on the monthly district rankings - one component of the data use HMIS 
policies - also had unintended effects. So long as high district rankings were achieved, district 
leadership was found to condone low prioritization of data quality in the HMIS. To cope with 
performance pressures, district data staff , who saw themselves as having little power, routinized 
behaviors (e.g., prioritizing review of ranking indicators rather than those of other health programs) 
that allowed them to meet their superiors’ expectations while working with limited technical capacity 
and an overburdened staff. Such types of “task trade-offs,” i.e., “focusing on actions that receive 
rewards to the detriment of other tasks” (Renmans et al., 2016) have been observed for health 




Conceivably, such behaviors may also incentivize data manipulation to facilitate achievements of 
targets. 
 
Finally, we found that policy implementation was also based on the SLBs’ own values (e.g., how 
much district leadership valued good data quality); their commitment and motivation towards their 
work (e.g., initiating informal UP-HMIS trainings); and their own interpretations of outlined policies 
(e.g., seeing district rankings as assessments of their own performance).  
 
A few limitations of our study must be noted. First, our respondent sample was weighted towards 
district-level staff because we unable to extensively capture the views of senior district health and 
administrative officials (e.g., chief medical officers and district magistrates) who had busy schedules, 
but whose insights would have valuably shaped our narrative. Second, while our goal was to conduct 
interviews in a quiet environment, we found this to be often challenging in district-level 
administrative offices. In some cases, our interviews were interrupted, which may have affected our 
rapport building with the respondent. Lastly, we recognize our findings may not be transferable to 
every district in UP, and that interviews in additional districts may further enhance our findings.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In order to achieve the UP-HMIS policy objectives, this study demonstrates the importance of 
incorporating the perspectives of policy implementers (the street-level bureaucrats), and recognizing 
the actual levels of discretion, autonomy and power they have in implementation processes. In the 
near term, policymakers may consider increasing trainings and hiring more data staff. However, 
addressing underlying organizational cultural barriers will require a comprehensive approach to help 




promote data-related policies. Strategies may include building integrity into data-related processes 
through an independent monitoring unit, empowering data staff to enforce accountability, and 




Chapter 3. Does the quality of data vary when indicators are associated with 
financial incentives or performance assessments? An examination of 
administrative health data in Uttar Pradesh, India. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Performance-based financing schemes (Fritsche et al., 2018) and performance metrics, like district 
rankings or league tables (Business Standard News, 2016; Kirunga Tashobya et al., 2018), have 
commonly been used by governments, and development partners to increase the impact of their 
health programs. Performance-based financing schemes are designed to financially reward health 
providers for achieving outlined targets or for performing specific activities (WHO, 2020). For 
example, the Janani Suraksha Yojana program in India provides a financial incentive to frontline 
community health workers for encouraging pregnant women to give birth in health facilities and a 
separate financial incentive to women immediately after their health facility delivery (National 
Health Mission, 2020). Similarly, performance measures, like district league tables 
(KirungaTashobya et al., 2018) and state-level or country rankings have also been widely used to 
benchmark the progress of health services in different geographic regions (Tandon et al., 2016; Niti 
Aayog, The World Bank, Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, 2019). For example, India’s national 
planning commission, the Niti Aayog, has developed a health index that annually ranks states and 
union territories to spark “positive competition” and learning within the country (Niti Aayog, The 
World Bank, Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, 2019).  
 
Timely, reliable, and accurate data are fundamental to both these strategies. Monthly health facility-
level data reported to the country’s national health management information system (HMIS) often 
serves as the primary, routine data source for monitoring and evaluating the performance of health 




ensuring that high-quality data are available to government program managers and their partners for 
decision-making.  
 
While performance-based financing schemes and performance metrics attempt to encourage better 
performance of health programs, studies have identified weaknesses in program design that 
inadvertently create perverse incentives that compromise data quality. Several studies have observed 
the overreporting of indicators associated with financial incentives; for example, one study 
examining data discrepancies between HMIS and survey data, found an overreporting bias of 5% in 
HMIS coverage data for the third dose of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DPT-3) across 41 African 
countries when compared to survey-based DPT-3 coverage (Sandefur and Glassman, 2015). The 
authors explained that the overreporting bias may be attributed to a Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization (GAVI) policy which paid eligible African countries for each additional child 
vaccinated with DPT-3. Another study in India examining the agreement between HMIS indicators 
on maternal health services with an externally conducted survey similarly observed an overreporting 
of maternal health indicators that were associated with financial incentives (Phillips et al., 2019). 
Challenges with data quality of indicators used in performance metrics have similarly been noted in 
qualitative studies that have described the pressures from supervisors to overreport data as a means of 
hiding low provision and utilization of health services and to secure additional funds for health 
facilities (Qazi and Ali, 2011; Husain et al., 2012),.   
 
Poor data quality has far-reaching consequences. Incomplete and inaccurate data may lead to 
inequitable distribution of limited resources, contribute to misinformed health priorities, and 
undermine the primary objective of a well-performing HMIS, which is to use good quality data to 
make better decisions that improve population health (Aqil and Lippeveld, 2009). To help 




(WHO) has developed a data quality toolkit that lay outs quantitative metrics for evaluating the 
quality of HMIS data within a geographic setting (World Health Organization, 2017). In a context 
like Uttar Pradesh (UP), India – where HMIS data are routinely used to disburse funds for 
performance-based financing schemes, and to inform performance metrics, like the district rankings 
that guide district-level and state-level health program strategies – a continuous assessment of HMIS 
data quality is essential (Uttar Pradesh Technical Support Unit, 2018).  
 
Considering previously published literature that questions the data quality of HMIS indicators that 
are associated with financial incentives or used in performance metrics, a direct comparison of data 
quality across indicators with different characteristics, (e.g., ranked, incentivized, unranked and 
unincentivized) may illuminate data quality issues that are critical to address. To the best of our 
knowledge, the variation in data quality among HMIS indicators that: (i) are associated with financial 
incentives (hereafter, incentivized indicators); (ii) are used in performance measures, like district 
rankings (hereafter, ranked indicators); and (iii) are neither ranked nor incentivized (hereafter, 
unranked and unincentivized indicators) has not been examined. We aim to address this gap by 
analyzing the quality of data being reported in Uttar Pradesh’s HMIS, which captures monthly 
facility-level data on (i) ranked, (ii) incentivized, (iii) ranked and incentivized, and (iv) unranked and 
unincentivized indicators. In this analysis, we hypothesize that ranked indicators, incentivized 
indicators, and ranked and incentivized indicators may have poorer data quality metrics compared to 







We conducted this assessment using data from January – December 2019 in the Uttar Pradesh Health 
Management Information System (UP-HMIS), the government administrative data for UP, which 
captures self-reported monthly health facility reports from different levels of the health system 
(subcenters, primary health centers, community health centers, district hospitals) across 75 districts in 
UP. Among these, 25 districts are high priority districts (HPDs) that receive additional financial 
support from the Government of Uttar Pradesh (GOUP) and technical assistance from the Uttar 
Pradesh Technical Support Unit (UP-TSU). In each HPD, one monitoring and evaluation staff 
member from the UP-TSU is placed at the district-level to support HMIS data quality and data use 
processes through activities such as analyzing data to check quality and performing HMIS supportive 
supervision visits within the district.  
 
The UP public health system serves an estimated population of roughly 230 million people (Census 
Population, 2020), and each month up to 28,241 health facilities, including subcenters, primary 
health centers, community health centers and hospitals, report to the UP-HMIS. Of these, 19,610 
health facilities are in non-HPDs, and the remaining 8,631 are in HPDs.  
 
Our study included a census all health facilities reporting to the UP-HMIS, and all monthly health 
facility reports submitted to the UP-HMIS were analyzed. Therefore, no power and sample size 
calculations were performed..  
 
The UP-HMIS dataset analyzed in this study captures 919 indicators, and includes 4 types of 
indicators: 
(i) ranked indicators, i.e., indicators used to compute the monthly ranks of each district relative 
to 74 other districts in the state. With respect to the district rankings, the GOUP’s expectation 




every month during their program review meetings; and identify low performing ranking 
indicators in order to develop corresponding strategies for their improvement. 
(ii) incentivized indicators, i.e., indicators that capture health services associated with financial 
incentives, for example, antenatal care, institutional deliveries, cesarean sections (C-
sections), intrauterine contractual devices (IUCD) insertions, postpartum IUCDs insertions, 
and childhood immunizations (UP-TSU, 2019);   
(iii) ranked and incentivized indicators, i.e., indicators that have characteristics of both (i) and 
(ii).  
(iv)  unranked and unincentivized indicators, i.e., indicators that capture data for health services, 
which are not incentivized and not used to compute district rankings.  
 
Research hypotheses 
Four hypotheses were examined in this study using the UP-HMIS dataset from January to December 
2019. First, we hypothesized that the reporting of ranked and incentivized indicators would be more 
complete than unranked and unincentivized indicators in the monthly facility reports (H1). Second, 
we hypothesized that the proportion of outliers among ranked and incentivized indicators would be 
higher than those for unranked and unincentivized indicators in the monthly facility reports (H2). 
Third, we hypothesized that there would be a systematic bias towards overreporting positive 
indicators (such as, number of services delivered) among ranked and incentivized indicators 
compared to unranked and unincentivized indicators in the monthly facility reports (H3). Finally, we 
hypothesized that the quality of all indicators reported in monthly facility reports from high-priority 
districts (HPDs) would be higher in terms of completeness (H4-a), number of outliers (H4-b), and 







Our analytical dataset consisted of 41 UP-HMIS indicators. With respect to the selection of ranked 
indicators, we only selected those reported in the UP-HMIS, relating to the provision of health 
services, and excluded indicators capturing inputs, like the availability of human resources. 
Incentivized indicators in the UP-HMIS were selected based on a review of Government of India 
(GOI) and Government of Uttar Pradesh (GOUP) policy documents from January to December 2019 
that describe the incentives given to Accredited Social Health Activists, who are community health 
workers, for achieving outlined targets or completing pre-defined activities (UP-TSU, 2019). Finally, 
we selected unranked and unincentivized indicators that pertained to health services that were not 
associated with a financial incentive nor captured by the district ranking indicators, however, 
belonged to the same health domains as ranked indicators, incentivized indicators, and ranked and 
incentivized indicators. The classification of the UP-HMIS indicators into the four indicator 
categories was reviewed by colleagues at the UP-TSU who were involved in designing the UP-HMIS 
and who continue to provide managerial support to the UP-HMIS state-level team in the GOUP. 
Table 4 lists the indicators included in this analysis. 
 
























1) Number of injectable contraceptives, depot medroxyprogesterone acetate (DMPA) first dose 
2) Number of children aged between 9 and 11 months fully immunized- male 
3) Number of children aged between 9 and 11 months fully immunized - female 
4) Number of pregnant women with 4 or more antenatal care (ANC) check ups 
5) Number of institutional deliveries conducted (including cesarean sections) 










1) Number of pregnant women tested for hemoglobin (Hb) 4 or >4 times in ANC visits  
2) Number of women receiving 1st post-partum checkup within 48 hours of delivery 
3) Number of children who received the third dose of pentavalent vaccine 
















1) Number of interval intrauterine device (IUCD) insertions (excluding post-partum IUCD/post-
abortion IUCD) 
2) Number of post-partum IUCD insertions (within 48 hours of delivery) 
3) Number of post-abortion IUCD insertions (within 12 days) 
4) Number of newborns who received 6 home based newborn care (HBNC) visits after institutional 
delivery 
5) Number of newborns who received 7 HBNC visits after home delivery 
6) Number of new pregnant women identified as high-risk pregnancy (HRP), who are 35 years and 
older 
7) Number of new pregnant women identified as HRP due to previous history with any complication 
8) Number of new pregnant women identified as HRP due to any other reasons not due to age or 
previous history 
9) Number of pregnant women registered in 1st trimester (within 12 weeks) out of the total ANC 


























1) Number of women aged 15-49 years receiving the first dose of DMPA after abortion  
2) Number of women aged 15-49 years receiving the first dose of DMPA after delivery (post-
partum) 
3) Number of women aged 15-49 years receiving first dose of DMPA in ‘interval’ period (6 weeks 
after delivery/ any time when woman is not pregnant other than post-partum or post-abortion) 
4) Number of IUCD inserted on the fixed day services (FDS) days 
5) Number of IUCD inserted on the fixed day off-service (FDOS) days 
6) Number of children who received measles and rubella (MR) vaccine 1st dose (9-11months) 
7) Number of children who received measles vaccine 1st dose (9-11 months) 
8) Number of pregnant women who received full ANC check-ups by the end of the reporting month. 
9) Number of PW having severe anemia (Hb<7) treated 
10) Number of pregnant women with Hb<7 gm received iron sucrose by the end of the reporting 
month. 
11) Number of home deliveries attended by a skill birth attendant (SBA)  
12) Number of home deliveries attended by a non-SBA 
13) Number of oral polio virus – birth doses (OPV 0) delivered 
14) Number of hepatitis B – birth dose delivered 
15) Number of vitamin K1 doses delivered after delivery - birth dose 
16) Number of pregnant women registered for ANC 
17) Number of women receiving 1st post-partum checkup between 48 hours and 14 days 
18) Number of HIV tests found positive during ANC visits  
19) Number of mothers provided full course of 180 Iron/Folic Acid (IFA) tablets after delivery 
20) Number of pregnant women tested for syphilis  
21) Number of pregnant women tested for blood sugar (oral glucose tolerance test) 




Methods for characterizing data quality were drawn from the WHO Data Quality Review 
Framework, which outlines four dimensions of data quality: (1) completeness and timeliness of data; 
(2) internal consistency of reported data; (3) external consistency of reported data; and (4) external 
comparisons of population data (World Health Organization, 2017). Given the lack of access to 




with monthly health facility report submissions to the UP-HMIS, our analysis focused on examining 
the four metrics in dimensions 1 and 2 as shown in Table 5. All four hypotheses relating to these 
measures were tested for significance at the 0.05 level (alpha error) by examining the difference 
between proportions using t-tests.  
 
Table 5. Data quality dimensions adapted from the World Health Organization Data Quality Review 
Framework 
Measures Definition 
Dimension 1: Completeness of data 
(a) Completeness of health facility reporting The percentage of expected monthly health 
facility reports submitted in the UP-HMIS web-
based portal 
(b) Completeness of indicator reporting The percentage of missing values for indicators 
in the submitted monthly health facility reports 
Dimension 2: Internal consistency of reported data 
(c) Identification of moderate and extreme 
outliers 
The percentage of moderate (+/-2 standard 
deviations) and extreme outliers (+/- 3 standard 
deviations) from the mean for each indicator 
reported in the submitted monthly facility report 
(d) Consistency between indicators The ratio of events reported for two sets of 
indicators that are expected to be equal 
 
With respect to completeness of data (dimension 1), we first examined the completeness of monthly 
facility reports by calculating the percentage of expected monthly reports submitted from health 
facilities to the online UP-HMIS web-based portal. Second, we examined completeness of indicators 
in monthly facility reports by examining the percentage of missing data for the four indicator 
categories (ranked; incentivized; ranked and incentivized; and unranked and unincentivized).  
 
With respect to internal consistency of reported data (dimension 2), we calculated the percentage of 
moderate outliers by identifying values that lie above or below two standard deviations from the 
mean for each indicator reported in the monthly facility reports. However, in instances when two 




moderate outlier. The percentage of extreme outliers was calculated by identifying values that lie 
above or below three standard deviations from the mean for each indicator reported in the monthly 
facility reports. Similarly, in instances when three times the standard deviation was less than 1, we 
used 1 as the corresponding value to determine an extreme outlier. This calculation prevented us 
from classifying values for indicators reported in the monthly facility reports as outliers when 
absolute changes were small. For example, a change in value from 0 to 1 for an indicator (that rarely 
reports a non-zero value, like HIV tests found positive during ANC visits) was not counted as a 
moderate or extreme outlier. With regard to outliers, we also quantified the proportion of outliers that 
lie above the mean and below the mean to gauge potential overreporting (>2 standard deviations 
above the mean) and underreporting (>2 standard deviations below the mean) of indicators.  
 
Next, we developed internal consistency checks to examine whether the observed relationships 
between the values of indicators were as expected based on our programmatic knowledge and in 
consultation with the UP-TSU colleagues. We found two methods to calculate the same metric, one 
using ranked and incentivized indicators, and another using unranked and unincentivized indicators. 
Then, we calculated the ratio of the values calculated from the two methods. Since the two methods 
calculate the same metric, we expect the resultant ratio to equal 1.0. A ratio >1.0 may suggest 
overreporting of the ranked and incentivized indicators relative to unranked and unincentivized 
indicators, and a ratio < 1.0 may suggest underreporting of ranked and incentivized indicators 
relative to unranked and unincentivized indicators. To account for potential, unintentional, data entry 
errors, we considered a 10% difference in ratios as acceptable for internal consistency based on the 
WHO Data Quality Assessment Toolkit guidelines (World Health Organization, 2017). Therefore, 
accounting for this 10% threshold, we interpreted ratios > 1.1 as potential evidence for overreporting, 
and ratios <0.9 as potential evidence for underreporting. For this analysis, we only included monthly 




checks for both methods. These internal consistency ratios were calculated for each monthly facility 
report. Table 6 presents the six consistency checks which were examined in this analysis.  
 
All the analyses were conducted using STATA 14.0. 
Table 6. Internal consistency checks examined in the analysis 












1 Total number of first DMPA1 
contraceptive dose should equal 
number of first DMPA doses 
given across programs 




Number of women 
receiving first DMPA 
contraceptive dose 
post-abortion, post-
delivery or any other 
time 
~ 1.0 
2 Total number of IUCDs2 
provided should equal total 
number provided during on and 
off-services days 
Total number of 
IUCDs provided 
Number of IUCDs 
provided during on 
and off-service days 
~ 1.0 
3 Total number of institutional 
deliveries resulting in a live birth 
should equal number of birth 
dose vaccine (vitamin K vaccine 
birth dose)  
Total number of 
institutional 
deliveries 
Total number of birth 




4 Total number of institutional 
deliveries resulting in a live birth 
should equal number of birth 
dose vaccine (oral polio virus 
vaccine birth dose)  
Total number of 
institutional 
deliveries 
Total number of birth 
doses for oral polio 
virus vaccine plus 
stillbirths  
~ 1.0 
5 Total number of institutional 
deliveries resulting in a live birth 
should equal number of birth 
dose vaccine (hepatitis B birth 
dose)  
Total number of 
institutional 
deliveries 
Total number of birth 
doses for hepatitis B 
plus stillbirths  
~ 1.0 
6 Total number of fully immunized 
child should be no greater than 
the number of doses of the 
measles-rubella vaccine 




Total number of 
measles-rubella 
vaccine given (9-11 
months) 
~ 1.0 







3.3 Results  
The results are presented below by the two data quality dimensions examined in this study.  
Dimension 1: Completeness of data 
A. Completeness of monthly health facility reporting 
Each facility is expected to submit a monthly report; therefore 338,892 facility reports were expected 
in the UP-HMIS dataset from January 2019 – December 2019. Overall, we found that 99.7% 
(n=337,907) of expected monthly health facility reports were submitted to the UP-HMIS across all 
districts with roughly the same percentage of monthly health facility reports submitted from HPDs 
(99.5%) and non-HPDs (99.8%). 
 
B. Completeness of indicator reporting in monthly health facility reports 
With respect to the completeness of indicator reporting in the monthly facility reports, consistent 
with our hypothesis (H1), we found that ranked indicators, and ranked and incentivized indicators 
were more completely reported compared to unranked and unincentivized indicators.  
 
As shown in Figure 5, the average percentage of missing data was lowest among ranked indicators 
(10.42%; 95%  CI: 10.37%, 10.48%) followed by ranked and incentivized indicators (12.45%; 95% 
CI: 12.40%, 12.49%) and incentivized indicators (24.42%; 95% CI: 24.37%, 24.47%), with unranked 
and unincentivized indicators having the highest average percentage of missing data (37.70%; 95% 
CI: 37.66%, 37.73%). The completeness of indicator reporting across all the four indicator categories 
were statistically different from one another at the 0.05 level (p<0.01). 
 
The same pattern of completeness observed by indicator category was observed for monthly facility 




significantly fewer missing values observed in HPD monthly facility reports compared to non-HPD 
monthly facility reports (p<0.01) consistent with H4-a. Appendix 5 presents the average percentage of 
indicator completeness, and confidence intervals for each indicator category disaggregated by HPD 
status. When examining the percentage of indicator completeness over time, we found that indicators 
reported in the monthly facility reports from HPDs had higher levels of completeness relative to 
those reported in monthly facility reports from non-HPDs (Appendices 6 and 7). 
 
Figure 5. The average percentage of missing data reported by indicator category in the monthly 
facility reports gathered from January to December 2019 
  
Note: Completeness was examined in 337,907 monthly health facility reports that had been submitted. Confidence 
intervals are presented in orange. * indicates that the percentage of completeness of indicator reporting across all the 












Figure 6. The average percentage of missing data being reported by indicator category in monthly 
facility reports from high priority districts (HPDs) and non-high priority districts (non-HPDs) 
gathered from January to December 2019 
 
Note: Completeness was examined in 337,907 monthly health facility reports that had been submitted. Confidence 
intervals are presented in orange. ^ indicates that within each indicator category the percentage of missing values 
observed in HPD monthly facility reports compared to non-HPD monthly facility reports are significantly different 
from one another (p<0.01). 
 
 
Dimension 2: Internal consistency of reported data 
A. Identification of moderate and extreme outliers 
Overall, about 8.2% of all monthly facility reports had moderate outliers (Figure 7). When 
examining moderate outliers by district status, nearly 8.7% of monthly facility reports from HPDs 
had moderate outliers, whereas roughly 8.1% of monthly facility reports from non-HPDs had 
moderate outliers (Figure 8).  
 
Supporting our hypothesis (H2), we observed the highest average percentage of moderate outliers 
reported in the monthly facility reports among ranked indicators (2.94%; 95% CI: 2.91%, 2.97%), 
followed by ranked and incentivized indicators (2.22%; 95% CI: 2.20%, 2.24%) and incentivized 
indicators (1.74%; 95% CI: 1.72%, 1.76%), with the lowest average percentage of moderate outliers 




pattern was observed in monthly facility reports across HPDs and non-HPDs (Figure 8). However, 
we identified a significantly higher average percentage of moderate outliers for two indicator 
categories - ranked indicators and incentivized indicators – in HPD monthly facility reports 
compared to non-HPD monthly facility reports (p<0.01), contradicting our hypothesis (H4-b). 
Appendix 8 presents the average percentage of moderate outliers and the corresponding confidence 
intervals for each indicator category disaggregated by HPD status. 
 
Figure 7. The average percentage of moderate outliers reported by indicator category in the monthly 
facility reports gathered from January to December 2019 
 
Note: Moderate outliers was identified by indicator category in 337,907 monthly health facility reports that had been 
submitted. Confidence intervals are presented in orange. * indicates that the percentage of moderate outliers 
identified across all the four indicator categories (examined as pairwise comparisons) are significantly different from 

















Figure 8. The average percentage of moderate outliers observed in monthly health facility reports 
from high priority districts and non-high priority districts from January to December 2019 
 
Note: Moderate outliers was identified by indicator category in 337,907 monthly health facility reports that had been 
submitted. Confidence intervals are presented in orange. ^indicates that within each indicator category the 
percentage of moderate outliers identified in HPD monthly facility reports compared to non-HPD monthly facility 
reports are significantly different from one another (p<0.01). 
 
In comparison to moderate outliers, extreme outliers were identified in 1.3% of monthly facility 
reports (Figure 9). Contradicting our hypothesis (H2), the highest average percentage of extreme 
outliers were observed among incentivized indicators (0.52%; 95% CI: 0.51%, 0.53%), followed by 
unranked and unincentivized indicators (0.31%; 95% CI: 0.30%, 0.31%), ranked and incentivized 
indicators (0.26%; 95% CI: 0.25%, 0.27%), and ranked indicators (0.23%; 95% CI: 0.22%, 0.25%).  
 
The same pattern was observed in monthly facility reports among HPDs and non-HPDs (Figure 10).  
However, we identified a significantly higher average percentage of extreme outliers for three 
indicator categories - ranked and incentivized indicators, incentivized indicators, and unranked and 
unincentivized indicators – in HPD monthly facility reports compared to non-HPD monthly facility 




of extreme outliers and the corresponding confidence intervals for each indicator category 
disaggregated by HPD status. The number of moderate and extreme outliers for each indicator in 
monthly facility reports in HPDs and non-HPDs are reported in Appendix 10. 
 
Overall, a majority of the outliers were overreported (Table 7). Among the underreported outliers, 
about 97.2% were moderate outliers. Among the overreported outliers, roughly 82.4% were moderate 
outliers, and 17.5% were extreme outliers.  
 
Figure 9. The average percentage of extreme outliers reported by indicator category in the monthly 
facility reports gathered from January to December 2019 
 
Note: Extreme outliers was identified by indicator category in 337,907 monthly health facility reports that had been 
submitted. Confidence intervals are presented in orange. *indicates that the percentage of extreme outliers identified 
across all the four indicator categories (examined as pairwise comparisons) are statistically different from one 













Figure 10. The average percentage of moderate outliers observed in monthly health facility reports 
from high priority districts and non-high priority districts from January to December 2019 
 
Note: Extreme outliers was identified by indicator category in 337,907 monthly health facility reports that had been 
submitted. Confidence intervals are presented in orange. ^indicates that within each indicator category the 
percentage of extreme outliers identified in HPD monthly facility reports compared to non-HPD monthly facility 
reports are statistically different from one another (p<0.01). 
 
Table 7. Percentage of moderate and extreme outliers that were overreported or underreported 
 
Outliers observed in 
monthly health facility 




Outliers observed in 
monthly health 




Outliers observed in 
monthly health 




Total number of underreported outliers 26,005 (7.70%) 
Moderate 8,934 (8.69%) 16,887 (7.18%) 25,821 (7.64%) 
Extreme 54 (0.05%) 130 (0.06%) 184 (0.05%) 
Total number of overreported outliers 189,608 (56.11%) 
Moderate 52,970 (51.50%) 103,292 (43.94%) 156,262 (46.24%) 




   
B. Consistency between indicators  
Consistent with our hypothesis (H3), we found evidence of possible overreporting of ranked and 




checks as reflected in ratios greater than 1.1, which account for the 10% threshold to allow for 
potential inconsistency (Table 8). When these ratios were disaggregated by district status, the same 
pattern of substantial overreporting (ratios > 1.1) was observed in monthly facility reports from 
HPDs and monthly facility reports from non-HPDs. While there were no significant differences 
observed in ratios for two internal consistency checks reported in monthly facility reports from HPDs 
and non-HPDs (H4-c), three consistency checks had significantly higher ratios reported in monthly 
facility reports from HPDs compared to those non-HPDs.   
 
Table 8. Internal consistency checks in monthly health facility reports in high priority districts 
(HPDs) and non-high priority districts (non-HPDs) 
Internal consistency check Ratio
a Ratio HPDb Ratio nHPDc  p-value 
Total number of first DMPA1 
contraceptive doses should equal 









Total number of IUCDs2 provided 
should equal total number provided 






(6.29,  6.89) 
0.59 
Total number of institutional 
deliveries resulting in a live birth 
should equal number of birth dose 









Total number of institutional 
deliveries resulting in a live birth 
should equal number of birth dose 







(1.71,  1.81) 
<0.01 
Total number of institutional 
deliveries resulting in a live birth 
should equal number of birth dose 




(3.13,  3.28) 
2.84 
( 2.78, 2.91) 
<0.01 
Total number of fully immunized 
children should be no greater than the 









1 Depot medroxyprogesterone acetate; 2 Intra-uterine contraceptive device; aRatio based on monthly health facility 
reports across all districts; bRatio based on monthly health facility reports from high priority districts (HPDs); cRatio 
based on monthly health facility reports from non-high priority districts (nHPDs); Note: all ratios for all internal 






This study examined the data quality of four indicator categories (ranked, ranked and incentivized, 
incentivized and unranked and unincentivized) using an administrative health dataset with 337,907 
monthly health facility reports from over 28,000 health facilities during a one-year time period.  
 
Our analyses show that data quality metrics for completeness and internal consistency varied by the 
four indicator categories (ranked, incentivized, ranked and incentivized, and unranked and 
unincentivized). With respect to completeness of indicator reporting, largely consistent with the first 
hypothesis (H1), we found a higher percentage of complete reporting for ranked indicators, closely 
followed by ranked and incentivized indicators. When examining the percentage of outliers by 
indicator category, we found that ranked indicators had the highest percentage of moderate outliers 
followed by ranked and incentivized indicators, incentivized indicators, and unranked and 
unincentivized indicators, supporting our second hypothesis (H2). However, this trend differed for 
extreme outliers. Incentivized indicators had the highest percentage of extreme outliers, followed by 
unranked and unincentivized indicators, ranked and incentivized indicators, and ranked indicators.  
 
The analyses comparing internal consistency revealed higher levels of systematic overreporting of 
ranked and incentivized indicators compared to unranked and unincentivized indicators, providing 
evidence for our third hypothesis (H3). Finally, with respect to the above data quality metrics by 
district status (HPDs and non-HPDs), consistent with our hypothesis (H4-a), we observed higher 
levels of completeness across the four indicator categories in monthly facility reports from HPDs. 
However, contrary to our hypothesis (H4-b), we found at least the same percentage or a higher 
percentage of moderate and extreme outliers by the four indicator categories in the monthly health 




observed potential overreporting of ranked and incentivized indicators relative to unranked and 
unincentivized indicators in monthly facility reports from both HPDs and non-HPDs. Furthermore, in 
three out of the six internal consistency checks, we observed significantly higher ratios in monthly 
facility reports from HPDs as compared to non-HPDs.  
 
The differences in completeness of reporting by indicator type may be explained by the higher 
demand of UP-HMIS indicators used to calculate district rankings, which were routinely reviewed by 
district and state leadership across all districts during monthly review meetings. In contrast, the high 
percentage of missing data for unranked and unincentivized indicators may reflect the low 
prioritization and demand for those data for decision-making.  
 
Our analyses also support previous studies, which have attributed high reporting burdens contributing 
to incomplete data and poor data quality (AbouZahr et al., 2007). More broadly across low- and 
middle-income countries (LMICs), the high burden of data collection and entry has been attributed to 
the implementation of vertical health programs and the requirements of funders (Chan et al., 2010). 
Similarly, in UP, high reporting burden has been attributed to a large number of national health 
programs and the concomitant rise in demand for those program data (Meghani et al., 2020). Our 
study suggests that data entry was prioritized for indicators associated with district rankings or 
financial incentives and highlights a need to rationalize the number of indicators in the UP-HMIS, 
which currently captures 919 indicators.  
 
In our analysis, we found a much lower percentage of extreme outliers reported in monthly health 
facility reports compared to moderate outliers across all districts (1.3% vs. 8.2%). We offer three 
potential explanations. First, close monitoring and demand of ranked indicators, ranked and 




Second, these indicators may be consistently overreported resulting in a lower percentage of 
detectable extreme outliers. Or, third, building on the first and second explanations, indicators may 
not be overreported at extreme levels to avoid undue attention from superiors, which may prompt 
investigations to examine potential overreporting.  
 
As seen in the internal consistency ratios (H3), the higher levels of systematic overreporting of 
ranked and incentivized indicators compared to unranked and unincentivized indicators may provide 
evidence for the second and third explanation. This finding resonates with the results from another 
data validation study in UP, which found overreporting of HMIS indicators that are associated with 
financial incentives (Phillips et al., 2019). More broadly, overreporting of data has also been 
observed in the context of achieving external donor-outlined targets and performance-based aid 
(Sandefur and Glassman, 2015; Closser, 2019), 
 
In the context of UP, our finding highlights how specific measures, like district ranking indicators, 
which are associated with rewards and punishments (described further in Chapter 4), may perversely 
incentivize individuals to adopt behaviors that maximize potential awards and minimize punishment 
possibly to the detriment of the broader good (Goodhart, 1989). This point is also represented in a 
study from Burkina Faso, which described how a data auditing verification process created perverse 
incentives for auditors to falsify the data because they were paid based on the number of patients they 
covered during each data verification exercise (Turcotte-Tremblay et al., 2017).  
 
By placing additional monitoring and evaluation staff in HPDs, the GOUP attempted to improve 
overall UP-HMIS data quality. Our findings suggest that the presence of additional technical staff 
may have contributed to improvements in data completeness, however this approach may be 




quality metrics may require a different set of strategies, such as strengthening the implementation of 
data quality audits that compare source documents in health facilities or managed by frontline health 
workers, with data being reported in the UP-HMIS, and ensuring those results are used to guide 
improvements. It is also possible that given the recent UP-HMIS reform, districts may first be 
prioritizing processes to improve the completeness of data being reported to the UP-HMIS before 
turning their attention to issues relating to data accuracy. 
 
Many of the challenges with UP-HMIS data quality presented here have not gone unnoticed by the 
GOUP. To streamline data collection efforts and improve the completeness of UP-HMIS data, the 
GOUP in collaboration with the UP-TSU has been conducting data rationalization consultations with 
state- and district-level decision-makers to reduce the number of indicators in the UP-HMIS. In 
addition, the GOUP has been actively working on addressing data quality gaps by scaling up the 
implementation of state-level data quality audits, quarterly state-level data quality meetings with 
district-level staff, and establishing a new cadre of monitoring and evaluation staff at the division 
level who can supervise and support data quality initiatives across all the 75 districts.  
 
At the national level, Niti Aayog, the national planning commission, has also been paying increasing 
attention to issues of data quality, by explicitly incorporating a measure for data integrity in its state-
health index, which is published annually to show the variations in health outcomes across different 
states and union territories of India (Niti Aayog, The World Bank, Ministry of Health & Family 
Welfare, 2019). Recently, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) also reiterated its 
commitment to conducting a National Family Health Survey to generate district-level estimates for 
health indicators, and launched the development of a tablet-based data entry application to facilitate 
digital data entry by frontline health workers “at source” (Press Information Bureau, Government of 




frontline health workers across all 75 districts to reduce the burden of data entry at the block-level, 
which plays the critical role of entering monthly paper-based reports collected from the frontline 
health workers and primary health workers to the UP-HMIS web-based portal. 
 
As the GOUP and the national-level government strengthen data quality processes, and strive 
towards improving HMIS data quality, it will be important to ensure that other factors that determine 
HMIS performance – like gaps in availability of human resources, both in number and technical skill, 
are addressed so that basic functions like supportive supervision and data validation activities are 
implemented at lower administrative levels. Similarly, it will also be important to move towards 
building an organizational culture that values good quality, and use of good quality data in decision-
making, so that data quality processes and activities are successfully institutionalized within the UP 
health system over time.  
 
While this analysis provides some evidence of differences in data quality metrics by indicator 
category, it is important to note several study limitations. First, we did not examine all the indicators 
reported in the UP-HMIS, as our focus was limited to examining the data quality of maternal and 
child health program indicators because they are a priority of the GOUP. Second, we recognize that 
calculating the number of outliers can be particularly problematic for indicators that are dependent on 
the availability of health commodities in health facilities. For these indicators, sudden increases in 
availability of health commodities in health facilities may coincide with higher completeness of data, 
which may lead to potential misclassification of values being identified as outliers. Third, our study 
had a small number of internal consistency checks because we were limited by our approach to 
calculate one construct in two different ways – one using ranked and incentivized indicators and the 
other using unranked and unincentivized indicators. Related to this point, while our findings on 




unranked and unincentivized indicators, we were unable to explore whether this phenomenon was 
being driven by the potential underreporting of unranked and unincentivized indicators. Facility-level 
audits measuring the agreement of HMIS web-based portal data with source documents, like health 
facility registers would have provided a direct measure of data accuracy (e.g., development of data 
verification ratios), however due to time and resource constraints this was not feasible. Related to 
resource constraints, lastly, we could not conduct an independent survey and measure the external 
consistency of coverage data for the indicators in our analysis, another data quality metric.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, our study provides initial evidence for how data quality varies for indicators that are 
associated with performance measures like district rankings and financial incentives. While 
completeness of data may have improved for ranked and incentivized indicators, we found evidence 
for potential overreporting of these indicators relative to unranked and unincentivized indicators. 
Routinely examining data accuracy would be important for ensuring that real progress and 
achievement is being reflected in the district rankings, and effectively guiding decision-making. Data 
quality audits that are currently being scaled up by the GOUP may help quantify potential data 
manipulation, however additional qualitative research may shed light on the underlying drivers that 
may be leading to this practice. As GOUP scales up the initiatives to improve HMIS data quality, 
effective implementation of those initiatives will be critical for achieving the intended objective of 




Chapter 4. Understanding when, how and why administrative health data are 




The Performance of Routine Information Systems (PRISM) framework identifies technical, 
organizational and behavioral determinants that are critical for improving the quality and use of 
health management information system (HMIS) or administrative data for decision-making (Aqil et 
al., 2009). While these determinants are useful for identifying interventions to improve 
administrative data quality and use, there are no conceptual frameworks or theories that explain how 
and why administrative data are manipulated, and equally importantly, how one might intervene to 
prevent data manipulation.  
 
A number of parallels can be drawn between data manipulation and corruption; for example, both 
entail officials misusing their power or coercing others to misuse their power for private gain; and 
corruption, like data manipulation, often happens “quietly,” in clandestine ways. There is a well-
developed body of theory on corruption in the health sector that may be used to study data 
manipulation (Sardan, 1999; Brinkerhoff, 2004; Lewis, 2006; Savedoff and Hussmann, 2006). 
Therefore, to better understand the forces that result in data manipulation and how best to respond to 
this practice in a health system, we drew upon a theoretical framework that consolidated previously 
proposed concepts on corruption in the health sector (Vian, 2008). In this study, we define the 
manipulation of administrative health data or data manipulation, as the fabrication or alteration of 
data, done with the aim of furthering one’s personal interests or to cope with systemic pressures; for 






Public health researchers have observed data manipulation in the unreliability of national statistics 
(Jerven, 2013; Sandefur and Glassman, 2015); they have reported on the falsification of 
administrative data (Qazi and Ali, 2009; Mercader et al., 2017), and explored how perceptions of 
compromised data quality affect data use (Mutemwa, 2006; Setel et al., 2007). The consequences of 
making decisions based on manipulated and poor quality data have been far-reaching, resulting in 
poor planning and inequitable distribution of resources and delivery of health services (Mackey et 
al., 2018), and a breakdown in transparency and accountability processes within a health system 
(Transparency International, 2019). Therefore, ensuring the accuracy of Health Management 
Information Systems (HMIS) data, the largest routinely collected data source about the health 
services delivered to a population, is of paramount importance.  
 
To improve the quality of HMIS data, many low- and middle-income countries have introduced 
district health information systems (DHIS2, 2019). These systems have been replacing paper-based 
reports with mobile health (mHealth) applications by enabling frontline health workers to record data 
directly on mobile phones (Asangansi et al., 2013; Ethiopian FMoH, 2014; Biemba et al., 2017); 
automating and implementing data validation processes to detect data quality errors (Government Of 
India, Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation, 2018; Burnett et al., 2019); and 
establishing web-based health data dashboards to promote visibility and real-time monitoring of 
collected data to support communication and decision-making (Nutley et al., 2013; Mutale et al., 
2018).  
 
While these technical processes are expected to improve data management, data quality and data use, 
some researchers acknowledge that they are insufficient to ensure good data quality and data use 
(Garrib et al., 2008; Karuri et al., 2014). In fact, the quality of administrative data remains a 




2019). For example, quantitative studies have shown a systematic overreporting of certain HMIS 
health indicators (Singh et al.; Sharma et al., 2016; Phillips et al., 2019), and qualitative studies have 
found that the inability to uphold data quality standards stems from multiple individual and 
organizational factors, including the lack of interest and ownership in the data (Hernández-Ávila et 
al., 2013), poor accountability processes, and even personal associations with political elites that 
condone the failure to comply with HMIS standards (Qazi and Ali, 2009, 2011; Ramesh et al., 2012). 
A key question remains: why are data manipulated or misreported in the first place? 
 
Answering this question requires unpacking contextual factors, organizational factors, and 
interpersonal dynamics of actors who may be incentivized to allow corrupt practices to thrive. In this 
paper, we first describe the types of data manipulation observed in Uttar Pradesh (UP), India and 
then using a theoretical framework on corruption in the health system (Vian, 2008) examine the (i) 
pressures and (ii) opportunities for data manipulation; and (iii) the rationalization of data 
manipulation by those involved. A deeper understanding of these collective factors driving data 




The Government of Uttar Pradesh (GOUP) implemented a series of initiatives in 2015 to address 
barriers affecting HMIS performance like, complex reporting formats, weak processes for HMIS data 
quality, and low use of HMIS data in decision-making (Meghani et al., 2020).  
 
First, the GOUP implemented a new online HMIS, known as the UP-HMIS to gather relevant data, 




needs. Among the 919 data elements in HMIS, some were used to calculate the monthly district 
rankings (Uttar Pradesh Technical Support Unit, 2018), others captured services that have been 
incentivized by the national government, like antenatal care, and institutional deliveries (Government 
of India, 2018), and the remaining data elements were collected for routine monitoring.  
 
Second, to improve data quality, the GOUP established data validation committees at two 
administrative levels below the state – at block and district levels – to ensure accurate data were 
available for decision-making. Relatedly, the GOUP also built automated data validation checks 
within UP-HMIS web-based portals to identify data errors, but also instituted data quality audits and 
supportive supervision visits at both levels. Finally, to facilitate the use of these validated data for 
decision-making across the health system, the GOUP developed a UP Health Dashboard. Populated 
using the UP-HMIS data, the Dashboard ranked each of the 75 districts in UP relative to one another 
based on their performance on priority health indicators every month. The policy did not outline any 
explicit awards or punishments for high or low ranking districts, however, the GOUP expected that 
these district ranking indicators would be examined during program review meetings at the district 
level to identify program weaknesses and develop action plans to target improvements in 
performance. Given this context, UP offered an opportunity to investigate why data are manipulated 
or misreported despite the implementation of technical solutions to improve data quality. 
 
Conceptual framework 
Based on our formative research, we adapted Vian’s framework on corruption in the health sector 
(Vian, 2008) to investigate key factors driving data manipulation in UP (Figure 12). First, to identify 
factors that created opportunities for data manipulation, we examined the level of discretion and 
autonomy of actors, the accountability mechanisms for performance and data quality, and processes 




studied pressures that incentivized data manipulation, e.g., performance pressures from one’s 
superiors and peers, as well as pressures associated with the organization’s work culture. Third, we 
explored the social norms, ethical beliefs and attitudes of health staff to understand how data 
manipulation was rationalized by those involved. Finally, acknowledging the importance of context, 
we remained open to studying how related health systems factors like availability of resources, 
workload, and leadership styles may influence data manipulation and its drivers.  
 
Figure 11. Conceptual framework for the study 
 
*Denotes the adaptations to the original framework on corruption in the health sector developed by Vian (2008) 
 
Sampling 
We conducted 83 interviews with officials at the district, division and state levels. Following the 
principal of maximum variation sampling, we purposively selected 16 high, middle and low ranked 




high priority and non-high priority districts (Government of India, 2015). To ensure broad 
representation of district respondents, within each district, we purposively interviewed respondents 
who were involved in at least one data-related activity, such as data analysis, data validation or data 
review (e.g., reviewing data to monitor program performance or make a program-related decision), 
and included both government employees of the state’s Directorates of Medical Health and Family 
Welfare (DOMHFW), as well as contractual employees of the National Health Mission (NHM) and 
the UP Technical Support Unit. Overall, we interviewed 48 district-level respondents. To better 
understand the organizational context, we also interviewed 35 division- and state-level officials in 
NHM and the DOMHFW responsible for monitoring district health programs. Finally, we observed 
14 district-level data validation and program review meetings in the 8 of the 16 districts where we 
conducted interviews to corroborate and triangulate findings from the in-depth interviews. 
 
Data collection 
Our district-level interview guide aimed to elicit respondents’ perceptions on: (1) the data quality of 
existing administrative data; (2) current practices to promote data quality; (3) the prioritization of 
data quality initiatives within the health department; (4) individual, organizational and contextual 
factors that influence data quality processes; and (5) potential opportunities to uphold data quality 
standards within the health system. Our division- and state-level guide focused on understanding 
which data are used for decision-making, how they are used, and potential challenges and 
opportunities for improving the use of data for decision-making in UP. 
 
Interviews were conducted primarily in respondents’ offices in Hindi or English depending on their 
preference. Before each interview, we obtained written informed consent. Interviews were audio-
recorded except for 22 interviews when respondents preferred hand-written notes be taken. 




verbatim and translated to English as needed by a qualified transcription agency; AM reviewed all 
transcripts for accuracy.  
 
Interviews (Table 9) and meeting observations (Table 10) were conducted in three phases: 
December 2018; February-March 2019; and August-October 2019. During data collection, the study 
team debriefed biweekly to discuss emerging findings, triangulate data by respondent type, and 
identify probes for subsequent interviews.  
 
Table 9. Types of positions held by respondents 




District magistrates, chief development officers 2 
Health officials Chief medical officers 2 
District staff Program staff1  46 
Data staff2  
Division  Monitoring and evaluation specialists 5 
State  DOMHFW: Directors, Joint Directors,  




1 Responsible for managing and monitoring implementation of health programs; positions include: assistant chief 
medical officers and district immunization officers; 2Responsible for collating, reviewing and analyzing health 
program data; positions include: assistant research officers, district program managers, district data managers, data 
entry operators, monitoring and evaluation specialists 
 
Table 10. Meeting observed at the district level in Uttar Pradesh 
Meeting types Number of observations 
Data validation committee meetings 6 









We conducted a thematic analysis using the framework method (Gale et al., 2013). First, we 
inductively coded twenty transcripts line-by-line, and used our conceptual framework (Figure 12) to 
develop an analytical framework that captured data on: (1) rationalization of data manipulation; (2) 
opportunities for data manipulation; (3) pressures and work-related stressors; and (4) other factors. 
The detailed sub-categories in the analytical framework are in Appendix 11. Relevant data were 
extracted from the interview transcripts, notes and meeting observations into the excel-based 
analytical framework. Then, memos for each category were prepared, summarizing the overall 
findings, identifying deviant cases, comparing/contrasting potential conflicting findings reported by 
respondents (Boeije, 2002), and triangulating meetings observations with interview findings (Carter 
et al., 2014). Memos were shared with team members to deepen the discussion and understanding of 
the data. After the analysis, a meeting was conducted with a couple of respondents as a way of 
member checking. 
 
4.3 Ethical Considerations 
The study was approved for ethical research by the Institutional Review Board of SIGMA Research 
and Consulting in New Delhi, India (10047/IRB/D/18-19). Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of 
Public Health deemed this research as IRB exempt (00009106). In some cases, we have not directly 
quoted respondents to ensure anonymity since they come from a tightly knit pool of actors whose 
speaking styles may be revealing. Furthermore, we do not identify the respondent’s organizational 






Despite recent improvements in data quality, district level respondents perceived that data 
manipulation and the pressures to manipulate data were common at the district level across both 
high-priority and non-high priority districts. Therefore, we do not present our results by this 
stratification. Similarly, because district rankings significantly fluctuated month-to-month over the 
course of our study, we decided not to present our results stratified by low, middle and high 
performing districts. Below, we describe types of data manipulation, opportunities and pressures to 
change data, and how respondents rationalize these actions. 
 
Types of data manipulation 
District staff observed direct (overreporting and underreporting) and indirect forms of data 





Table 11. Types of administrative data manipulation observed at the block and district levels in Uttar Pradesh, India 
Type of data manipulation How it works Examples of indicators being manipulated 
Direct forms  
Overreporting progress The numerator, i.e., the number of services 
provided, reflect a longer time-period (e.g., 
45 days), while the denominator is assumed 
to be for the typical 30-day reporting period. 
In other instances, data may be made up to 
reflect progress. 
Observed for indicators that are:  
(i) difficult to cross-validate with other indicators (e.g., 
supplies distributed, community activities conducted); 
 (ii) associated with financial incentives (e.g., 
identification of high-risk pregnancies, institutional 
deliveries, bed occupancy rates); and  
(iii) for priority programs and national campaigns that are 
closely monitored (e.g., institutional deliveries, high risk 
pregnancies) 
Underreporting indicators Reporting fewer incidents than actually occur   Observed for indicators that may reflect poorly on health 
workers (e.g., maternal deaths) 
Indirect forms 
Retrofitting service data to match 
inventory  
Distribution of health commodities are 
calculated based on stocks/inventory left in 
the health facilities at the end of the month 
compared to the inventories at the beginning 
of the month. 
 
Inventory data do not reflect the actual 
number of commodities distributed by health 
workers. 
Observed for data pertaining to health commodities, like 
oral contraceptive pills, and multi-dose vaccine vials  
Hiding data Data reflecting low progress on certain 
health indicators are not presented during 
review meetings with senior officials 
Any information about health programs with low 
performance are not presented in reports or PowerPoint 







A. Overreporting progress 
District staff described overreporting of health indicators that were (i) monitored in the district 
rankings and (ii) associated with financial incentives. Overreporting involved inflating the number of 
services (numerator) provided over a fixed reporting period (denominator). According to district data 
staff, ranking indicators (e.g., the ratio of health worker incentives paid against total institutional 
deliveries) were often overreported to demonstrate higher than actual progress before meetings with 
district administrative officials, as one district data staff described:  
“To prepare for the District Health Society meeting [with district magistrates/district 
administrative officials], I collect the data till 20th of the month. I see that the ASHA 
payments till 20th is not so good, so they [chief medical officers/district health officials] ask 
to change the data of ASHA payments [numerator] but the number of [institutional] 
deliveries should be same [denominator]" (I-5).  
 
District staff observed similar practices in some blocks, where block health officials requested that 
their data staff overreport before meetings with their superiors, district health officials. Similar 
practices were observed at the field level by community health workers before their monthly 
meetings with their supervisors:  
"Our ANMs [health workers] come and say that this is the actual amount of work done and 
this is the amount of work that is yet not done … they create the report where even if 4 people 
have been vaccinated, they write it as 14 people vaccinated. They say they will vaccinate the 
remaining 10 people when they come the next day" (I-32, District program staff). 
  
While personal financial gain may influence community health workers to overreport incentivized 




were not always community health workers, who were the direct beneficiaries of financial incentives. 
Their supervisors at the block-level may change the data (e.g., identify pregnant women as high risk 
pregnancies even if they are not) and through complex kick-back systems receive a portion of the 
incentives given to community health workers.  
 
B. Underreporting poor performance 
Overall, district-level respondents felt that maternal and neonatal deaths were systematically 
underreported within the health system (e.g., by documenting fewer or no deaths than actual) because 
such indicators reflected poorly on a health worker’s performance. This challenge was also broadly 
acknowledged by district leadership, who emphasized the importance of changing this practice:  
“Staff are afraid that if they report a maternal death then they will get some punishment. 
They feel that they may be blamed for not taking care of the mother. They escape by not 
mentioning maternal or child deaths… If the message goes to a higher level, then some 
action may be taken, some investigation may be conducted to find out the reason for death. 
Like if the HB [hemoglobin] was less, then superiors will ask ‘why was this not taken care 
of?’" (I-36, District administrative official)  
 
C. Indirect forms of data manipulation 
Drawing on experiences from their supportive supervision visits, district staff observed other subtle 
forms of data manipulation. For example, they often felt data on the distribution of health 
commodities (e.g., oral contraceptive pills) were retrofitted to match the existing health facility 
inventories and were not based on verifiable data reported in health workers’ registers. Before 
meetings with district administrative officials, district staff also described requests by district health 
officials to hide data on poorly performing indicators from meeting presentations to avoid bringing 




Opportunities for data manipulation 
A. Discretion 
Many district staff observed that unchecked power and authority exercised by senior block and 
district health officials created opportunities for data manipulation. Their high level of discretion 
coupled with little demand for accurate data resulted in low prioritization of data quality processes, 
which was problematic for two main reasons.  
 
First, without explicit support from their health officials, data staff in blocks and districts were unable 
to convene data validation meetings and unable to create accountability for other health staff to 
deliver on their data quality-related tasks.  Second, other lower-level staff’s lack of seniority limited 
their ability to prevent district and block health officials from requiring data manipulation. For 
example, when district health officials demanded that data be fixed or changed, district data staff 
described their reluctance to push back because their job security was directly tied to district health 
officials’ opinion of them. Furthermore, the lack of avenues available to district staff, particularly 
data staff, to report their grievances was problematic; as one stated, “who would they raise their 
voices to when all the feedback goes back to one person?” (I-16). Similar challenges were described 
at the block-level between block staff and block health officials. 
 
B. Accountability 
District staff described the implementation of two competing forms of accountability within the 
health system: district- and state-level leadership created strong accountability mechanisms for 
performance, while weakly enforcing accountability for data quality. For accurate data to inform 






1. Accountability for performance 
District-level performance was largely based on the monthly district rankings in the UP-Health 
Dashboard. A district’s rank was routinely reviewed during meetings with district health and 
administrative officials. If the district’s ranking was low, district staff felt the focus shifted to 
pinpointing blame rather than examining the drivers of low performance:  
“They [District administrative officials] just want to see their A grading of the district. No 
one wants to know that we cannot do well in the outpatient department because we do not 
have doctors” (I-32, District data staff).   
 
Following these meetings, district health and administrative officials reportedly sanctioned 
punishments via official letters or requests for “action taken reports” requiring explanations for poor 
performance. Unofficial forms of communication like threats to withhold salaries or delay approval 
of holidays were also reportedly used by district leadership, a point corroborated by the district health 
officials and administrative leaders we interviewed.  
 
The district leadership’s emphasis on accountability for performance was seen to mirror state-level 
priorities, as meetings between districts and states predominantly focused on monitoring targets and 
performance based on the district rankings. Most state-level respondents corroborated this, saying 
they used data to monitor performance as opposed to identify or address issues of data quality.  
 
2. Accountability for data quality 
Despite the presence of two formal mechanisms to improve data quality – supportive supervision 
visits and data validation committee meetings – six factors appeared to weaken their enforcement: (i) 




perception that district performance reflects one’s own performance, (v) systemic corruption; and (vi) 
weak processes for disciplining or dismissing staff.  
 
First, district-level respondents described an inadequate level of understanding about data quality – 
what good data quality means and how it is measured – among district administrative and health 
leadership. Often “good data” were interpreted as “good performance” and not necessarily “good 
quality data.” Relatedly, some district- and state-level respondents rationalized poor performance by 
explaining that services were being systematically underreported:  
“We are doing very good work, our doctors, paramedics… but it is not reflected in the data 
because you [they] are not managing the data. It is not that the doctors are not seeing the 
patients, day by day the OPD [Outpatient Department] load is increasing… but it is not 
reflected in the data” (I-58, State-level respondent).  
 
This perception that services are being delivered but being underreported may also explain why 
reporting errors were not given due consideration when identified during district data validation 
meetings: 
"They [data entry operators or community health workers] do not worry about writing the 
wrong data. They just say, ‘Oh, it went wrong, tell me what to fill here.’ Here, data does not 
mean true data" (I-18, District data staff).  
 
Some district-level data staff further explained that less time was invested in recording, reviewing 
and assessing the data quality of data that did not inform the district-level rankings and were not 





Second, high workload associated with the implementation of a number of national health programs 
and fortnightly health campaigns also contributed to the low prioritization of data quality 
accountability mechanisms, like supportive supervision. As one district data staff noted: “In practice, 
we have so much work that supportive supervision actually becomes too much…there is no time to do 
actually do it” (I-27). District data staff also reported that some of them preferred “changing the 
data” rather than conducting supportive supervision (I-43).  
 
When supportive supervision did occur, district data staff questioned the quality of these visits, 
describing them as informal “tea-visits” rather than official validations of web-based data (I-43). 
This laxness was attributed to district staff’s minimal training on using the supportive supervision 
checklist or lack of sincerity towards work. 
 
Third, the state leadership’s emphasis on performance over data quality contributed to weak 
enforcement of data quality at district and block levels. Several district data staff felt this was evident 
in the little attention given to data quality issues when data demonstrated good performance (e.g., a 
high district ranking): “The trouble is, if the performance is good on the basis of data, no one is 
going to ask anything [about data quality]” (I-43). In a similar vein, one state-level respondent 
explained if the focus is on demonstrating improvement, using the data source that fits that 
messaging becomes priority. 
 
State-level respondents also said there was limited demand for data quality at the state-level. 
According to some, lack of consideration for data quality was perhaps most reflected in a decision to 
minimize the functions of a data unit within the DOMHFW. Until 2015, this cell was responsible for 
reviewing paper-based administrative data and hosting monthly meetings to review the quality of 




web-based reporting, some state-level respondents said that the state leadership felt a less prominent 
role for the data unit was justified. Regardless, district data staff and state-level respondents 
universally expressed the importance of establishing clear lines of reporting from district-level data 
units to the state-level data units. State-level respondents further articulated that building capacity for 
data analysis and data quality in DOMHFW would be critical for improving accountability for data 
quality. 
 
Fourth, some district-level respondents explained the difficult tradeoff they faced between upholding 
data quality or using data to show good district performance, because the latter factored into their 
performance assessment: “You can look at the data to actually see whether or not things are 
improving and to track health programs; or, you can focus on looking at the data mainly as a way to 
save your own job” (I-13, District data staff). This conflict of interest was also applicable to 
community, block, and district staff/officials, as one district administrative official explained. 
 
Fifth, district-level respondents explained how political or personal connections with members of the 
legislative assembly or district health and administrative officials weakened accountability for data 
quality and data manipulation at lower administrative levels. For example, district data staff 
described how those who manipulate data at community or block levels were protected by district 
health officials who they had bribed for their current positions or were connected with through 
existing systems of kick-back.  
 
Finally, and related to the point above, influential connections coupled with high levels of discretion 
meant that senior block and district health officials rarely bore the consequences of engaging in 




enforce disciplinary measures against a block health official who was extorting a portion of the 
financial incentives given to community health workers for supporting institutional deliveries: 
 “If I tell the CMO [chief medical officers/district health official], the CMO will not take any 
action. The previous CMO would have called the MOIC [medical officer-in-charge/block 
health official] and said, ‘Listen I heard this news. You need to give me this much for this 
problem to go away…’” (I-29). 
 
Politics aside, many district-level respondents pointed to the lengthy process for dismissing and 
suspending government employees (Legal Service India, 2018), which made holding them 
accountable very difficult. Despite being aware of the problems associated with corruption, district 
administrative officials submitted that in light of significant human resources constraints, making do 
with the staff they had was their only option.  
 
3. Examples of strong enforcement of district-level data quality accountability mechanisms 
District staff identified two factors contributing to the strong enforcement of data quality 
accountability mechanisms at the district-level. First, district health and administrative officials who 
prioritized good quality data, through their enforcement of supportive supervision visits and review 
or presentation of those reports during meetings. Second, many district health officials with better 
enforcement of data quality processes held weekly meetings with block-level officials/staff to ensure 
consistent achievement of targets, troubleshoot problems, and safeguard against data manipulation.  
 
On a broader scale, there was a consensus across respondents of all levels that the replacement of 
paper-based reporting with digital reporting increased accountability for good quality data and 




“Now with HMIS/UP-HMIS [web-based reporting platforms], manual [paper-based] reporting 
is decreasing, things are improving. Previously, it was difficult to catch errors but now with 
digitization, it’s easier for us to go back in time and see what data were being reported. With 
data coming online, we have capacity to do more analytical work.” (I-78, State-level respondent) 
 
Interviews with division- and state-level respondents also signaled increasing prioritization of data 
quality at higher administrative levels with the recent development of a division-level monitoring and 
evaluation unit, as well as a state-level data validation committee and audit team. State-level 
respondents also noted that demand for the states, including UP, to improve data quality was coming 
from the national-level, particularly, the Niti Aayog, India’s planning commission:  
“Niti Aayog is not accepting [paper-based] data so all are focusing on HMIS data and that 
has to be correct and complete… they are ensuring HMIS should have correct data entry, 
data validation committee should be there, data should be checked and data output should be 
maximized, so this process is beginning now.” (I-55, State-level respondent) 
 
Pressures to manipulate data 
A. Performance pressures  
A high-pressure environment geared towards results and achievement of targets was evident in the 
content and number of meetings held at the district, and between districts and the state. Low 
achievement in the district rankings resulted in videoconferences with senior state-level leadership, 
which many district data staff described as a “one-way communication” where the state-leadership 
restated its performance expectations (I-25, District data staff).  
 
District staff felt this top-down pressure was reiterated during district-level meetings with district 




district rankings, district administrators (e.g., district magistrates) would demand improvement. 
District staff universally stated that the district magistrates would never suggest “changing or 
manipulating the data,” however, to steer clear of their “scolding” during the next meeting, district 
and block health officials would demand their staff to “increase the reporting” of priority health 
indicators. As one district data staff explained: 
“The thing is that they [block health officials and staff] have already understood that in the 
previous meeting, I was scolded for this. … So, if any one of the MOIC [medical-officer-in 
charge/block-level health official] was scolded for this HBNC [home-based newborn care] 
thing in the last month; to take care of that next month they will do this [data manipulation]" 
(I-43, District data staff). 
 
Many district staff described feeling “frustrated,” “burnt out,” and “overburdened.” However, one 
district staff noted that the most severe performance pressure was yet to come: rankings of district 
program managers, who are contractual data staff of the NHM. At the time of these interviews, these 
rankings were being developed by the GOUP, and the expectation was that they would be released 
every month alongside the district rankings (UP NHM, 2019). 
 
B. Punitive work environment 
Fear-based tactics, such as transfers or holding back salaries were often employed by district health 
and administrative officials to increase accountability for program performance. These tactics were 
observed during district-level meeting observations and confirmed by the district health and 
administrative officials we interviewed, who noted using similar approaches. 
 
Many district program and data staff described “holding their breath” when attending district-level or 




performance. The pressures to “fix” or “improve” performance fostered an organizational culture 
where data manipulation became a coping strategy, which was operationalized via informal networks 
with district and block health officials, and data staff at the block and district levels. In particular, to 
draw less attention and scrutiny during meetings with district administrative officials or state-level 
officials if ranked as a top district, district staff said their district health officials preferred to be 
“somewhere in the middle” of the district rankings as one noted: “CMO [District health official] is 
satisfied as long as we are ranked somewhere in the middle. Same with DM [District 
Magistrate/district administrative official]" (I-43, district data staff). 
 
Rationalization 
Not all district staff succumbed to the pressures of their environment. Many responded to these 
pressures by using existing technical reasons for being unable to manipulate data. One district data 
staff recalled refusing a request by clearly stating: “We [assistant research officers/district data staff] 
are not data generators. We compile data” (I-37).  
 
Other district data staff also described flatly ignoring requests to change data. For example, district 
data staff, who were aware of data being manipulated, refused from clicking the “submit” button on 
the online UP-HMIS that would record those data on the UP-HMIS web-based data portal. In another 
example, a district data staff described a peer’s strong adherence to data quality principles, who 
continued to report actual attendance data of block-level medical officers despite facing high levels 
of pressure to inflate their attendance. However, persistently ignoring these requests resulted in a 
hostile work environment, which eventually led to the data staff’s resignation.  
  
District data staff also noted how many districts had “rapid increases in district ranking even though 




were attributed to manipulating the district rankings indicators. In such situations, when it was 
obvious that other districts were engaging in the practice, resisting data manipulation was socially 
unpopular. This challenge was reiterated by another district data staff who described how the district 
health official felt peer pressure to demonstrate progress when comparable districts had high district 
ranks, which the respondent speculated was due to overreporting (I-37). In short, data manipulation 
was seen as the way to survive within the broader system that appeared to condone the practice. 
 
District-level respondents also felt job security and family financial security were often used as 
justification for data manipulation. One district data staff reflected on a personal transformation from 
wanting “to change the system” and abiding by abstract ethical norms to the current realization that 




Our study identified the main forms of administrative health data manipulation (Table 11) and the 
informal networks that operationalized the practice to provide a clearer view of the underlying 
factors that incentivize data manipulation. This analysis also presents the first application of the Vian 
corruption in the health system framework to study data manipulation. While the topic of data 
manipulation has been peripherally examined in the context of falsification of records for personal 
financial gain, and misreporting of administrative data to meet targets or benefit from results-based 
aid programs (Qazi and Ali, 2011; Sandefur and Glassman, 2015; Closser, 2019), our goal through 






Based on our analysis, we find that the problem of data manipulation, in part, reflects the persistent 
disconnect between “brilliantly formulated policies” and “realities on the ground”(Pritchett, 2009). In 
UP, HMIS policies clearly stated the objective of using good quality data in decision-making. 
However, the uneven implementation of data use and data quality policies at local levels resulted in 
competing systems of accountability. More specifically, the overemphasis on one aspect of the data 
use policies (i.e., using district rankings to create accountability for performance, and not the related 
aspect of identifying gaps and devising actions plans for improvement) - created unrealistic 
expectations of achieving significant improvements in a short time (or, before the next monthly 
district ranking). 
 
Top-down pressures from the state translated to stronger system-wide enforcement of accountability 
for performance rather than data quality. The absence of functional state-level data units reflected the 
void in state-level demand for better data quality, further amplifying these pressures. At the district-
level, performance pressures were reinforced by a punitive performance management system, where 
district staff/health officials were chastised during high-level meetings for low district rankings. 
Furthermore, a major conflict of interest emerged: the performance of district/block health officials, 
who were responsible for data quality were also judged on those same data (via the district ranking). 
This situation perversely incentivized data manipulation and led to a break down in the formal 
channels of accountability, transparency, and enforcement of practices for good data quality. Since 
job security of lower level staff was strongly tied to their obedience to superiors’ directives, the 
discretionary powers of officials often remained unchecked. Finally, the widespread social 
acceptability of data manipulation, in part to cope with the performance pressures, resulted in the 





Our study mirrors findings from other studies where data were manipulated for personal financial 
gain and to achieve outlined targets (Qazi and Ali, 2011; Sandefur and Glassman, 2015; Closser, 
2019). However, unlike these studies, which have explored pressures to manipulate data in the 
context of achieving external donor-outlined targets and performance-based aid (Sandefur and 
Glassman, 2015; Closser, 2019), we found that data manipulation was a coping strategy to manage 
pressures associated with a punitive work culture which demanded achievements of aggressive 
targets quickly. The approaches to performance management - naming, shaming and blaming – more 
commonly affected contractual staff working in data units, who were less capable of effectively 
responding to pressures from their superiors. As observed in other studies, we found the data units 
lacked functional independence and had little discretionary power at the district-level, and were 
incapacitated at the state-level, allowing data manipulation to persist (Sandefur and Glassman, 2015).  
 
Consistent with other studies, we also found that enforcement of accountability for data quality were 
weaker for those connected with influential politicians or those who had bought their positions from 
them because they had impunity for non-performance (Closser, 2019). In addition, we found that the 
overwhelming influence of indirect social pressures via socially acceptable working norms created a 
tension between delivering on the expectations of peers and supervisors in the district and abiding by 
abstract ethical norms. One corruption theory grounded in behavioral sciences explains that 
individuals who are likely to be involved in corruption are “those who internalize the sanction 
(experience guilt, shame or embarrassment)” for not participating in their organization’s corrupt 
practices, and “conclude they have in fact done wrong” by rebuking those corrupt practices; though 
their actions chastising corruption would be considered correct outside their networks (Smith-Crowe 
and Warren, 2014). This point further demonstrates the challenges of working in punitive 
environment, where possibly false impressions of reality (e.g., feeling embarrassed for not achieving 




While our analysis describes the main forces of data manipulation and how they interact with one 
another, we were unable to fully examine if pressures to manipulate data subside when technical and 
resources constraints within the system are addressed. In our interviews with respondents from high 
priority districts, which receive additional technical support, we anticipated fewer pressures to 
manipulate data. However, contrary to expectation, they reported similar experiences with data 
manipulation to those articulated by respondents in non-high priority districts, suggesting that issues 
of data manipulation and corruption are not a mere reflection of insufficient resources but broader 
organizational cultural issues. 
 
There have been louder calls for countries to implement top-down anti-corruption approaches and 
strengthen system-wide governance initiatives (Sudarshan and Prashanth, 2011). In 2013, the 
Government of India (GOI) instituted Lokpal and Lokayukta to investigate corruption at the national 
and state-levels respectively (The Times of India, 2013). States like Karnataka, also expanded 
Lokayukta into vigilance cells within health departments (The Times of India, 2013). While it is 
currently unclear, whether these units are able to identify or even address issues of data manipulation, 
the Government of India has started implementing national data quality audits to strengthen data 
quality. The frequency, breadth (in terms of indicators and geography), and feasibility of conducting 
data quality audits seems challenging in large states like UP with nearly 29,000 public health 
facilities. Even if they are implemented as intended, it would be critical for the national government 
to penalize practices of data manipulation to curb recurrences, as well as devise strategies to address 
the root causes of it.  
 
Our study has several limitations worth highlighting. First, we examined the drivers of data 
manipulation, and while our respondents spoke with us extensively about data manipulation 




we recognize that the sensitive nature of this research may have resulted in social desirability bias. 
However, we attempted to address this limitation through prolonged engagement in the field, rapport 
building with participants, and generating detailed and nuanced accounts that would reveal a full 
picture. Third, due to their busy schedules, we were unable to extensively capture the views senior 
district health and administrative officials (e.g., chief medical officers and district magistrates) whose 
insights may have further illuminated the findings from this study.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This study unpacks the main drivers of data manipulation and shows why these practices persist 
despite the strong initiatives to improve data quality by the GOUP. A deeper understanding of the 
underlying barriers to data manipulation is the first step towards identifying strategies to curb this 
practice. While stakeholder engagements in UP will be required to identify context-appropriate 
strategies in UP, our study identifies three main entry points to mitigate data manipulation: (1) 
changing the incentive structures, for there to be equal emphasis on data quality as there is on 
performance data; (2) strengthening checks and balances to reinforce the integrity of data-related 
processes at all levels; and (3) implementing system-wide policies that make data manipulation an 
unacceptable anomaly.  Future evidence on context-relevant top-down and bottom-up strategies to 





Chapter 5. Discussion and conclusions  
 
5.1 Research purpose  
Leveraging both qualitative and quantitative methods, this dissertation explored the non-technical 
determinants of Health Management Information System (HMIS) performance, such as 
organizational and behavioral factors, that are often less examined in the literature. Chapter 2 
explained the observed gap between well-intentioned HMIS policies and their implementation by 
analyzing how organizational factors and culture shaped implementation processes. Chapter 3 
quantitatively analyzed the variations in data quality for HMIS indicators that are used in 
performance metrics (like district rankings) and are associated with financial incentives with those 
that are only collected for routine monitoring. Finally, Chapter 4 described the types of HMIS data 
manipulation observed in Uttar Pradesh (UP), and their underlying drivers. 
 
This chapter summarizes the key results from each of the three papers, presents the strengths and 
limitations of the overall study, and describes the broader policy implications as well as 
recommendations for future research.  
 
5.2 Summary of findings  
Chapter 2 identified four key factors that affected HMIS policy implementation and performance in 
Uttar Pradesh. First, respondents described the human resource shortages, including the lack of 
block-level data entry operators, which overburdened existing staff and weakened the 
implementation of HMIS activities. A second implementation gap was the inadequate knowledge 
about UP-HMIS policy guidelines, and limited computer literacy among block- and district-level 




District data staff, particularly contractual data staff, described how their limited power and authority 
required them to escalate minor issues to the level of the district-leadership in order to create 
accountability among other staff for UP-HMIS activities. However, district-level data staff also noted 
that working within a very hierarchical organizational system meant having to follow their 
supervisors’ directives– even if they contradicted HMIS policy guidelines. A fourth gap affecting 
HMIS performance was the overemphasis on using monthly district rankings to create accountability 
for performance. Though the primary policy intention was to use district rankings to guide 
improvements in program implementation, district-level respondents described how their superiors’ 
“fixation” with becoming a top-ranking district, often meant disregarding the quality of data 
informing district rankings.  
 
Chapter 3 showed that data quality metrics for completeness and internal consistency varied by the 
four HMIS indicator categories (ranked, incentivized, ranked and incentivized, and unranked and 
unincentivized). The highest level of completeness in the monthly health facility reports was 
observed for ranked indicators, closely followed by ranked and incentivized indicators, incentivized 
indicators and finally, unranked and unincentivized indicators, which had the highest percentage of 
missing data. The high percentage of completeness for ranked indicators may be explained by the 
demand by district and state leadership to review these data during monthly meetings. 
 
Contrary to expectation, when examining the percentage of outliers, we found that ranked indicators 
had the smallest percentage of extreme outliers and unranked and unincentivized indicators had the 
highest percentage of extreme outliers. However, findings from internal consistency ratios revealed 
higher levels of systematic overreporting of ranked and incentivized indicators relative to unranked 
and unincentivized indicators. Together, these findings suggest that ranked and incentivized 




superiors that may prompt investigations. Finally, with respect to the performance of the three data 
quality metrics (completeness, outliers, internal consistency) by monthly facility reports in high 
priority districts (HPDs) and non-high priority districts (non-HPDs), as expected, we observed higher 
levels of completeness across the four indicator categories in monthly facility reports from HPDs. 
However, we observed the same percentage of moderate and extreme outliers, and evidence for 
potential overreporting of ranked and incentivized indicators relative to unranked and unincentivized 
indicators (based on internal consistency ratios) in monthly facility reports from both HPDs and non-
HPDs. 
 
Chapter 4 described the four types of data manipulation observed by district-level respondents and 
the underlying drivers of data manipulation in UP. The four types of data manipulation described 
were: (i) the overreporting of positive indicators, for example, health service indicators like 
institutional deliveries; (ii) the underreporting of negative indicators, e.g., reporting of maternal 
deaths or stillbirths; (iii) the retrofitting of health commodities data to match health facility 
inventories at the end of the month; and (iv) hiding data that showed low progress from presentations 
to senior district or state officials.  
 
Many district respondents observed that unchecked power and authority exercised by senior block 
and district health officials created opportunities for data manipulation. Their high level of discretion 
coupled with little demand for accurate data resulted in low prioritization of data quality processes. 
Relatedly, district-level respondents emphasized that opportunities for data manipulation were 
created, when accountability mechanisms for data quality were weakly enforced, which they 
attributed to six factors: (i) poor understanding of data quality; (ii) high workload; (iii) overemphasis 
on performance data; (iv) perception that district performance reflects one’s own performance, (v) 




Performance pressures and punitive work culture were also identified as key factors that created 
pressure to manipulate data. A high-pressure environment geared towards results and achievement of 
targets was evident in the content and number of meetings held at the district-level, and between 
districts and the state. Many district-level respondents also described the use of fear-based tactics, 
such as transfers or holding back salaries to increase accountability for program performance.   
Finally, district-level respondents explained the social pressure to manipulate data and described job 
security and financial security for one’s family as reasons to justify data manipulation. 
 
Some district-level staff described resisting manipulating data by drawing on technical reasons for 
being unable to change data or flatly ignoring requests. However, as potential elements of a broader 
strategy to mitigate data manipulation, district- and state-level respondents identified several 
potential avenues for exploration, including, the replacement of paper-based reports with digital 
reporting and the implementation of skills-based trainings to build technical knowledge among data 
and program staff. However, respondents noted that the most important factor to address data 
manipulation is having leadership that values, demands, and prioritizes good quality data in decision-
making.  
 
Conclusions from all three research papers demonstrate that issues of a weak HMIS implementation 
are not merely a reflection of insufficient resources or the lack of technical guidelines. Our 
qualitative findings (in Chapters 2 and 4) describe how organizational cultural factors – particularly, 
challenges associated with working within a strict hierarchy, and broader performance pressures and 
punitive work culture resulted in weak enforcement of data quality mechanisms, and created perverse 
incentives to manipulate district ranking indicators to show high achievement of performance 
metrics. The HMIS data quality analysis (in Chapter 3) corroborated these assessments and presented 




performance measures like district rankings and financial incentives. Findings from all three chapters 
demonstrate the lack of alignment in goals among health actors in data units and those in leadership 
positions, which resulted in data quality goals often being at odds with the goal of achieving a high 
district ranking. Findings also point to the need for strengthening the integrity of data-related 
processes at all levels of the health system, and implementing system-wide policies that make data 
manipulation an anomaly, not a norm. 
 
5.3 Strengths and limitations 
Since the strengths and limitations of each paper are highlighted in Chapters 2-4, this section reflects 
on the overall strengths and weaknesses of the dissertation. A major strength of the dissertation is the 
collaboration with technical partners of the GOUP -  the Uttar Pradesh Technical Support Unit (UP-
TSU), who had intimate understanding of the state’s governance structure and the UP-HMIS policy 
guidelines - throughout the dissertation research. First, research questions were designed to be policy 
relevant and were developed in consultation with the UP-TSU. The study tools, which were based on 
an initial document review, were further refined following discussions with colleagues at the UP-
TSU, and interviews with HMIS program implementers at the block and district levels. During data 
collection, emerging themes were also shared with colleagues at the UP-TSU. At this time, findings 
presented in Chapters 2-4 have been shared with UP-TSU colleagues for their written feedback, and 
meetings have been planned in August 2020 to discuss the interpretation of the dissertation’s 
findings, and the policy implications of this work in greater detail.  
 
Second, this dissertation leverages both qualitative and quantitative methods, such as in-depth 
interviews, meeting observations, document review, and descriptive quantitative analyses, which has 




triangulate findings from in-depth interviews with district-level meeting observations, which 
provided direct empirical evidence on behaviors and interactions pertaining to hierarchy and 
performance management. Similarly, the quantitative component of this dissertation (Chapter 3) 
corroborated qualitative findings (Chapters 2 and 4) by quantifying the level of potential 
overreporting of ranked and incentivized HMIS indicators compared to unranked and unincentivized 
HMIS indicators. 
 
Finally, being able to conduct all the in-depth interviews and meeting observations myself over the 
span of one year has had several advantages. My prolonged engagement in UP helped me build and 
gain the trust of my respondents and allowed me to better understand the organizational and health 
system culture that my respondents operate within. My long-term presence in UP also exposed me to 
a wide a range of respondents across different districts, which allowed me to iterate on the in-depth 
interview guide, develop nuanced accounts of my respondents’ experiences with HMIS 
implementation, and conduct interviews until data saturation was achieved.  
 
While the strengths described above improved the quality of the overall dissertation, there are 
shortcomings worth noting. In addition to those specified in each chapter, one major limitation of this 
dissertation was being unable to quantify the prevalence of data manipulation observed across 
districts in UP, even though we were able to identify the drivers of HMIS data manipulation (Chapter 
4) and quantitatively present evidence for potential overreporting, a type of data manipulation 
(Chapter 3). To enhance the quantitative findings presented, a data validation audit that verifies the 
HMIS data entered in source documents, like facility-level registers with UP-HMIS web portal data 
could have provided direct evidence on the practice of data manipulation. Second, the qualitative 
data collection for this dissertation happened in three phases over the span of one-year, and districts 




collection, which may have shaped their responses to some questions. However, because all the 
district-level policies examined in this dissertation had already been released by the GOUP at the 
start of data collection, this limitation is unlikely to significantly modify the findings presented here. 
 
5.4 Policy implications 
The findings from this dissertation have immediate- and long-term policy implications for 
strengthening HMIS performance in UP. The first three recommendations focus on drawing on 
technical strategies to improve HMIS performance in the state. The remaining recommendations 
largely focus on building an organizational culture that demands and values good HMIS data quality 
for decision-making.  
 
(1) Improve the number of qualified staff who can carry out data-related activities at all levels 
health systems 
One of the most critical gaps affecting HMIS performance is the overburdened block-level data entry 
operators, who are responsible for entering paper-based facility reports from 26 to 31 health facilities 
(depending on block size) to up to 16 web-based health program portals every month. Hiring 
additional data entry operators is the most obvious solution for reducing the reporting burden, and the 
current scale up of electronic data entry platforms like ANMOL (Auxiliary Nurse Midwives Online) 
by the GOUP may drastically help reduce the reporting burden on block-level data entry operators. 
However, as the findings in Chapter 2 explained, ensuring the availability of data entry operators 
(and human resources, generally) is not enough, as they are often redirected to other activities at the 
behest of their supervisors. To improve the performance of HMIS in the state, the GOUP must ensure 





In particular, alleviating the workload placed on district-level staff (e.g., assistant chief medical 
officers/program staff) would require addressing the uneven distribution of responsibilities among 
them. For example, the GOUP may consider establishing a cutoff for the maximum number of health 
programs one program staff is allowed to manage. Implementation of such a directive may help 
reduce situations which disproportionately overburden few program staff and in turn may encourage 
all program staff to take on greater ownership of their programs, including their program data.  
 
Second, the GOUP should consider developing an ongoing collaboration with staffing agencies to 
establish a staffing pool that can be drawn upon in times of acute need. These staffing agencies can 
vet and assign the most qualified candidates to support the block or district’s short-term needs, for 
example, to support the implementation of monthly national health campaigns and short-term health 
drives, which often result in existing staff being redirected to support these “urgent” activities, 
thereby disrupting the implementation of routine data-related activities.  
 
Relatedly, findings showed how the lower status of contractual data staff relative to permanent staff 
inhibited them from effectively overseeing the implementation of HMIS data-related activities. 
Strategies that bridge the hierarchical divide between permanent and contractual staff and integrate 
contractual staff into the existing workforce would be critical for creating and enforcing 
accountability for HMIS-related activities. 
 
Lastly, addressing the persistent human resources shortages across different cadres who are required 
to support HMIS processes at different levels will require the GOUP to identify sustainable 
mechanisms and strategies for producing, retaining, and equitably distributing health workers in the 





(2) Invest in skill-based trainings, and automate data analysis to close existing technical knowledge 
gaps affecting HMIS performance  
Trainings during the scale-up of the UP-HMIS assumed a key competency: computer literacy and 
basic computer skills among block- and district-level staff. This oversight, in part, reflects the 
changing workforce in UP: new hires are often computer literate but lack technical knowledge of 
HMIS; whereas, older staff, who are nearing retirement, are better-versed in HMIS processes but 
remain less skilled with computers. In this context, the GOUP should consider developing targeted 
training sessions that address gaps in technical knowledge and computer literacy to ensure effective 
implementation of HMIS processes by all cadres in the health system. Developing and implementing 
an effective training program may involve drawing on theories about adult learning techniques, 
which outline the distinct styles with which adults learn and retain materials (Knowles, 1970) 
especially for those who continue to show deficiencies in their technical understanding of the HMIS 
despite have received prior trainings. In addition, the GOUP should consider routinely updating 
training content and implementing trainings (virtually or in-person) when data collection formats or 
data collection processes are changed so that health cadres responsible for data entry and analysis 
remain up-to-date with data demands for new and existing health programs.  
 
Aside from trainings, to close technical and computer literacy gaps, automating basic technical 
analyses, such as the generation of monthly reports, and building additional data validation checks 
(including those proposed in Chapter 3), may be helpful to block-level data staff, who often rely on 






(3) Draw on technical strategies to improve data quality and increase the transparency of data being 
reported at all levels of the health system 
Technical strategies that promote data entry at source may inhibit “fixing” of data at the block levels, 
and bring transparency and accountability, especially as data are entered in real-time. As of July 
2020, the GOUP has been scaling up the use of electronic data entry platforms like ANMOL 
(auxiliary nurse midwives online), which will enable frontline staff to directly enter data into web-
based portals via tablets. The state-wide implementation of such platforms would increase the 
availability of real-time data, which may encourage greater use of data for decision-making and help 
enhance transparency as more staff within the heath system would be able to view the data, making it 
harder to make changes to the data and establish informal networks for data manipulation (Press 
Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare et al., 2016).  
Similarly, technical approaches, such as incorporating additional data validation metrics as proposed 
in Chapter 3 to identify potential overreporting of ranked and incentivized indicators relative to 
unranked and unincentivized indicators may help identify data quality errors early on, which may be 
followed up or verified during supportive supervision visits or audits at the facility-level.  
 
(4) Build leadership, and ownership to generate accountability for good quality data at all levels of 
the health system 
Having strong leadership that values, demands, and prioritizes good quality data in decision-making 
is critical for creating an organizational culture where data quality is prioritized, and mechanisms to 
strengthen HMIS data quality are enforced at all levels of the health system. Instilling among 
leadership at all levels of health system the value of data quality is critical and may require additional 
trainings to illustrate the benefits of good data quality and to further develop relevant skills for 





Aside from leadership being a critical factor in creating accountability for good quality data within 
the health system, the GOUP should strengthen the capacity of existing data units or establish a new, 
integrated data unit within the Directorate to coordinate, monitor and evaluate data quality processes 
across the state. To effectively lead, state-level data units must have sufficient financial and decision-
making authority to develop and implement data quality initiatives, as well as enforce accountability 
mechanisms to promote good HMIS data quality at all levels of the health system.  
 
Most importantly, state-level data units could help strengthen existing GOUP initiatives, such as, the 
implementation of the state-level data validation committee meetings, and data quality audits, which 
have been weakly implemented. Relatedly, the state-level data units could play a broader analytic 
role to support better planning and monitoring of health programs being implemented in the state.  
 
(5) Create incentives for good data quality, and disincentives for data manipulation 
At the district-level, findings clearly demonstrated the tangible benefits of achieving high district 
rankings, such as better postings and promotions of health and administrative officials from top-
ranking districts. In addition, top-ranking district officials were also less likely be to “named and 
shamed” for poor performance during district and state high-level meetings. Consequently, 
maintaining or achieving top district rankings took precedence over enforcing data quality 
mechanisms, especially when the incentives for good data quality and the disincentives for bad data 
quality were both lacking.  
 
The GOUP may consider the following incentives to improve HMIS data quality: (i) computing a 
metric for data accuracy, which is calculated into the monthly district rankings; (ii) implementing a 
“naming and faming” strategy (Zomer, 2018) that recognizes block and district officials, whose 




requiring district and state officials to review the data quality results from supportive supervision 
visits and data validation committee meetings, just as the GOUP guidelines mandate the review of 
the monthly district rankings from the UP Health Dashboard during these meetings.  
 
To disincentivize data manipulation, the GOUP should clearly articulate the consequences of data 
manipulation in policy guidelines and enforce those guidelines. This policy should be considered as a 
part of a broader anti-corruption agenda which should include: (i) requiring district health officials to 
disclose conflicts of interests that could influence the recruitment, appointment or promotions of staff 
in the district; and (ii) expanding the Lokpal and Lokayukta’s role by establishing vigilance cells to 
strengthen system-wide governance and employment grievance redressal mechanisms in the GOUP 
health system (The Times of India, 2013). Successful implementation of these initiatives will require 
strong leaders, who are passionate about defeating corruption and able to navigate political 
repercussions.  
 
In addition, the GOUP should consider removing any direct or indirect “incentives” for potential data 
manipulation. By introducing “randomness” in the selection of indicators used to compute the 
monthly district rankings, the GOUP may reduce the perverse incentive for data manipulation. 
Relatedly, by expanding the pool of district ranking indicators, the GOUP could also increase 
attention given to health programs that are overlooked. Lastly, it is important to recognize that 
“urgencies,” like, the immediate implementation of a national campaign and the expectation of high 
achievement often opens an opportunity for data manipulation because of the high pressure health 
officials feel to deliver on results in a short period of time. The GOUP may like to consider strategies 






(6) Build respect for data managers and data staff within the health system 
Building respect for data managers and data staff within the health system, who are responsible for 
implementing and overseeing data-related activities will be critical to improving HMIS performance. 
Creating a collaborative working environment based on mutual respect and one that recognizes their 
essential role in the health system may increase the status of data managers and staff. Some tangible 
approaches may include a combination of financial and non-financial approaches, such as, increasing 
salaries to retain employees but also recognizing staff who have exceeded expectations. The 
government may also consider establishing mechanisms for absorbing contractual data staff into 
established government positions, which may also help address the power dynamics that exist 
between permanent staff and contractual staff, many of whom were hired to support data-related 
activities.  
 
(7) Strengthen the public health capacity to ensure leadership and staff at different levels of the 
health system are well-equipped to make strategic decisions to guide program improvement 
District-level respondents described that high-level meetings with their supervisors generally focused 
on the importance of achieving a high district ranking, but seldom in those meetings did they discuss 
“how” to improve the program performance within the district. While this observation certainly 
underscores the need to reshape organizational incentives (as discussed in point 3-5 above), it 
possibly also reflects a mismatch of expectations between district health staff and officials, and their 
superiors. District health officials and staff expect their superiors to provide them with technical and 
analytical guidance. Yet many district administrative officials have limited formal public health 
training, given their role is to govern across all sectors within the district, not just health. At the same 
time, there is an implicit assumption by district administrative officials that their district health 
officials and staff have the relevant technical public health competencies to single-handedly manage 




already suggested, “public health is not clinical medicine” (McPherson, 2001). Effective public 
health governance, which is inherently complex, requires the intersection of multiple skillsets, 
disciplines, and sectors.  
 
Therefore, addressing this challenge requires considering several issues, such as: (i) establishing or 
strengthening technical units with public health experts, possibly at the division- or state-levels, that 
can provide targeted guidance to districts on how to improve the implementation and performance of 
their health programs; (ii) clarifying the roles and responsibilities of which units or teams are 
expected to provide the technical leadership necessary for improving program performance at the 
district, division and state-levels; and (iii) ensuring those units have access to the relevant resources 
and skillsets necessary to achieve their intended goals.  
 
To take this work forward, perhaps, the most important next step would be to host one or more 
roundtable discussions with government stakeholders from block, district, division and state levels to 
identify strategies for improving data quality and strengthening HMIS performance in UP. These 
discussions could happen over four stages, for example: (i) first, present evidence from this 
dissertation and other resources to collectively frame the key problems affecting HMIS data quality 
and broader HMIS performance; (ii) second, brainstorm and map relevant strategies to address the 
problems identified based on best practices from districts in UP and those from other states; (iii) 
third, identify the key stakeholders (by role, and authority) whose involvement would be critical for 
championing the implementation of identified strategies; and (iv) finally, synthesize the discussions 
from parts (i-iii) into actionable policy briefs for consultation with a broader set of government 





5.5 Future research 
While this dissertation addressed a number of questions, it also gave rise to further questions 
summarized in two key areas presented below. 
 
(1) Explore incentives to improve HMIS performance, particularly data quality, at the state and 
national levels 
Organizational incentives and disincentives to strengthen HMIS performance at the district-level 
were greatly shaped by the expectations of leadership at the division, state, and national levels. While 
this study was able to shed light on the incentives and disincentives for strengthening data quality 
based on the perspective of district-level staff and health officials, future research should unpack the 
incentives and disincentives for creating accountability for performance and data quality experienced 
by division, state and national leadership, who collectively represent three different organizations 
(Departments of Medical Health and Family Welfare, the National Health Mission and the Indian 
Administrative Services). A holistic understand of existing incentives and disincentives of leaders at 
different levels of the health system and across the three organizations that are involved in overseeing 
public health in UP, would be critical for creating alignment on the GOUP’s goal of improving the 
state’s health performance and using quality data to measure progress against that goal.  
 
(2) Conduct facility-level audits across high-priority and non-high priority districts 
Building on findings from chapter 3, which provided initial evidence on potential overreporting of 
ranked and incentivized UP-HMIS indicators relative to unranked and unincentivized indicators, 
conducting health facility audits across high priority and non-high priority districts would be an 
important next step for verifying data quality at different levels of the health system. Specifically, 




consistency between data reported in the web-based UP-HMIS portal, with data reported in the 
source documents and registers found in the sub-centers, primary health centers, and community 
health centers of a district. This exercise could help identify where inconsistencies are introduced and 
help establish a baseline of data quality within the state, which future facility-level audits could be 






Appendix 1. The flow of information in the Uttar Pradesh Health Management Information System (HMIS) in Uttar Pradesh 
 
 




Appendix 2. UP-HMIS policy expectations for data quality and data use meetings at the block- and district-levels in Uttar Pradesh, India 
 Data validation committee meetings Data use meetings 
Block-level  District-level  District-level Executive 
Committee 
District-level Governing Body 
meeting: District Health 
Society  
Purpose Ensure quality 
(completeness, validation, 
consistency, accuracy) of 
data reported by the sub-
centers, primary health 
centers and community 
health centers in the block 
 
Ensure timely uploading 
and forwarding of data to 
districts 
Ensure the completeness, 
validation, consistency, and 
accuracy of data being reported 
from all blocks 
 
Ensure availability of quality 
data for district-level data use 
meetings 
Examine data, including the district ranking to measure relative 
performance of a district in UP based on priority health 
indicators 
 
Help district administration to identify the reasons for poor 
performance (e.g., availability, quality, utilization issues) and 
take appropriate actions 
Timeline Between 1st-5th of every 
month 
Between 6-10th of every month Last week of the month Last week of the month 
Chairperson Medical officer-in-charge Assistant chief medical officer 
for reproductive and child 
health programs 
Chief medical officer  District magistrate 
Participants Block attendees:  
(1) permanent data staff: 
assistant research officer; 
(2) permanent program 
staff: health education 
information officers; (3) 
contractual data staff: 
block program manager, 
data entry operators 
District attendees: (1) 
permanent data staff: assistant 
research officers; (2) 
contractual data staff: district 
program managers, district data 
manager, data entry operators 
 
 
Block attendees: (1) permanent 
staff: medical officers-in-
charge; (2) contractual data 
staff: block program managers, 
data entry operators 
District attendees: (1) 
permanent program staff: 
assistant chief medical 
officers, district community 
process managers; (2) 
permanent data staff: 
assistant research officers; 
(3) contractual data staff: 
district program managers, 
district data managers, 
district accounts managers, 
data entry operator 
 
District attendees: (1) permanent 
program staff: assistant chief 
medical officers, district 
community process managers; 
(2) permanent data staff: 
assistant research officers; (3) 
contractual data staff: district 
program managers, district data 
managers, district accounts 
managers, data entry operator 
 
Block attendees: (1) permanent 
program staff: medical officers-




Block attendees: (1) 
permanent staff: medical 
officers-in-charge; (2) 
contractual data staff: block 
program managers, data 
entry operators 
 
staff: block program managers, 
data entry operators 
 
Partners: (1) World Health 
Organization; (2) United Nations 
partners (e.g., UNICEF and 




Appendix 3. The primary data-related roles and responsibilities of health staff/officials in the Uttar Pradesh health system 







Permanent N/A Directors & Joint Directors - 
Department of Medical 
Health & Family Welfare 
Data review & 
feedback 
▪ Review data quality 
▪ Use data to monitor performance 
Contractual N/A General Managers from the 






N/A  Administrative 
official 
District Magistrate; Chief 
Development Officer 
Data review & 
feedback to district 
▪ Chair Governing Body - District 
Health Society meetings 
▪ Use data to monitor performance 
Permanent Health officials 
 
Chief Medical Officer 
(CMO) 
Data review & 
feedback to block 
level 
▪ Chair Executive Committee Meetings 
▪ Use data to monitor performance 
Program staff Assistant Chief Medical 
Officer & Deputy CMO 
Data validation, 
review, validation, 
and feedback  
▪ Feedback to block 
▪ Programs officers to screen reports for 
accuracy & share reports with 
AROs/DDMs before data validation 
committee meeting 
Data staff Assistant Research Officer Data analysis, 
validation, and 
feedback  
▪ Review the data shared by district 
program nodal officers, prepare for the 
data validation committee meeting 
Contractual Data staff 
(NHM) 
District Program Managers 
District Data Managers 
Data (external 
agency) 
HMIS Operators Data entry and 
compilation  
▪ Following the data validation 
committee meetings, data are uploaded 





Permanent Health official Medical office-in-charge Data review, 
validation and 
feedback  
▪ Preside over the block-level data 
validation committee meeting 
Data staff Assistant Research Officer Data analysis, 
validation, and 
feedback to block 
▪ Screen the reports received from 
ANMs for accuracy  
▪ AROs review the data and conduct a 
data validation committee meeting 





















Data entry operators Data entry ▪ Validated data are uploaded by the 







r Permanent / 
contractual 





▪ ANMs/Facilities will compile the 
reports collected from ASHAs & 










 Permanent / 
contractual 










Appendix 4. Analytical framework used for the analysis 
# Domains Codes Sub-codes 
1 Policy 
environment 
National policy expectation National targets, national Schemes 
State policy expectations Blocks, districts, states 
2 Factors affecting 
policy 
implementation  
Technical factors  Reporting processes and complexity, availability of materials 
Resources Human resources distribution, human resources availability, 
trainings, technical skills 
Processes Supportive supervision 
Work culture  Authority/discretion, accountability, collaboration/coordination, 
workload  
Behavioral factors Commitment to work, attitudes towards data quality/use 
3 Characteristics 
of actors 
District permanent staff Responsibilities, incentives 
District contractual staff Responsibilities, incentives 
Senior district officials (district 
magistrates) 
Responsibilities, incentives 
Divisional staff Responsibilities, incentives 
State officials Responsibilities, incentives 




Data quality meetings Processes, platforms 
Data use Processes, platforms 
5 Effects of UP-
HMIS policy 
implementation 
Data quality Positive, negative, other 









Appendix 5. Percentage of missing data (overall) by indicator category for monthly health facility reports from high priority districts 






Ranked indicators (HPD) 0.056  0.230 (0.055, 0.056) 
Ranked indicators (non-HPD)  0.125 0.330 (0.124, 0.125) 
P-VALUE* <0.01 
  
Ranked and incentivized indicators (HPD) 0.067 0.251 (0.067, 0.068) 
Ranked and incentivized indicators (non-
HPD) 
0.149 0.356  (0.148, 0.149) 
P-VALUE* <0.01 
  
Incentivized indicators (HPD) 0.185 0.388 (0.184, 0.186) 
Incentivized indicators (non-HPD)  0.269 0.443 (0.269, 0.270) 
P-VALUE* <0.01 
  
Unranked and unincentivized indicators 
(HPD) 
 0.325 0.468 (0.325, 0.326) 
Unranked and unincentivized indicators 
(non-HPD) 
 0.399 0.489 (0.399, 0.399) 
P-VALUE* <0.01 
  




 Appendix 6. Trends in the percentage of missing data over time by indicator category for monthly health facility reports from high priority 
districts and non-high priority districts from January to December 2019  
            
 








Appendix 7. Trends in the percentage of missing data over time by indicator (n=41) reported in monthly health facility reports from high 




A. Percentage of missing data among ranked indicators in the monthly health facility-reports from high priority districts   
Jan  Feb Mar Apr May June Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov  Dec 
Number of pregnant women tested for 
hemoglobin (Hb) 4 or >4 times in ANC 
visits  
10% 8% 9% 6% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 4% 3% 2% 
Number of women receiving 1st post-
partum checkups within 48 hours of 
delivery 
11% 9% 9% 7% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 3% 2% 
Number of children who received 
pentavalent 3 dose 
10% 7% 7% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 3% 2% 
Number of children who received Bacille 
Calmette-Guérin (BCG) dose 
10% 8% 8% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 3% 2% 
 
B. Percentage of missing data among ranked indicators in the monthly health facility-reports from non-high priority districts   
Jan  Feb Mar Apr May June Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov  Dec 
Number of pregnant women tested for 
hemoglobin (Hb) 4 or >4 times in ANC 
visits  
19% 17% 16% 15% 14% 13% 11% 11% 11% 10% 8% 9% 
Number of women receiving 1st post-
partum checkups within 48 hours of 
delivery 
22% 20% 19% 18% 16% 15% 12% 12% 12% 11% 10% 10% 
Number of children who received 
pentavalent 3 dose 
16% 15% 14% 13% 12% 11% 9% 9% 9% 9% 8% 8% 
Number of children who received Bacille 
Calmette-Guérin (BCG) dose 













C. Percentage of missing data among incentivized indicators in the monthly health facility-reports from high priority districts   
Jan  Feb Mar Apr May June Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov  Dec 
Number of interval intrauterine device 
(IUCD) insertions (excluding post-partum 
IUCD/post-abortion IUCD) 
11% 9% 9% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 4% 4% 
Number of post-partum IUCD insertions 
(within 48 hours of delivery) 
13% 11% 11% 8% 8% 7% 8% 8% 7% 7% 7% 5% 
Number of post-abortion IUCD insertions 
(within 12 days) 
84% 83% 83% 81% 81% 81% 80% 80% 80% 79% 78% 77% 
Number of newborns received 6 home 
based newborn care (HBNC) visits after 
institutional delivery 
12% 10% 11% 8% 7% 7% 8% 7% 7% 5% 5% 4% 
Number of newborns received 7 HBNC 
visits home delivery 
18% 16% 17% 15% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 13% 
Number of new pregnant women identified 
as high-risk pregnancy (HRP), who are 35 
years and older 
17% 18% 17% 14% 13% 13% 13% 13% 14% 15% 13% 13% 
Number of new pregnant women identified 
as HRP (previous history with any 
complication) 
17% 18% 17% 14% 13% 13% 13% 13% 14% 16% 14% 14% 
Number of new pregnant women identified 
as HRP (any other reasons) 
17% 18% 16% 14% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 16% 14% 14% 
Number of pregnant women registered in 
1st trimester (within 12 weeks) out of the 
total ANC registrations that month 
9% 8% 8% 5% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 4% 3% 2% 
 
D. Percentage of missing data among incentivized indicators in the monthly health facility-reports from non-high priority districts   
Jan  Feb Mar Apr May June Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov  Dec 
Number of interval intrauterine device 
(IUCD) insertions (excluding post-partum 
IUCD/post-abortion IUCD) 
20% 18% 17% 17% 15% 14% 11% 11% 11% 11% 10% 9% 
Number of post-partum IUCD insertions 
(within 48 hours of delivery) 
25% 23% 21% 21% 19% 18% 16% 15% 15% 15% 14% 13% 
Number of post-abortion IUCD insertions 
(within 12 days) 




Number of newborns received 6 home 
based newborn care (HBNC) visits after 
institutional delivery 
23% 21% 20% 19% 18% 16% 14% 14% 14% 14% 12% 12% 
Number of newborns received 7 HBNC 
visits home delivery 
27% 26% 25% 25% 23% 22% 21% 21% 21% 22% 21% 20% 
Number of new pregnant women identified 
as high-risk pregnancy (HRP), who are 35 
years and older 
30% 29% 28% 27% 26% 25% 23% 23% 23% 24% 24% 23% 
Number of new pregnant women identified 
as HRP (previous history with any 
complication) 
31% 30% 29% 28% 27% 26% 24% 24% 24% 25% 24% 24% 
Number of new pregnant women identified 
as HRP (any other reasons) 
30% 29% 28% 27% 27% 25% 23% 23% 24% 24% 24% 24% 
Number of pregnant women registered in 
1st trimester (within 12 weeks) out of the 
total ANC registrations that month 
17% 15% 14% 13% 12% 11% 9% 9% 10% 9% 7% 7% 
 
Ranked and incentivized indicators 
 
E. Percentage of missing data among ranked and incentivized indicators in the monthly health facility-reports from high priority districts   
Jan  Feb Mar Apr May June Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov  Dec 
Number of injectable contraceptive, Antara 
program - first dose 
15% 13% 13% 10% 9% 9% 8% 7% 7% 6% 5% 3% 
Number of children aged between 9 and 11 
months fully immunized- male 
10% 8% 8% 5% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5% 4% 3% 2% 
Number of children aged between 9 and 11 
months fully immunized - female 
10% 8% 8% 5% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5% 4% 3% 2% 
Number of pregnant women with 4 or more 
antenatal care (ANC) check ups 
10% 8% 8% 5% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 4% 3% 2% 
Number of institutional deliveries 
conducted (including cesarean sections) 
12% 10% 10% 7% 7% 6% 7% 6% 6% 6% 7% 6% 
Number of pregnant women screened for 
HIV 
15% 13% 14% 11% 9% 8% 7% 6% 6% 6% 5% 3% 
  
F. Percentage of missing data among ranked and incentivized indicators in the monthly health facility-reports from non-high priority districts   
Jan  Feb Mar Apr May June Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov  Dec 
Number of injectable contraceptive, Antara 
program - first dose 




Number of children aged between 9 and 11 
months fully immunized- male 
20% 16% 15% 14% 12% 11% 10% 10% 10% 9% 8% 8% 
Number of children aged between 9 and 11 
months fully immunized - female 
20% 16% 15% 14% 12% 11% 10% 10% 10% 9% 8% 8% 
Number of pregnant women with 4 or more 
antenatal care (ANC) check ups 
18% 15% 14% 14% 12% 11% 9% 9% 10% 9% 8% 9% 
Number of institutional deliveries 
conducted (including cesarean sections) 
23% 22% 20% 18% 17% 14% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 
Number of pregnant women screened for 
HIV 
30% 28% 26% 25% 23% 20% 17% 16% 15% 14% 13% 12% 
 
Unranked and unincentivized indicators 
 
G. Percentage of missing data among unranked and unincentivized indicators in the monthly health facility-reports from high priority districts   
Jan  Feb Mar Apr May June Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov  Dec 
Number of women aged 15-49 years 
receiving the first dose of DMPA (Inj. 
Antara) after abortion during the reporting 
month.  
28% 28% 28% 25% 23% 22% 21% 22% 23% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of women aged 15-49 years 
receiving the first dose of DMPA (Inj. 
Antara) after delivery (post-partum) during 
the reporting month.  
28% 29% 28% 25% 24% 22% 21% 22% 23% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of women aged 15-49 years 
receiving first dose of DMPA (Inj. Antara) 
in ‘interval’ period (6 weeks after delivery/ 
any time when woman is not pregnant other 
than post-partum or post-abortion) during 
the reporting month.  
27% 28% 27% 25% 24% 22% 21% 22% 23% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of IUCD inserted on the fixed day 
services (FDS) days during the reporting 
month. 
88% 88% 87% 87% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of IUCD inserted on the fixed day 
off-service (FDOS) days during the 
reporting month 
88% 88% 87% 87% 86% 87% 86% 86% 86% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of children who received measles 
and rubella (MR) vaccine 1st dose (9-
11months) 




Number of children who received measles 
vaccine 1st dose (9-11 months) 
12% 9% 9% 8% 8% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 7% 7% 
Number of pregnant women received full 
ANC check-ups by the end of the reporting 
month. 
29% 29% 29% 27% 27% 26% 26% 26% 27% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of PW having severe anemia 
(Hb<7) treated 
83% 82% 82% 81% 81% 80% 80% 79% 79% 79% 78% 77% 
Number of pregnant women with Hb<7 gm 
received iron sucrose by the end of the 
reporting month. 
87% 87% 87% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 85% 86% 
Number of home deliveries attended by 
skill birth attendant (SBA)  
20% 18% 19% 16% 15% 15% 16% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 
Number of home deliveries attended by 
non-SBA 
17% 15% 16% 14% 13% 13% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 
Number of oral polio virus – birth dose 
(OPV 0) 
11% 9% 9% 7% 6% 6% 5% 6% 6% 5% 4% 3% 
Number of hepatitis B – birth dose 13% 11% 12% 9% 8% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 5% 4% 
Number of vitamin K1 after delivery - birth 
dose 
17% 15% 15% 12% 11% 10% 10% 10% 9% 8% 7% 6% 
Number of total number of pregnant women 
registered for ANC 
10% 7% 8% 5% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 4% 3% 2% 
Number of women receiving 1st post-
partum checkup between 48 hours and 14 
days 
11% 9% 9% 7% 6% 5% 6% 5% 5% 4% 4% 3% 
Number of HIV tests found positive during 
ANC visits  
15% 14% 14% 11% 9% 8% 8% 7% 7% 7% 5% 4% 
Number of mothers provided full course of 
180 Iron/Folic Acid (IFA) tablets after 
delivery 
11% 10% 9% 7% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 2% 
Number of pregnant women tested for 
syphilis  
15% 12% 13% 10% 9% 8% 8% 8% 8% 7% 5% 4% 
Number of pregnant women tested for 
blood sugar (oral glucose tolerance test) 
84% 83% 83% 82% 81% 81% 80% 79% 80% 80% 79% 77% 
Number of new cases of pregnant women 
with hypertension detected 
11% 9% 10% 7% 6% 5% 6% 5% 5% 4% 3% 2% 
Note: missingness increases to 100% of some of the indicators suggesting potential changing in reporting forms where the GOUP may be stopped requesting 





H. Percentage of missing data among unranked and unincentivized indicators in the monthly health facility-reports from non-high priority 
districts   
Jan  Feb Mar Apr May June Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov  Dec 
Number of women aged 15-49 years 
receiving the first dose of DMPA (Inj. 
Antara) after abortion during the reporting 
month.  
41% 41% 40% 38% 38% 36% 34% 33% 35% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of women aged 15-49 years 
receiving the first dose of DMPA (Inj. 
Antara) after delivery (post-partum) during 
the reporting month.  
41% 41% 40% 39% 39% 36% 34% 33% 35% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of women aged 15-49 years 
receiving first dose of DMPA (Inj. Antara) 
in ‘interval’ period (6 weeks after delivery/ 
any time when woman is not pregnant other 
than post-partum or post-abortion) during 
the reporting month.  
41% 41% 40% 38% 38% 36% 34% 33% 35% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of IUCD inserted on the fixed day 
services (FDS) days during the reporting 
month. 
90% 90% 90% 89% 89% 89% 88% 88% 89% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of IUCD inserted on the fixed day 
off-service (FDOS) days during the 
reporting month 
91% 91% 90% 90% 90% 90% 89% 89% 90% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of children who received measles 
and rubella (MR) vaccine 1st dose (9-
11months) 
24% 20% 17% 16% 14% 12% 10% 10% 11% 10% 9% 9% 
Number of children who received measles 
vaccine 1st dose (9-11 months) 
24% 22% 21% 20% 19% 19% 17% 17% 18% 18% 17% 16% 
Number of pregnant women received full 
ANC check-ups by the end of the reporting 
month. 
36% 35% 35% 34% 34% 33% 32% 32% 34% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of PW having severe anemia 
(Hb<7) treated 
87% 87% 85% 85% 84% 84% 82% 82% 82% 82% 81% 81% 
Number of pregnant women with Hb<7 gm 
received iron sucrose by the end of the 
reporting month. 
90% 89% 89% 89% 89% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 87% 87% 
Number of home deliveries attended by 
skill birth attendant (SBA)  




Number of home deliveries attended by 
non-SBA 
26% 24% 24% 24% 22% 21% 20% 20% 20% 21% 20% 20% 
Number of oral polio virus – birth dose 
(OPV 0) 
19% 17% 16% 15% 14% 12% 11% 11% 11% 11% 9% 9% 
Number of hepatitis B – birth dose 25% 24% 22% 21% 20% 18% 16% 16% 15% 16% 15% 14% 
Number of vitamin K1 after delivery - birth 
dose 
28% 28% 26% 25% 23% 22% 19% 18% 18% 17% 16% 15% 
Number of total number of pregnant women 
registered for ANC 
16% 14% 13% 13% 12% 10% 9% 9% 10% 9% 8% 7% 
Number of women receiving 1st post-
partum checkup between 48 hours and 14 
days 
22% 20% 19% 18% 16% 14% 13% 13% 12% 12% 10% 10% 
Number of HIV tests found positive during 
ANC visits  
31% 30% 28% 27% 26% 23% 20% 19% 18% 16% 15% 14% 
Number of mothers provided full course of 
180 Iron/Folic Acid (IFA) tablets after 
delivery 
23% 21% 20% 19% 17% 16% 13% 13% 13% 12% 11% 11% 
Number of pregnant women tested for 
syphilis  
27% 25% 24% 23% 21% 19% 16% 15% 15% 14% 13% 12% 
Number of pregnant women tested for 
blood sugar (oral glucose tolerance test) 
87% 87% 86% 85% 85% 84% 83% 83% 82% 82% 81% 81% 
Number of new cases of pregnant women 
with hypertension detected 




Appendix 8. Percentage of moderate outliers identified by indicator category for monthly health facility reports from high priority districts 
(HPDs) and non-high priority districts (non-HPDs) from January to December 2019 




Ranked indicators (HPD) 0.030  0.170 (0.029, 0.030) 
Ranked indicators (non-HPD) 0.029  0.167 (0.028, 0.029) 
P-VALUE* <0.01  
  
Ranked and incentivized indicators 
(HPD) 
0.021 0.145 (0.021, 0.022) 
Ranked and incentivized indicators 
(non-HPD) 
0.022 0.148 (0.022, 0.022) 
P-VALUE* <0.01 
  
Incentivized indicators (HPD) 0.019 0.139 (0.019, 0.020) 
Incentivized indicators (non-HPD) 0.016 0.126 (0.016, 0.016) 
P-VALUE* <0.01 
  
Unranked and unincentivized indicators 
(HPD) 
0.015  0.121 (0.014, 0.015) 
Unranked and unincentivized indicators 
(non-HPD) 
0.014 0.118 (0.014, 0.014) 
P-VALUE* <0.01 
  




Appendix 9. Percentage of extreme outliers identified by indicator category for monthly health facility reports from high priority districts 
(HPDs) and non-high priority districts (non-HPDs) from January to December 2019  




Ranked indicators (HPD) 0.0019  0.043 (0.0017, 0.0020) 
Ranked indicators (non-HPD) 0.0024 0.049 (0.0023, 0.0025) 
P-VALUE* <0.01   
Ranked and incentivized indicators 
(HPD) 
0.0027 0.052 (0.0026, 0.0028) 
Ranked and incentivized indicators 
(non-HPD) 
0.0025 0.050 (0.0024, 0.0026) 
P-VALUE*  <0.01   
Incentivized indicators (HPD) 0.0061 0.077 (0.0059, 0.0062) 
Incentivized indicators (non-HPD) 0.0047 0.068 (0.0046, 0.0048) 
P-VALUE* <0.01   
Unranked and unincentivized indicators 
(HPD) 
0.0031 0.056 (0.0030, 0.0032) 
Unranked and unincentivized indicators 
(non-HPD) 
0.0030  0.054 (0.0029, 0.0030) 










Appendix 10. Trends in the percentage of moderate and extreme outliers over time by indicator (n=41) reported in monthly health 
facility reports from high priority districts and non-high priority districts from January to December 2019 
 
A. Moderate outliers observed in monthly health facility reports from high priority districts and non-high priority districts from January to 
December 2019 























































































Number of pregnant women tested 
for hemoglobin (Hb) 4 or >4 times 
in ANC visits  
2,919 6,239 2,317 5,077 602 1,162 3.032% 3.005% 3.044% 
Number of women receiving 1st 
post-partum checkups within 48 
hours of delivery 
2,650 4,298 2,309 3,959 341 339 2.342% 2.741% 2.149% 
Number of children who received 
pentavalent 3 dose 
3,052 6,657 2,253 4,977 799 1,680 3.169% 3.133% 3.185% 
Number of children who received 
Bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG) 
dose 











Number of interval intrauterine 
device (IUCD) insertions 
(excluding post-partum 
IUCD/post-abortion IUCD) 
2,048 4,768 1,922 4,320 126 448 2.278% 2.128% 2.349% 
Number of post-partum IUCD 
insertions (within 48 hours of 
delivery) 
337 568 317 541 20 27 0.315% 0.358% 0.294% 
Number of post-abortion IUCD 
insertions (within 12 days) 
30 77 30 77 0 0 0.186% 0.150% 0.205% 
Number of newborns received 6 
home based newborn care (HBNC) 
visits after institutional delivery 




Number of newborns received 7 
HBNC visits home delivery 
2,378 3,284 2,126 3,090 252 194 2.102% 2.712% 1.807% 
Number of new pregnant women 
identified as high-risk pregnancy 
(HRP), who are 35 years and older 
2,000 2,442 1,936 2,358 64 84 1.687% 2.276% 1.392% 
Number of new pregnant women 
identified as HRP (previous history 
with any complication) 
1,283 1,436 1,237 1,391 46 45 1.043% 1.464% 0.829% 
Number of new pregnant women 
identified as HRP (any other 
reasons) 
1,759 2,296 1,714 2,239 45 57 1.546% 2.005% 1.315% 
Number of pregnant women 
registered in 1st trimester (within 
12 weeks) out of the total ANC 
registrations that month 





















Number of injectable 
contraceptive, Antara program - 
first dose 
365 772 359 759 6 13 0.400% 0.389% 0.405% 
Number of children aged between 
9 and 11 months fully immunized- 
male 
3,012 6,997 2,382 5,566 630 1,431 3.289% 3.096% 3.379% 
Number of children aged between 
9 and 11 months fully immunized - 
female 
3,018 6,884 2,487 5,808 531 1,076 3.256% 3.105% 3.326% 
Number of pregnant women with 4 
or more antenatal care (ANC) 
check ups 
2,957 6,715 2,367 5,322 590 1,393 3.166% 3.034% 3.228% 
Number of institutional deliveries 
conducted (including cesarean 
sections) 
953 2,001 709 1,526 244 475 1.005% 1.001% 1.006% 
Number of pregnant women 
screened for HIV 


























Number of women aged 15-49 
years receiving the first dose of 
DMPA (Inj. Antara) after abortion 
during the reporting month.  
133 162 133 159 0 3 0.175% 0.229% 0.147% 
Number of women aged 15-49 
years receiving the first dose of 
DMPA (Inj. Antara) after delivery 




(post-partum) during the reporting 
month.  
Number of women aged 15-49 
years receiving first dose of 
DMPA (Inj. Antara) in ‘interval’ 
period (6 weeks after delivery/ any 
time when woman is not pregnant 
other than post-partum or post-
abortion) during the reporting 
month.  
223 436 213 425 10 11 0.391% 0.383% 0.395% 
Number of IUCD inserted on the 
fixed day services (FDS) days 
during the reporting month. 
147 284 143 275 4 9 1.458% 1.438% 1.468% 
Number of IUCD inserted on the 
fixed day off-service (FDOS) days 
during the reporting month 
70 129 69 127 1 2 0.712% 0.693% 0.723% 
Number of children who received 
measles and rubella (MR) vaccine 
1st dose (9-11months) 
2,955 6,518 2,223 5,209 732 1,309 3.173% 3.114% 3.201% 
Number of children who received 
measles vaccine 1st dose (9-11 
months) 
1,011 2,213 1,007 2,107 4 106 1.132% 1.072% 1.162% 
Number of pregnant women 
received full ANC check-ups by 
the end of the reporting month. 
1,829 3,678 1,565 3,205 264 473 3.194% 3.270% 3.157% 
Number of PW having severe 
anemia (Hb<7) treated 
238 359 230 347 8 12 1.009% 1.171% 0.924% 
Number of pregnant women with 
Hb<7 gm received iron sucrose by 
the end of the reporting month. 
236 321 234 311 2 10 1.335% 1.652% 1.170% 
Number of home deliveries 
attended by skill birth attendant 
(SBA)  
438 1,371 435 1,313 3 58 0.681% 0.508% 0.000% 
Number of home deliveries 
attended by non-SBA 
2,531 3,413 2,208 3,222 323 191 2.183% 2.868% 1.855% 
Number of oral polio virus – birth 
dose (OPV 0) 
2,486 5,598 2,245 5,044 241 554 2.685% 2.581% 2.734% 




Number of vitamin K1 after 
delivery - birth dose 
407 639 314 540 93 99 0.377% 0.443% 0.345% 
Number of total number of 
pregnant women registered for 
ANC 
3,140 6,805 2,296 5,182 844 1,623 3.240% 3.218% 3.250% 
Number of women receiving 1st 
post-partum checkup between 48 
hours and 14 days 
2,473 4,216 2,257 3,899 216 317 2.256% 2.563% 2.108% 
Number of HIV tests found 
positive during ANC visits  
67 80 67 80 0 0 0.053% 0.072% 0.044% 
Number of mothers provided full 
course of 180 Iron/Folic Acid 
(IFA) tablets after delivery 
2,281 3,670 2,076 3,363 205 307 2.021% 2.367% 1.852% 
Number of pregnant women tested 
for syphilis  
700 1,640 665 1,514 35 126 0.823% 0.747% 0.860% 
Number of pregnant women tested 
for blood sugar (oral glucose 
tolerance test) 
131 196 114 181 17 15 0.563% 0.659% 0.514% 
Number of new cases of pregnant 
women with hypertension detected 
795 1,119 780 1,079 15 40 0.654% 0.824% 0.570% 
 
B. Extreme outliers observed in monthly health facility reports from high priority districts and non-high priority districts from January to 
December 2019 














































































 Number of pregnant women tested 
for hemoglobin (Hb) 4 or >4 times 
in ANC visits  
125 285 177 285 0 0 0.162% 0.189% 0.150% 
Number of women receiving 1st 
post-partum checkups within 48 
hours of delivery 




Number of children who received 
pentavalent 3 dose 
111 0 0 0 0 0 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
Number of children who received 
Bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG) 
dose 











Number of interval intrauterine 
device (IUCD) insertions (excluding 
post-partum IUCD/post-abortion 
IUCD) 
753 1,405 752 1,382 1 23 0.721% 0.783% 0.692% 
Number of post-partum IUCD 
insertions (within 48 hours of 
delivery) 
300 369 300 369 0 0 0.233% 0.319% 0.191% 
Number of post-abortion IUCD 
insertions (within 12 days) 
60 63 60 63 0 0 0.213% 0.299% 0.168% 
Number of newborns received 6 
home based newborn care (HBNC) 
visits after institutional delivery 
702 0 0 0 0 0 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
Number of newborns received 7 
HBNC visits home delivery 
503 0 0 0 0 0 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
Number of new pregnant women 
identified as high-risk pregnancy 
(HRP), who are 35 years and older 
602 424 89 417 1 7 0.169% 0.093% 0.205% 
Number of new pregnant women 
identified as HRP (previous history 
with any complication) 
593 469 97 466 1 3 0.186% 0.101% 0.227% 
Number of new pregnant women 
identified as HRP (any other 
reasons) 
985 488 92 486 1 2 0.195% 0.098% 0.240% 
Number of pregnant women 
registered in 1st trimester (within 12 
weeks) out of the total ANC 


























 Number of injectable contraceptive, 
ntara program - first dose 




Number of children aged between 9 
and 11 months fully immunized- 
male 
90 380 123 372 3 8 0.166% 0.129% 0.183% 
Number of children aged between 9 
and 11 months fully immunized - 
female 
98 0 0 0 0 0 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
Number of pregnant women with 4 
or more antenatal care (ANC) check 
ups 
126 111 45 111 0 0 0.264% 0.221% 0.286% 
Number of institutional deliveries 
conducted (including cesarean 
sections) 
208 114 59 114 0 0 0.415% 0.413% 0.416% 
Number of pregnant women 
screened for HIV 
























Number of women aged 15-49 years 
receiving the first dose of DMPA 
(Inj. Antara) after abortion during 
the reporting month.  
0 971 500 969 3 2 0.547% 0.574% 0.534% 
Number of women aged 15-49 years 
receiving the first dose of DMPA 
(Inj. Antara) after delivery (post-
partum) during the reporting month.  
0 869 601 862 1 7 0.559% 0.685% 0.495% 
Number of women aged 15-49 years 
receiving first dose of DMPA (Inj. 
Antara) in ‘interval’ period (6 weeks 
after delivery/ any time when 
woman is not pregnant other than 
post-partum or post-abortion) during 
the reporting month.  
1 752 592 750 1 2 0.516% 0.677% 0.434% 
Number of IUCD inserted on the 
fixed day services (FDS) days 
during the reporting month. 
0 1,263 982 1,261 3 2 0.857% 1.123% 0.723% 
Number of IUCD inserted on the 
fixed day off-service (FDOS) days 
during the reporting month 
0 545 334 544 1 1 0.332% 0.389% 0.304% 
Number of children who received 
measles and rubella (MR) vaccine 
1st dose (9-11months) 




Number of children who received 
measles vaccine 1st dose (9-11 
months) 
723 450 208 450 0 0 0.224% 0.219% 0.226% 
Number of pregnant women 
received full ANC check-ups by the 
end of the reporting month. 
0 1,045 573 1,044 1 1 0.538% 0.596% 0.510% 
Number of PW having severe 
anemia (Hb<7) treated 
45 783 407 783 0 0 0.416% 0.431% 0.408% 
Number of pregnant women with 
Hb<7 gm received iron sucrose by 
the end of the reporting month. 
59 305 282 305 0 0 0.212% 0.307% 0.165% 
Number of home deliveries attended 
by skill birth attendant (SBA)  
335 272 105 261 3 11 0.124% 0.111% 0.130% 
Number of home deliveries attended 
by non-SBA 
251 357 105 349 1 8 0.151% 0.109% 0.171% 
Number of oral polio virus – birth 
dose (OPV 0) 
574 970 358 969 1 1 0.448% 0.371% 0.485% 
Number of hepatitis B – birth dose 407 1,086 501 1,084 7 2 0.538% 0.527% 0.543% 
Number of vitamin K1 after delivery 
- birth dose 
282 369 108 358 3 11 0.157% 0.114% 0.177% 
Number of total number of pregnant 
women registered for ANC 
108 306 147 297 6 9 0.150% 0.158% 0.147% 
Number of women receiving 1st 
post-partum checkup between 48 
hours and 14 days 
508 1,058 881 1,050 1 8 0.687% 0.936% 0.562% 
Number of HIV tests found positive 
during ANC visits  
117 91 117 91 0 0 0.075% 0.125% 0.050% 
Number of mothers provided full 
course of 180 Iron/Folic Acid (IFA) 
tablets after delivery 
497 1,035 497 1,034 0 1 0.520% 0.516% 0.522% 
Number of pregnant women tested 
for syphilis  
337 734 337 734 0 0 0.377% 0.360% 0.385% 
Number of pregnant women tested 
for blood sugar (oral glucose 
tolerance test) 
60 88 60 88 0 0 0.255% 0.302% 0.231% 
Number of new cases of pregnant 
women with hypertension detected 











1. Perceptions of being empowered in the workplace 
a. autonomy 
b. self-efficacy 
c. ability to make a difference 
d. meaning or commitment to one’s work 
2. Morality/ethics 






2. Accountability for performance  
a. Measurement of goals 
b. Monitoring mechanisms 
c. Sanctions/Consequences 
3. Accountability for data quality 
a. Measurement of goals 






b. Fear-based (job security, withholding pay, scolding) 
2. Workload (including time pressure) 
Other factors [Open-ended] 
Types of data 
manipulation 











Appendix 12. In-depth interview guide  
Note: This in-depth interview guide was largely used for the district-level interviews. The guide reflects 
the range of questions asked during the interviews, however not all questions were asked of each 
respondent. A subset of these questions was used for interviews with division- and state-level 
respondents. These interview guides were also translated into Hindi. 
 
I. Background characteristics 
Interviewer: Document the following information in a separate document 
a) Respondent current position/designation 
b) District affiliation (HPD vs non-HPD) 
c) Length of service in the district 
d) Length of service in the GOUP 
e) Educational background 
f) Any experience working outside the gov’t sector 
 
II. Interview guide 
Thank you for taking the time to speak with me. Before we begin our conversation, I would like us to read 
through the informed consent to review the aims of the study and then I would like to seek your consent 
to participate in this study. I would learn more about the quality of routine data sources, and how these 
data are used to make decisions about health programs in UP. Learning from your perspective would give 
me an opportunity to learn more about the current context around data use/quality, and how we may be 
able to bring improvements to these existing processes. 
 
Roles & responsibilities  
Let’s begin our conversation by first discussing the general roles and responsibilities of officials who are 
involved in data-related activities  
 
1) At the district-level, who is responsible for reviewing the data, analyzing the data, and making 
decisions based on the program data? 
a. What are the expected roles and responsibilities of the following individuals with respect 
to data? 
i. Permanent staff: CMO, ACMO/DIO, ARO, DEO 
ii. Contractual staff: DPM, DDM, HMIS operator, DEO 
iii. Supervisors: District Magistrate 
iv. Other staff (perhaps located in the DM’s office): any statistical officer? 
b. What roles and responsibilities do they actually carry out?  
i. How does this affect the quality of routine data available at the district level?  
ii. Are those who are responsible for carrying out these activities, able to do so in 
practice? Why or why not? 
iii. If they are not able to carry out those responsibilities, then who does?  
c. How does this affect how data are used for making decisions at the district-level? 
d. How do they view the data? How do you know that?  
 
 
2) Now, let’s talk about the officials at the block-level – who is responsible for reviewing the data, 
analyzing the data, and making decisions based on the program data? 
a. What are the expected roles and responsibilities of the following individuals with respect 
to data? 
i. Permanent staff: MOIC, HMIS operator 




iii. Other staff? 
b. What roles and responsibilities do they actually carry out?  
c. How does this set up affect the quality of routine data available at the block level?  
i. Are those who are responsible for carrying out these activities, able to do so in 
practice? Why or why not? 
ii. If they are not able to carry out those responsibilities, then who makes those 
decisions, and why?  
d. How does this affect how data are used for making decisions at the block-level? 
e. How do they view the data? How do you know that?  
 
Interactions of the district with the block-level and state-level  
Now, I would like to learn more about your interactions with block, district and state level officials.  
 
3) How and when do you interact with block officials on data-related issues (e.g., discuss the quality 
of HMIS/UP-HMIS, MCTS/RCH and so on)? 
a. Who do you speak with from the block-level, and when?  
i. PROBE: program review meetings, data validation meetings, other meetings? 
b. How frequently do you meet with them? 
c. When these meetings occur, how are these meetings run?  
i. What is discussed during these meetings?  
1. Are data reviewed during these meetings?  
a. If so, what types? What types of data tend to be reviewed mostly 
frequently? And, why? 
ii. Who attends these meetings from the block level? 
iii. What type of feedback do you provide blocks? Do block-level staff also provide 
any feedback during these meetings?  
d. What types of decisions are made during these meetings? Who monitors these decisions, 
and follows up on them? 
 
4) How and when do you interact with state officials on data-related issues?  
a. Who do you interact with at the state-level? 
i. PROBE: Program Managers (NHM), Directors/Joint Directors (Directorates of 
Medical Health and Family Welfare), MD-NHM, Principal Secretary 
b. How frequently do you meet them?  
c. How do they view the data? How do you know that? 
d. When meetings occur, how are they run?  
i. What is discussed during these meetings?  
1. Are data reviewed during these meetings?  
a. If so, what types? What types of data tend to be reviewed mostly 
frequently? And, why? 
ii. Who attends these meetings from the state level, district level, block level? 
iii. What type of feedback does the state provide districts? Do district-level (or block-
level) staff also provide any feedback during these meetings?  
e. What types of decisions are made during these meetings? Who monitors these decisions, 
and follows up on them? 
 
5) How and when do you interact with the district magistrate on data-related issues?  
a. When do you meet the district magistrate, and how frequently? 
i. PROBE: District Health Society meetings, during campaigns, other program-
related meetings? 




i. What is discussed during these meetings?  
1. Are data reviewed during these meetings?  
a. If so, what types? What types of data tend to be reviewed most 
frequently? And, why? 
ii. Who attends these meetings? 
1. PROBE: block level? district level? other partners? 
iii. What type of feedback do you receive from the District Magistrate or other 
officials during these meetings? Do you also provide any feedback during these 
meetings?  
c. What types of decisions are made during the meeting? Who monitors these decisions, and 
follows up on them? 
 
Reflection on how meetings are run & the types of feedback received  
6) Overall, what types of feedback do you receive about your work from different supervisors (e.g., 
District Magistrate, NHM officials, Directorate officials? 
a. How do they provide this feedback, and when? 
b. How fair is the feedback you receive? 
c. How does their feedback affect how you do your work – e.g., how you modify/implement 
data quality processes, or use data when making decisions? 
 
7) Now, specifically reflecting on meetings, tell me about: 
a. What you think has worked well or not? 
b. Are there specific issues that come up again and again during these meetings? 
c. Are there problems that should be raised but are not? 
d. Are there individuals or participants that should participate but do not? 
e. How would you change how these meetings are conducted? 
 
General perceptions around prioritizing data and data quality 
Now, I would like to learn more about your perceptions about data quality, and the use of data when 
making decisions about health programs and so on.  
 
8) In the health department, do you feel that superiors and staff feel that data quality is an important 
activity? Why or why not? 
a. What types of issues pertaining to data quality do they bring up?  
b. When do they bring them up? 
i. PROBE: during meetings? when reviewing reports, etc.?  
c. How do their perceptions on this issue of data quality influence how the district or block 
views data quality efforts? 
i. Can you provide examples? 
 
9) In the health department, do superiors encourage staff to make decisions based on data? Why or 
why not? 
a. Can you give examples of when this happens, for example, what types of decisions are 
made, what types of data sources are used? 
 
Existing practices around data quality and how this affects decision-making  
Now, let’s talk about issues of data quality. Data quality is affected for various reasons. For example, 
sometimes this is because there is lack of sufficient understanding around the data; in other situations, 





10) When you review block level data at the district, for example, during a program review meeting or 
data validation meeting – are there situations when you observe that data are not reported 
accurately?  
a. How do you know that data have been misreported? 
a. What types of data tend to be misreported?  
b. Do you have a sense about why these data are being misreported? 
c. How frequently does this happen?  
d. How is reporting of unusual data/indicators identified? 
i. Probes: during meetings when data are shared; in advance of meetings; in-built 
validation checks in UP-HMIS? 
e. What are the reasons that prompt/encourage/pressure people to change the data? 
f. What causes people to change the data more than others?  
g. What happens when someone misreports?  
i. What are the consequences for misreporting data? Is any action taken, and if so, 
by whom? 
ii. How well are these consequences working to address problems with 
misreporting? 
iii. What else could be done to address misreporting? 
 
Reflecting on your own role pertaining to data-related processes  
Now, I would like to learn more about your own experiences  
 
11) What are the processes in place for data quality (e.g., data validation meetings are held to ensure 
data are properly reviewed and validated)?  
a. How well are these processes being implemented?  
 
12) What are the factors that are driving how well these processes are running or not running? 
a. What are the expectations in terms of how data should be used for programmatic decision-
making? How do you think data are actually being used? 
 
 
13) How important do you feel data-related activities are with respect to other things? What are the 




14) Are you able to make decisions to ensure appropriate processes are in place for there to be good 
quality data (e.g., data validation meetings are held to ensure data are properly reviewed and 
validated) and so on? Why or why not?   
a. If you are not able to make decisions, then who generally does? 
 
15) Do you feel district-level staff are able to perform data-related activities that are expected of them 
(e.g., data compilation, data review, data analysis)? Why or why not?  
a. Tell me, how you would reflect on your performance in this regard? 
 
16) Do you feel that district-level staff are committed to performing data-related activities? For 
example, do they see value in collecting data, engaging in data validation activities, and making 
decision based on data? Why or why not? 
 
17) How do you think your work is making a difference in improving health programs and health 




 Fixing the status quo 
 
18) Given all that we have discussed, what can be done to improve the overall data quality at the 
district level?  
a. Based on your experiences, which initiatives have shown improvement? Why or why not?  
b. What would you recommend? 
 
Data use for decision-making 
 
19) How likely are you to use the data to make decisions about health programs implemented in your 
district? Why or why not?  
a. Would you use data for certain types of decisions or programs, but not others? Can you 
give me an example? 
b. If you use data to inform a program decision, what types of data sources do you use most 
frequently? Why? 
c. Are there decisions for which you would like to have data, but for which data aren’t 





Appendix 13.  Meeting observations  
 
Objective: Examine if, how and when data are being referred to or are being used during 
discussions/decision-making processes during meetings at the district-level  
General questions 
Type of meeting  Monthly MOIC review meeting 
 Validation committee meeting  
 Other, please specify _____________ 
District Name   
 
Meeting Location  
 
Name of meeting room  
 











Observation Category  Prompts Notes 








Gender distribution   





Note how the listed 
objects are used or 




























Strategy documents    
Other, please note here:    





▪ Who is sitting at the head of the table?  
 
 
▪ Draw a quick sketch of the meeting 










content of the meeting 
▪ Who starts and closes the meetings?  
▪ Who runs the meetings (e.g., who 





▪ What is the agenda of the meeting? 







▪ What topics are discussed during the 








▪ What types of issues are discussed 







▪ How are decisions discussed? For 
example, is input requested from most 





▪ What types of discussions (or 
decisions) dominant the meeting? For 
which topics is the largest amount of 
time devoted to during meetings? Do 
discussions about decisions appear to 











▪ Who has opportunity to speak and 








▪ Are these opportunities to speak 
openly and voice concerns granted? 









▪ How is positive or negative feedback 
taken by the group? And does this 








▪ What are the arguments are raised to 







Organizational Style ▪ How do participants address one 
another during the meeting? 
 
 
▪ Any practices or behaviors reflected 
by those who may have more status or 









▪ Are any labels or language use to 
dismissive (or indicate receptiveness 





Discussion of data 
during the meeting 
▪ What types of data/information are 
discussed or referred to during the 
meeting and in what context? 
o List data sources 
o List how they are used 
 
 
▪ Are data or evidence used during a 
decision-making process or 






▪ Are there issues for which data were 
needed but were missing? What were 
they?  
▪ How were decisions made in the 




▪ What types of data are most 










▪ What types of information or 
questions do the district cadre ask of 
the block-level cadre? Who (indicate 
position) tends to make these asks 
during these meetings? 
 
 
▪ How do block level cadre respond to 
requests for information or data from 
the district level? 
 
▪ What types of information or 
questions do the block-level cadre ask 
of the district-level cadre?  
 
 
▪ How do district level cadre respond to 
requests for information or data from 
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